JOSEPH PRIESTLEY ON LANGUAGE, ORATORY, AND CRITICISM

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

January, 1957

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
3 1262 08552 2372

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to those who have made this study possible, and to whom is due much of the credit for whatever merit it may possess. First, he would like to acknowledge the assistance given by his committee chairman, Dr. Douglas Ehninger, whose previous investigations in eighteenth-century English rhetoric provided much of the necessary groundwork for this study, and who has given his guidance to the work from its inception. His assistance even when on leave from the University and his handling of many of the final details while the writer was away from Gainesville are indicative of his unselfish contributions to this endeavor.

Particular mention should also be made of Dr. Dallas C. Dickey, who was, at first, chairman of the writer's committee, and who gave direction to his over-all program until the qualifying examination, and who also has given valuable assistance on this dissertation. Others serving on the writer's committee and who have influenced this study both by their teaching in the classroom and by their direct help on the undertaking are: Professor H. P. Constans and

Dr. Roy E. Tew, both of the Department of Speech; and Dr. Delton Scudder and Dr. Charles S. McCoy, both of the Department of Religion. Two other members of the faculty of the University of Florida have been of special service: Dr. James E. Congleton, Department of English, and Dr. Richard J. Anderson, Department of Psychology.

The writer would also like to express his appreciation to the College of Arts and Sciences and the Graduate School of the University of Florida, who have generously extended to him a fellowship which enabled him to devote full time to his studies during the entire period of his doctoral work.

The facilities of a number of libraries and the assistance of many librarians have been used during the course of this study, and the writer wishes to acknowledge his obligation to them. Mrs. Betty Taylor, Mrs. Sue Jones, Miss Martha Covey, and Mrs. Mary Wolfe, all of the University of Florida Inter-Library Loan Division,have been of particular help. The writer was also extended generous aid by the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; Dickinson College Library, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; the Priestley-Forsyth Memorial Library, Northumberland, Pennsylvania; the University of Pennsylvania Library, the American Philosophical Society Library, and the Library Company, all of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the University of Tulsa Library, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and the Central Christian College Library,

Bartlesville, Oklahoma. In addition to these libraries which have been visited in person, many books have been made available to the writer through inter-library loan, particulary from the Library of Congress, the University of Michigan, Yale University, and the Peabody Institute.

The writer is also grateful to those whose investigations into rhetoric and into the life of Joseph Priestley have been at his disposal for this investigation. (See Bibliography.)

Finally, the writer desires to express appreciation to his wife, Jo Anne, who has not only been patient and understanding during the course of this study, but who has been of real value as a travel companion, research assistant, and typist.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii

PREFACE vii

Chapter

I. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY . . 1

Priestley's Connection With His Age; Biographical Sketch of Priestley.

II. PRIESTLEY'S *RUDIMENTS* AND *UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR* . . 45

Introduction; *The Rudiments of English Grammar*; *A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar*; The Significance and Influence of Priestley's Grammars.

III. PRIESTLEY'S *LECTURES ON ORATORY AND CRITICISM* . . 84

Introduction; General View of the *Lectures on Oratory and Criticism*; Priestley's Introduction to Oratory; Priestley's Doctrine of Recollection; Priestley's Doctrine of Method; Priestley's Doctrine of Style; Priestley's Doctrine of Elocution; Summary.

IV. DOMINANT TRENDS IN LATER EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH RHETORIC 138

The Classical Trend; The Belletristic Trend; The Elocutionary Trend; The Psychological-Epistemological Trend; Summary.

Chapter Page

V. PRIESTLEY AND CLASSICISM 170

Introduction; The Classical Features of Priestley's Rhetorical System; The Sources of Priestley's Classicism; Conclusion.

VI. PRIESTLEY AND THE RHETORIC OF BELLES LETTRES . . 202

Introduction; Priestley and Belles Lettres; Conclusion.

VII. PRIESTLEY AND ELOCUTION 236

Introduction; Priestley and the Characteristic Doctrines of Elocution; Priestley's Elocutionary Sources; Conclusion.

VIII. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RHETORIC . . 265

Introduction; Recollection and Association; Method and Association; Style and Association; Elocution and Association; Summary.

XI. CONCLUSION 304

Appendix

I. FIGURES ILLUSTRATING PRIESTLEY'S RHETORICAL SYSTEM 316

II. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY AND LORD BACON 322

BIBLIOGRAPHY 332

PREFACE

Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), although best known today for his contributions to science, actually spent more time in the pulpit and the classroom than he did in the laboratory. Among his educational endeavors was a six-year period (1761-1767) as "Tutor of Languages and Belles Lettres" at Warrington Academy, one of the foremost Dissenting schools of the period. In preparing for the lectures he delivered in this capacity, Priestley both enlarged his study of English grammar, begun earlier in his own grammar school, and entered upon an investigation of rhetorical theory. As a result of these inquiries, he wrote three works on language, oratory, and criticism: The Rudiments of English Grammar (1761), with an enlarged edition following in 1768; A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar (1762); and the work upon which this study is particularly focused, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (1777).

Modern scholars, in discussing eighteenth-century English rhetoric, have considered Priestley's work significant enough to warrant their attention. W. P.

Sandford, who surveyed English theories of public address from 1530 to 1828, devotes several pages to a summary of Priestley's Lectures on Oratory and Criticism;[1] and Harold Harding, whose study concentrated on English rhetorical theory between 1750 and 1800, lists Priestley's work as one of the six most important of that period.[2] The most extensive consideration given to Priestley's rhetorical theory, however, is found in Douglas Ehninger's doctoral study on theories of invention in English rhetoric from 1759 to 1828. In Chapter V of this thesis, Ehninger treats Priestley's inventional theory in detail; but, while his study is thorough, the author does not attempt to cover more than this one phase of Priestley's rhetorical system.[3]

Priestley's name also makes frequent incidental appearances in the literature of rhetorical theory. Karl Wallace, for example, in his study of Francis Bacon on communication, notes the similarities between Priestley and

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[1]William Phillips Sandford, English Theories of Public Address, 1530-1828 (Columbus, Ohio, 1938), pp. 115-117.

[2]Harold F. Harding, "English Rhetorical Theory, 1750-1800" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1937), p. 166.

[3]Douglas Ehninger, "Selected Theories of Inventio in English Rhetoric, 1759-1828" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1949), pp. 221-266.

Bacon on certain theoretical points;[4] Thonssen and Baird give brief mention to Priestley's views on emotion;[5] and Thonssen and Fatherson, in their Bibliography of Speech Education, give recognition to Priestley's Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, but list only the 1781 edition, overlooking entirely the original edition of 1777.[6] Also of importance is the fact that both Clarence Edney[7] and Warren Guthrie[8] give Priestley a place in their discussions of the development of rhetorical theory in America.

From the foregoing facts, it is evident that Priestley's work in the field of rhetoric has generally been considered significant and deserving of attention; but it likewise is evident that no comprehensive study of his writings on language, rhetoric, and criticism has yet been made. In addition to this comparative lack of

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[4]Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric (Chapel Hill, 1943), pp. 223-224.

[5]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York, 1948), p. 357.

[6]Lester Thonssen and Elizabeth Fatherson, Bibliography of Speech Education (New York, 1939), p. 29.

[7]Clarence W. Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in Nineteenth Century America," A History of Speech Education in America, ed. Karl R. Wallace (New York, 1954), p. 85.

[8]Warren Guthrie, "Development of Rhetorical Theory in America," Speech Monographs, XIV (1947), 44.

attention, there are also other reasons which make an investigation of Priestley's rhetoric desirable. The period in which Priestley wrote and lectured was the very period in which such theorists as George Campbell, Thomas Sheridan, and Hugh Blair were beginning to lay the foundations of modern rhetorical theory. Moreover, Priestley's eminence in the fields of science, religion, politics, and education makes his comments on rhetoric of potential importance and interest, and therefore deserving of more thorough investigation.

The purpose of this study, then, is two-fold: to analyze Priestley's works on language, oratory, and criticism, in order that their contents may be explained and set forth systematically, with the various relationships among ideas made clear; and to examine his views in an effort to determine both the sources from which they were derived, and their connection with the dominant trends in late eighteenth-century English rhetorical thought.

CHAPTER I

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

I. Priestley's Connection with His Age.

> And, if we choose one man as a type of the intellectual energy of the century, we could hardly find a better than Joseph Priestley, though his was not the greatest mind of the century. His versatility, eagerness, activity, and humanity; the immense range of his curiosity, in all things physical, moral, or social; his place in science, in theology, in philosophy, and in politics; his peculiar relation to the Revolution, and the pathetic story of his unmerited sufferings, may make him the hero of the eighteenth century.[1]

This statement by Frederic Harrison well summarizes Joseph Priestley's connection with his age, for, truly, he was a man of the eighteenth century. He not only showed the spirit of liberalism and revolt, so typical of the period, but he played an important role in shaping its science, theology, philosophy, politics, and education.

A glance at Priestley's associations with the leaders in each of these areas gives an indication both of his varied activities and of his stature among his

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[1]Frederic Harrison, "A Few Words About the Eighteenth Century," The Choice of Books and Other Literary Pieces (London, 1886), pp. 369-370.

contemporaries. He was intimately acquainted with Benjamin Franklin, and corresponded frequently with Sir John Pringle, president of the Royal Society. For seven years he was literary companion to Lord Shelburne, important Parliamentary figure, and at one time, prime minister; was a friend, and later an enemy of Edmund Burke; and was well acquainted with Pitt the elder, Pitt the younger, Charles James Fox, and Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Richard Price and Theophilus Lindsey, noted ministers of the day, were, for many years, his close friends. When in Birmingham, he met monthly with the Lunar Society, among whose members were James Watt, Josiah Wedgwood, Erasmus Darwin, and Matthew Boulton; and, when in London, he attended the monthly meetings of the Whig Club at the London Coffee House. While touring France, he met and exchanged ideas with the French scientist Lavoisier. Once he dined with Samuel Johnson, and, in the later part of his life, was the close companion of Thomas Cooper. During his lifetime, he engaged in written controversies with such famous men as Sir William Blackstone, the English jurist, and Noah Webster, the American lexicographer. He was both a friend and patient of Dr. Benjamin Rush, noted American physician. After coming to America, he called on George Washington and preached before John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, later corresponding with them both. Few men in history could point to such close

connections with the leaders of their age in so many varied fields as could Joseph Priestley.

A. Priestley and Science. The eighteenth century witnessed tremendous advances in science, and with these the name of Joseph Priestley is invariably and rightly connected. He is credited with isolating nine gases, including oxygen, carbon monoxide, and ammonia, thus earning for himself the title "Father of Pneumatic Chemistry." Indeed, T. E. Thorpe concludes that "there is no doubt that Priestley did more to extend our knowledge of gaseous bodies than any preceding or successive investigator."[2] Priestley is also credited with making significant contributions in the fields of electricity, sound, light, and botany.[3] His great strength in scientific matters lay in experimentation and observation, in which he was particularly adept; although, as many have suggested, he was often unable properly to evaluate the results of his discoveries.[4]

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[2]Thomas Edward Thorpe, Essays in Historical Chemistry (London, 1902), p. 41.

[3]John F. Fulton and Charlotte H. Peters, "An Introduction to a Bibliography of the Educational and Scientific Works of Joseph Priestley," The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, XXIX (1936), 159-161; John Henry Muirhead, Nine Famous Birmingham Men (Birmingham, 1909), p. 29; A. Wolfe, A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1939), pp. 161ff., 175, 239-242, 248-255, 449.

[4]Lord Henry Brougham, Lives of Men of Letters and Science Who Flourished in the Time of George III (Paris,

Because of these outstanding contributions in science, Priestley attained membership in the learned societies of four countries. The British Royal Society invited him to membership in 1766; and, seven years later, awarded him their highest honor, the Copley Medal, for his work on carbonated water. In 1772, the French Academy of Science elected him as one of its eight associates. In 1780, the Imperial Academy of Science at St. Petersburg granted him membership; and, after coming to the United States, he was extended membership in the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia.

B. Priestley and Theology. In spite of his important work in science, Priestley would undoubtedly have pointed to theology as his favorite and most significant pursuit.[5] Preaching and religious writing occupied a large share of his attention from the time he memorized the catechism at his mother's knee, until he laid aside proof

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1845), p. 270; William Henry, An Estimate of the Philosophical Character of Dr. Priestley (York, 1832), pp. 5-9; T. E. Thorpe, Joseph Priestley (New York, 1906), p. 168; Alexander Gordon and Joseph Phillip Hartog, "Joseph Priestley, LL.D. (1733-1804)," Dictionary of National Biography (London, 1937-1938), XVI, 373.

[5]See Joseph Priestley, The Theological and Miscellaneous Works of Joseph Priestley, ed. John Towell Rutt (Hackney, n.d.), XIX, 360; Thomas H. Huxley, "Joseph Priestley [1874]," reprinted in Science and Education (New York, 1900), p. 9.

sheets for a commentary on the Scriptures only an hour before his death. For over thirty years he preached regularly, and during his life wrote and published some twenty-five volumes on theological subjects. In addition, he played a vigorous and important role in the religious controversies that made up so significant a part of eighteenth-century intellectual life.

In his preaching and religious writing, as in nearly all his other activities, Priestley showed clearly those liberal tendencies for which he is so famous. Brought up by Calvinistic parents, by the age of eighteen he had rejected the doctrine of original sin; and, for this reason, refused to become a communicant of the church which he had for many years attended.[6] Gradually he progressed through Arminianism, Arianism, then finally to Unitarianism. His views, as they eventually developed, often appear little short of paradoxical. He rejected both the pre-existence of Christ and his virgin birth, but believed in his miracles and resurrection. He accepted neither the common view of the Trinity nor the doctrine of atonement, but did believe in the second coming of Christ to this earth. He denied plenary inspiration of the Bible, but believed that many Old and New Testament prophecies were, even in his day,

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[6] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 14.

being fulfilled. He believed in the homogeneity of body and soul, which he himself termed a form of "materialism," but he fully expected the resurrection of the righteous unto eternal life. While he had a high regard for the Scriptures, and studied them daily throughout his life, he, like many twentieth-century modernists, believed that the reason of man was the final tribunal of truth.[7]

Priestley's greatest service to theology, it has been suggested, "is to be found in his adoption of the historical method of investigating the problems of doctrine and in his special handling of that method."[8] He sought the "primitive nucleus" of Christianity, which he thought would be found not only in the New Testament, but even more in the understanding which first-century Christians had of their religion. In fact, both James Moffatt and Alexander Gordon credit Priestley with being the first to use this approach.[9] Thus, while Priestley's knowledge of history was not extensive, and his inferences sometimes incorrect, he may be

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[7]See John Graham Gillam, The Crucible; The Story of Joseph Priestley, LL.D., F.R.S. (London, 1954), pp. 105-106; Stephen Hale Fritchman, Men of Liberty (Boston, 1944), p. 14; Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 14-15; James Martineau, Essays, Reviews, and Addresses (London, 1901), I, 10-11.

[8]Thorpe, Joseph Priestley, p. 109.

[9]Ibid., p. 111; James Moffatt, The Historical Approach to the New Testament (London, 1921), pp. 117-118.

regarded as a precursor of the historical treatment of Biblical and theological questions.

Priestley's theological writings are numerous and varied. His first important work was the three-volume Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion (1772-1774), composed when he was a student at Daventry Academy. This work, twice republished, was a treatment of certain fundamental elements of the Christian faith: the existence and attributes of God, the duty and future expectations of mankind, the rule of right and wrong, the passions, and evidences of the Jewish and Christian Revelations. Another of his major works in this field was a Harmony of the Evangelists (1777), first published in Greek, and later in English, with critical notes. In 1782, he completed a two-volume History of the Corruptions of Christianity, employing the historical method mentioned above. This subsequently went through four editions. Another work based on the historical method, and which was an attempt at a major defense of Unitarianism, was An Early History of the Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ (1786), in four volumes. Still in the same vein, Priestley published between 1790 and 1803, a four-volume General History of the Christian Church. Another work of considerable length, and the last of his major compositions, was Notes on All the Books of Scripture (1803-1804), consisting of four volumes of expositions of

Scriptural passages, some of which he had used in his Birmingham pulpit.[10] Priestley also edited and contributed to The Theological Repository, a liberal periodical published from 1769 to 1771 and again from 1784 to 1788.

There were times in Priestley's life when he was a scientist, times when he was an educator, and times when he was a political theorist, but he was always a preacher. It was for the ministry that he prepared himself from boyhood, and in the ministry that he found his first employment. He regularly occupied pulpits in Needham Market, Nantwich, Leeds, Birmingham, Hackney, Philadelphia, and Northumberland. Even at those times when he was primarily engaged in other pursuits, he "never failed to officiate occasionally" in the pulpit.[11]

As a preacher, Priestley, even according to his admirers, was not an effective speaker. Throughout life he was a rather severe stutterer; and this, coupled with the fact that he read his sermons and used almost no action, would lead one to conclude that he was anything but eloquent.[12] He did, however, recognize his weakness in

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[10] Works of Priestley, IX, 5.

[11] Works of Priestley, XIX, 360.

[12] See Thomas Belsham, Zeal and Fortitude in the Christian Ministry (London, 1804), p. 20; John Corry, The Life of Joseph Priestley, with Critical Observations on His Works (Birmingham, 1804), p. 51; Thorpe, Joseph Priestley,

this respect and seems to have adapted himself to a type of address suited to his defects. He is said by one observer to have employed the "voice and manner . . . of one friend speaking to another."[13] Correspondingly, his messages were generally "plain, simple, instructive, and practical."[14] Another critic described his sermons as "mild, persuasive and unaffected . . . full of sound reasoning and good sense."[15]

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p. 105; Thomas Cooper, "Observations on the Writings of Joseph Priestley," Memoirs of Dr. Joseph Priestley to the Year 1795, Written by Himself: With a Continuation, to the Time of His Decease, by His Son, Joseph Priestley (Northumberland, Pa., 1806), II, 480; William Christie, "Observations on the Writings of Joseph Priestley," Memoirs of Dr. Joseph Priestley to the Year 1795, II, 818-882. Corry, in his Life of Joseph Priestley, pp. 43-44, thus describes Priestley's personal appearance: "Dr. Priestley was about the middle stature, or five feet eight inches high. He was slender and well proportioned; his complexion was fair, his eyes grey and sparkling with intelligence, and his whole countenance was expressive of the benignity of his heart. He often smiled, but seldom laughed. He was extremely agile in his motions. He walked fast and very erect, and his deportment was dignified. His dress was a black coat without a cape, a fine linen or cambric stock, a cocked hat, a powdered wig (which, however, he laid aside in America), shoes and buckles. The whole of his dress was remarkably clean, and this purity of person and simple dignity of manners evinced that philosophic propriety which prevailed throughout his conduct as a private individual. He was an ungraceful orator; his voice was low and faltering, and he had a custom of shrugging up his shoulders."

[13]Thorpe, Joseph Priestley, p. 105.

[14]Belsham, Zeal and Fortitude, p. 27.

[15]Thorpe, Joseph Priestley, p. 105.

Many of Priestley's sermons were published as pamphlets, later being collected to form Volumes XV and XVI of his Works. A book of sermons by Priestley and Richard Price, first published in 1791, went through three editions.

Through his preaching and writing, Priestley became "one who was largely instrumental in the establishment of Unitarianism in England and America."[16] Fulton and Peters call him "the chief early protagonist in the [United States], as well as in England, of the Unitarian Movement."[17] Certainly, Priestley was among the first of the liberal theologians, and his preaching over a forty-year period on two continents, along with his widely read religious writings, enabled him to exert a considerable impact upon the theological thought of his century.

C. Priestley and Philosophy. Closely allied with his theology was Priestley's work in philosophy; and while he is obviously not of the same rank as Berkeley or Hume, his work in metaphysics certainly qualifies him to be

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[16]Charles C. Everett, "Joseph Priestley, the Old Unitarianism and the New," Immortality and Other Essays (Boston, 1902), p. 103. See also George Willis Cooke, Unitarianism in America (Boston, 1910), pp. 71, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 118; Condard Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America (Boston, 1955), pp. 213, 215; Walter Prichard Eaton, The Evolution of Unitarian Thought (Boston, 1925), p. 16; Thomas Belsham, Memoirs of the Late Reverend Theophilus Lindsey (London, 1873), pp. 157, 158, 159, 164, 165, 175.

[17]Fulton and Peters, "Introduction to Bibliography," p. 150.

listed among the more important philosophers of his century.[18] Five major works from Priestley's pen, all coming in the decade of the 1770's, belong in this classification: An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry, Dr. Beatties's Essay, and Dr. Oswald's Appeal (1774), a long essay strongly opposing the so-called "common sense philosophy"; Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind (1775), an abbreviated, simplified edition of Hartley's Observations on Man, with commendatory and explanatory essays supplied by Priestley; Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (1777), appended to the Observations, which presents Priestley's view of the linkage of all things in a great chain of cause and effect; and A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism (1778), a written controversy between Priestley and Price on the doctrines presented in the Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit. Either implicit or explicit in all of these philosophical inquiries, is Priestley's strong support of Hartley's doctrine of the association of ideas, about which more will be said below, and which constitutes his major contribution to the philosophy of the period.

D. Priestley and Politics. Priestley also deserves mention in the field of government, where, as in theology, he exhibits the liberalism and revolt characteristic of his

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[18] Wolfe, History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy, p. 785.

age. His first effort in political science was his Essay on the First Principles of Government (1768), in which he wrote:

> It must necessarily be understood, therefore, whether it be expressed or not, that all people live in society for their mutual advantage; so that the good and happiness of the members, that is, of the majority of the members, of any state, is the great standard by which everything relating to that state must finally be determined.[19]

It was this sentiment of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," that gave Jeremy Bentham the idea for his "greatest happiness" formula.[20] Bentham himself said:

> By an early pamphlet of Priestley's, the date of which has fled from my recollection, light was added to the warmth. In the phrase, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' I then saw delineated for the first time, a plain as well as a true standard for whatever is right or wrong, useful, useless, or mischievous in human conduct, whether in the field of morals or politics.[21]

Another of Priestley's ideas with important political implications was his strong stand for the right of private judgment and the principle of toleration, which, according to Muirhead, he asserted "with a completeness and consistency that excelled even John Locke and his own distinguished

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[19]Joseph Priestley, Essay on the First Principles of Government (2nd ed; 1771), p. 13, quoted in Huxley, "Joseph Priestley [1874]," p. 31.

[20]Huxley, Ibid; Murihead, Nine Famous Birmingham Men, pp. 31-32.

[21]Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh, 1843), X, 79.

contemporary and brother-at-arms in the same cause, Dr. Price."[22] Being a Dissenter himself, he, of course, contended that the state had no right to require that all of its subjects either subscribe to the Established Church or suffer various indignities. This view is presented in Priestley's Free Address to Protestant Dissenters (1769), and in his Letter to William Pitt on Toleration and the Established Church (1787).

Also important in this connection, is Priestley's employment as literary companion to Lord Shelburne, one of the leading members of the House of Lords. In this capacity, he collected information for Shelburne on subjects of parliamentary discussion, and kept his library in order, as well as tutoring Shelburne's sons and carrying on extensive scientific research. During his seven years in this position, Priestley attended many of the parliamentary debates involving Chatham, Fox, Burke, Sheridan, Pitt, and other great statesmen of the era. Like Shelburne, Priestley was favorable toward the American cause, and even went beyond his patron in acquiescing in independence for the colonies.[23]

After Priestley left the service of Lord Shelburne and moved to Birmingham, he became embroiled in the most

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[22]Muirhead, Nine Famous Birmingham Men, pp. 30-31.

[23]See Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 181, 197, 210.

heated political controversy of his career. His outspoken opposition to the Test Acts, coupled with his defense of the French Revolution, gave rise to the opinion that he opposed both King and Church. In reply to attacks upon himself, Priestley unfortunately wrote:

> The present silent propagation of truth may even be compared to those causes in Nature which lie dormant for a time, but which in proper circumstances act with the greatest violence. We are, as it were, laying gunpowder, grain by grain, under the old building of error to produce an instantaneous explosion; in consequence of which that edifice, the erection of which has been the work of ages, may be overturned in a moment, and so effectually as that the same foundation can never be built up again.[24]

While Priestley did not mean this to be an endorsement of violence, and was always loyal to the King and Constitution, his ill-chosen metaphor gave rise to still more opposition. In addition, his reply to Burke's Remarks on the Revolution in France (1791)--a work which led to his being granted honorary French citizenship--contributed to his unpopularity with many of his countrymen.

On July 14, 1791, the second anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, a group in Birmingham met to celebrate the occasion, and although Priestley chose not to attend, he became the prime object of the mob that formed in opposition. His meeting house was burned, his home

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[24]Quoted in Robert Martin Caven, Joseph Priestley, 1733-1804 (London, 1933), pp. 12-13.

and laboratory destroyed, and he barely escaped with his life, being warned by friends of the approaching mob. Although he remained for about two years in London, difficulties for him and his family continued, so that he eventually found it necessary to leave England and come to America. It was here that he renewed his acquaintance with John Adams, whom he had previously met in England, and came into contact with Washington and Jefferson. He frequently attended sessions of Congress in Philadelphia, and was at one time nominated as chaplain of the House of Representatives.

Priestley, therefore, played a not unimportant part in the political drama of the eighteenth century. While he never held public office, except in the French Convention, which he chose not to attend, he was involved, to some degree, in several of the major political issues of the period. He not only wrote on political theory, but was a vigorous pamphleteer, associated with the leading statesmen of the age, and frequently attended the legislative bodies of both England and the United States. In the end, his liberal views in politics and religion brought violence upon himself, his family, and his friends; not because they were necessarily in error--for most of the causes for which he contended were later adopted--but because his beliefs were in advance of his times. Toleration, reform, freedom from

slavery, the well-being of the majority of the citizens, were accomplishments of the nineteenth century, not the eighteenth; but they were, in large measure, made possible because men such as Priestley, both in word and action, opened the way for their adoption.

E. Priestley and Education. Of even greater interest in this study than Priestley's accomplishments in science, theology, philosophy, and politics, is his work in the field of education. Education as a discipline made important strides during the eighteenth century, particularly in such matters as the broadening of the curriculum so as to make it more utilitarian, the reduction of emphasis on Latin and Greek with a corresponding increase of attention to English, the improvement of methods of discipline and instruction, and the extension of educational opportunities to the middle and lower classes.

In each of these reforms, Priestley played a part. He was, in one way or another, connected with educational pursuits nearly all of his life, teaching in his own grammar school at Nantwich, lecturing in Dissenting academies at Warrington and Hackney, tutoring in private homes at Nantwich and Calne, instructing in religious classes at the various places where he preached, or advising Thomas Jefferson concerning the organization of the University of Virginia. Priestley's most important educational efforts,

however, came during his six-year connection with Warrington Academy, one of the leading Nonconformist or Dissenting academies of the eighteenth century. Schools of this type were operated and, in general, patronized by those who did not choose to give assent to the thirty-nine articles of the Established Church, and who were, therefore, excluded from teaching in or attending the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. While these academies did not enjoy all the facilities and financial assistance which the universities had at their disposal, they were not inferior in scholarship, and had the advantage of being free from the bounds of tradition. Being, therefore, more adaptable, they became important centers of educational progress during the eighteenth century.[25]

In his Warrington position as "Tutor of Languages and Belles Lettres," Priestley contended strongly for an increased emphasis on instruction in English rather than the ancient languages, and worked diligently to broaden the curriculum to include more utilitarian subjects, such as history, law, and geography. McLachlan, in his account of

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[25]Herbert McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts; Being the History of the Nonconformist Academies, 1662-1820 (Manchester, 1931), pp. 16-44; H. C. Barnard, A Short History of English Education, From 1760 to 1944 (London, 1947), pp. 35-36; Freeman R. Butts, A Cultural History of Education (New York, 1947), p. 339.

Priestley's efforts in this connection, calls him "the most intrepid innovator" among the Dissenting professors,[26] and a "pioneer" in curriculum development.[27] Eby and Arrowood, likewise, assert that he "did more perhaps than any other man to modernize the curriculum of the dissenting academies," and suggest that his "influence was felt over all of Great Britain and the United States."[28] Priestley's work at Warrington with those who could not enter the universities, as well as in his own private school at Nantwich where he taught both boys and girls--in separate rooms, of course--indicates his interest in providing educational opportunities beyond the restrictions prevalent in previous generations. In addition, he helped in the trend toward more democratic and pedagogically sound instructional methods; for besides lecturing to his classes extemporaneously from prepared notes, he invited questions, engaged the class in discussion, spent a part of each period in review and examination, and even fraternized with the students at tea in his own home.

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[26]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, p. 18.

[27]Ibid., p. 35.

[28]Frederick Eby and Charles Flinn Arrowood, The Development of Modern Education (New York, 1934), pp. 606-607. See also Barnard, History of English Education, pp. 34-36; T. L. Jarman, Landmarks in the History of Education (New York, 1952), pp. 193-194.

In addition to his efforts in the classroom, Priestley was also active as a writer of works on pedagogy. In 1765 he published An Essay on a Course of Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life. With plans of lectures on I. The study of history and general policy. II. The history of England. III. The constitution and Laws of England, etc. In 1788, this was extended into Lectures on History and General Policy; and Liberal Education. Other works dealing with the theory of education are his Miscellaneous Observations Relating to Education (1778), and The Proper Objects of Education in the Present State of the World (1791). Priestley's textbooks include: The Rudiments of English Grammar (1761), A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar (1762), A Chart of History (1765), A Syllabus of a Course of Lectures on the Study of History (1765), A Chart of Biography (1769), and A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (1777).

In education, then, as in a number of other areas, Joseph Priestley occupies a noteworthy place. Through his teaching and writing, he exerted a significant influence on the strategic educational advances of his century; and, while he does not rank with Locke, Rousseau, or Rollin, "no study of eighteenth-century education can claim to be complete which takes no account of the work of the Tutor in

Languages and Belles Lettres at Warrington Academy."[29]

F. Priestley and Language, Oratory, and Criticism. The eighteenth century is identified with scientific advancement, political revolution, philosophical progress, theological controversy, and educational reform--and with each of these areas of activity, Joseph Priestley was, as we have seen, closely connected. The spirit of rationalism and enlightenment, of liberalism and revolt, so characteristic of the age, is also typified in Priestley's life and labors. Thus, in his attitudes as well as his achievements, Priestley reflects the age in which he lived.

It is the specific thesis of this study that just as Priestley's views in these fields are, in so many respects, representative of his century, so are his views on language, oratory, and criticism largely representative of the rhetorical and critical thought of his age; and, as a result, that the best way to interpret him as a rhetorician is by a consideration of his representativeness. More specifically, as will be argued in detail in Chapter IV, four dominant trends characterized English rhetorical thought between 1758 and 1828, and each of these is prominently reflected in Priestley's rhetorical system.

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[29]Herbert McLachlan, Warrington Academy, Its History and Influence (n. p., 1943), p. 29.

Our study will begin with an expository review of Priestley's system of rhetoric, as presented in his grammars and his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, and will then proceed through a comparison of his doctrines with each of the four dominant trends mentioned above. Such a study will not only help to explain the rhetoric of Priestley himself, but will also shed additional light on this important period in the development of modern rhetorical and critical thought by displaying previously unobserved relationships between Priestley and other rhetoricians and critics of the period.

Before considering this thesis in detail, however, it is appropriate to conclude these introductory remarks with a brief biographical sketch of Priestley, focusing particularly upon those events which have some connection with his views of language, oratory, and criticism.

III. Biographical Sketch of Priestley. For our purposes, Priestley's life may be divided into three periods: education and early years, the tutorship at Warrington Academy, and the years after Warrington.

A. Education and Early Years. Joseph Priestley was born on March 13, old style, 1733, at Fieldhead, about six miles southwest of Leeds, in Yorkshire. His father, Jonas Priestley, was a cloth dresser, and his mother is described as a pious woman who attempted to train her children in

Christian principles. Priestley's mother died when he was six years old, and three years later, in 1742, he went to live permanently with a paternal aunt, a Mrs. Keighley, who assumed the responsibility for his education. He attended various schools near his home, and, in addition, did considerable independent study, so that by the time he was nineteen, he had learned Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic, High Dutch, French, and Italian, as well as, "geometry, algebra, and various branches of mathematics, theoretical and practical."[30] Also by this time, he had read Gravesande's Elements of Natural Philosophy, Watt's Logic, Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, and had made some proficiency in other areas of learning.[31]

From an early age, Priestley planned to enter the ministry--except for a period when it was thought that his health might interfere--and with this design, his relatives agreed. Since they were all strict Calvinists, they wanted him to attend the academy at Mile-end; but Priestley, even at this age, was unwilling to subscribe to the ten articles of Calvinism which students at this academy were required to sign upon entrance and every six months thereafter.

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[30] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 7-8, 13.

[31] Ibid., p. 13.

It was decided, therefore, that he should attend the Dissenting academy at Northampton, conducted by Dr. Philip Doddridge, a well-known scholar among the Nonconformists. Before Priestley enrolled, however, Doddridge died, and the academy was moved to Daventry to be placed under the direction of Caleb Ashworth, Doddridge's choice as his successor. Ashworth, who later received a D.D. from Marischal College, Aberdeen, is described as "a man of ability and learning,"[32] and continued as Divinity Tutor at Daventry until his death in 1775. Although Ashworth was a Nonconformist minister, Priestley recorded that he took "the orthodox side of every question," while Samuel Clark, the sub-tutor, generally upheld the side of "heresy."[33]

Daventry Academy was much to Priestley's liking, for it permitted free discussion among the pupils and tutors on disputed questions, and the general plan of their studies--which followed Doddridge's published lectures--"was exceedingly favorable to free inquiry."[34] In his Memoirs, Priestley recalls that while in this situation, he generally embraced the "heterodox" side of almost every question.[35]

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[32]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, p. 152.

[33]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 23.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

Two events of Priestley's stay at Daventry are of particular interest in this study. The first is that, so far as can be determined, it was here that Priestley first came into contact with the field of rhetorical theory. Ashworth used as a textbook for some of his work Doddridge's Lectures on Preaching;[36] and, while these twenty-five lectures were concerned with pastoral visitation, behavior to other ministers, conduct toward those needing particular care, conversation, and the sacraments, as well as with the preacher's work in the pulpit, they also contained some suggestions on delivery which, as we shall see in Chapter VII, may have exerted some formative influence on Priestley's views.

The second item of importance is that at Daventry, Priestley first came into contact with the works of Dr. David Hartley, the English physician and metaphysician.[37] Hartley's Observations on Man attempts to explain the psychical functions of man, by reference to the principle called "the association of ideas," and Priestley adopted this theory completely. Most of the philosophical works which he wrote at later periods in his life centered in this theme. Moreover, as we shall see later, this concept also had a great influence on his rhetorical doctrines.

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[36]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, p. 152.

[37]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 24.

On the basis of his previous study, Priestley was excused from nearly two years of the five-year course at Daventry;[38] and so in 1755, after three years at the academy, he took his first ministry at Needham Market, Suffolk, where he seems to have applied himself diligently. Here he studied things "classical, mathematical, and theological";[39] and, besides composing at least one new sermon each week,[40] he catechised the children with Dr. Watt's Catechism, lectured on the theory of religion from his own Institutes of Revealed Religion, and wrote on a variety of theological subjects, in nearly every case with decidedly liberal tendencies.[41]

Although his salary at Needham Market was supposed to have been forty pounds a year, he never received above thirty, and with the expense of his board more than twenty pounds, he was generally without sufficient funds.[42]

Of greater concern to him than finances, however, was his stuttering. He wrote:

> But what contributed greatly to my distress, was the impediment in my speech, which had increased so much, as to make preaching very painful, and took from me all

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[38] Ibid., p. 13.

[39] Ibid., p. 34.

[40] Ibid., p. 43.

[41] Ibid., p. 40.

[42] Ibid., p. 30.

> chance of recommending myself to any better place. In this state, hearing of the proposal of one Mr. Angier, to cure all defects of speech, I prevailed upon my aunt to enable me to pay his price, which was twenty guineas; and this was the first occasion of my visiting London. Accordingly I attended him about a month, taking an oath not to reveal his method, and I received some temporary benefit; but soon relapsed again, and spoke worse than ever.[43]

In order to supplement his meager salary, Priestley, somewhat reluctantly, turned to teaching. In his Memoirs he wrote:

> Like most other young men of a liberal education, I had conceived a great aversion to the business of a schoolmaster, and had often said that I would have recourse to anything else for a maintenance in preference to it. But having no other resource, I was at length compelled by necessity to make some attempt in that way; and for this purpose I printed and distributed proposals, but without any effect. Not that I was thought to be unqualified for this employment, but because I was not orthodox. I had proposed to teach the classics, mathematics, &c., for half-a-guinea per quarter, and to board the pupils in the house with myself for twelve guineas per annum.[44]

He next proposed to give lectures to adults on various branches of science, beginning with the use of globes. In this he was more successful, and had one course of ten hearers. Although the effort was cut short by his removal from Needham Market, it is significant as Priestley's first venture into the teaching profession.[45]

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[43] Ibid., p. 33.

[44] Ibid., p. 41.

[45] Ibid.

After three years at Needham Market, Priestley moved to Nantwich in Cheshire to minister to a congregation of about sixty persons.[46] It was here that he actually became a schoolmaster for the first time, and contrary to his expectation, found "the greatest satisfaction" in this employment.[47] His school, which continued from seven in the morning until four in the afternoon, generally consisted of some thirty boys, with a separate room for about half a dozen young ladies. After closing his own school for the day, he taught until seven in the family of a Mr. Tomkinson, "an eminent attorney, and a man of large fortune, whose recommendation was of the greatest service" to him.[48] With this busy schedule, Priestley had little time for reading or even for composing new sermons,[49] but he did fare better financially than he had at Needham Market, being able to buy a few books and some "philosophical instruments," including a small air-pump and an "electrical machine." [50]

Priestley's stuttering grew worse during his first two years at Nantwich, and at one time he informed the congregation that he would give up preaching and confine

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[46] Ibid., p. 43.
[47] Ibid., p. 42.
[48] Ibid., pp. 42-43.
[49] Ibid., p. 43.
[50] Ibid.

himself to his school. But before abandoning the work for which he had trained, he set about once again to try to improve his speech. He describes the method in his Memoirs: "By making a practice of reading very loud and very slow every day, I at length succeeded in getting, in some measure, the better of this defect, but I am still obliged occasionally to have recourse to the same expedient."[51] Here Editor Rutt records in a footnote a memorandum from a Mr. Samuel Parkes who mentioned Priestley's "walking to time, or pacing at a set step. He spoke a single word at every step, and, by constant repetition of these practices, acquired a habit of pacing."[52]

Priestley's schoolmastering at Nantwich is of especial interest in this study, because it was here, in 1761, that he composed his first work in the field of language, The Rudiments of English Grammar.[53]

B. Tutor at Warrington Academy. In October of 1757, while Priestley was in his first ministry at Needham Market, an academy was opened at Warrington by the Nonconformists, in order to train ministers for the pulpits of their churches and laymen for various walks of life. Of the 393 students

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[51] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[52] Ibid.

[53] This grammar is discussed in detail in Chapter II of this thesis.

educated at this academy during the twenty-six years it was in operation, twenty-one followed the medical profession, twenty-four took up law, eighteen joined the army, about a hundred entered business, and fifty-five became ministers.[54] The complete course lasted five years, but a shorter three-year curriculum was arranged for those studying for business and commerce.

Warrington Academy opened with two tutors, Dr. John Taylor in Divinity and Moral Philosophy, and John Holt in Natural Philosophy and Mathematics. Beginning in the second year, John Aikin was added to teach in the field of Languages and Polite Literature.[55] Although the enrollment was not large or the prospects always bright, the school continued with these three tutors until March 5, 1761, when Dr. Taylor died.[56]

When the trustees of the Academy gathered for their yearly meeting on June 25, 1761, they unanimously asked John Aikin to take the tutorship in divinity, and he accepted. After hearing read several letters recommending Joseph Priestley for the tutorship in languages and literature which

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[54]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, p. 209.

[55]Valentine David Davis, A History of Manchester College (London, 1932), pp. 31-35.

[56]Ibid., p. 40.

Aikin's transfer thus left vacant, they drew up the following resolution:

> We whose names are underwritten Trustees of the Academy at Warrington, at our general yearly meeting this Day, June 25, 1761, having taken into our mature and impartial consideration the above mentioned recommendation, do hereby declare our unanimous choice of the Reverend Mr. Joseph Priestley of Naptwich [sic], to be tutor in the Languages & polite Learning, desire that this resulution be communicated to him by Mr. Holland & Mr. Seddon and that he be desired to accept of the invitation proposed to him.[57]

When the messengers brought the proposal, Priestley accepted, "though," as he later wrote, "my school promised to be more gainful to me." His acceptance, he said, was based upon the conviction that "my employment at Warrington would be more liberal, and less painful. It was also a means of extending my connexions. But . . . I should have preferred the office of teaching the mathematics and natural philosophy, for which I had at that time a great predilection."[58]

Upon coming to the Academy in September, 1761, Priestley took up his new duties with his usual vigor. He wrote in his Memoirs:

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[57]John F. Fulton, "The Warrington Academy (1757-1786) and Its Influence Upon Medicine and Science," Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine, I (1933), 61, from a photostat of a page from the minute books of the Warrington Academy.

[58]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 47.

> Though at the time of my removal to Warrington I had no particular fondness for the studies relating to my profession then, I applied to them with great assiduity; and besides composing courses of "Lectures on the Theory of Language," and on "Oratory and Criticism" on which my predecessor had lectured, I introduced lectures on "History and General Policy," on the "Laws and Constitution of England," and on the "History of England." This I did in consequence of observing that, though most of our pupils were young men designed for situations in civil and active life, every article in the plan of their education was adapted to the learned professions.[59]

During his six years at Warrington, Priestley also, at one time or other, taught elocution, logic, Hebrew, anatomy, civil law, Greek, French, and Italian.[60]

The years at Warrington were dotted with important events in Priestley's personal life. In 1762 he married Mary Wilkinson, the daughter of a Welsh ironmaster, which union Priestley called "a very suitable and happy connexion."[61] And indeed it was, for Joseph and Mary Priestley enjoyed nearly forty years in a close, compatible relationship. The Priestley's had four children--Sarah, Joseph, William, and Henry.

Also in 1762, Priestley was officially ordained as a Dissenting minister; for, although he had not conquered

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[59] Ibid., p. 51.

[60] Ibid., pp. 50, 54.

[61] Ibid., p. 48.

his stuttering, he had, by this time, determined to continue in the ministry.

As a result of the publication of his Chart of Biography--a diagram three feet long and two feet wide, indicating in linear fashion the duration of the lives of significant figures between 1200 B. C. and 1800 A. D.--he was awarded the degree Doctor of Laws from the University of Edinburgh, December 4, 1764.[62] Since this university was in Scotland, and thus not under the jurisdiction of the Test Acts, it could grant degrees to Dissenters.

It was also at Warrington that Priestley began his work as a scientist. On one of his annual visits to London, he met Benjamin Franklin, William Watson, John Canton, and Richard Price, all of whom were members of the Royal Society; and, after discussing the matter with them and receiving their encouragement, he wrote a history of electricity, including some original experiments of his own. According to Priestley's Memoirs,[63] it was these experiments, and the recommendation of these friends, that brought his admission into the Royal Society.[64]

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[62]Ibid., p. 58; Catalogue of Graduates from Edinburgh University, 1587-1858; Fulton and Peters, "Introduction to Bibliography," p. 156.

[63]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 58.

[64]W. Cameron Walker, "The Beginnings of the Scientific Career of Joseph Priestley," Isis, XXI (1934),

While these events of Priestley's stay at Warrington are important in the total picture of his life, so far as the present study is concerned the most significant activities of these years were his teaching and writing in connection with his courses on the theory of language and universal grammar, oratory and criticism, and elocution.

For the course in the theory of languages, he wrote A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar, which was privately printed for the use of his students in 1762. This work was much broader in scope than the Rudiments of English Grammar, published the previous year; but on topics treated in both, it is quite similar.[65]

Also upon becoming Tutor of Languages and Belles Lettres, Priestley composed the work with which the present study is principally concerned, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism.[66] Concerning these lectures, he wrote in the Preface at the time of their publication in 1777,

> This course of Lectures was composed when I was Tutor in the Languages and Belles Lettres in the Academy at Warrington, and was first delivered in the year 1762. . . . . .

95, argues convincingly that, despite Priestley's statement in the Memoirs, he was actually admitted to the Royal Society upon the basis of his literary work, primarily his Chart of Biography.

[65]For a detailed discussion of this work see Chapter II of this thesis.

[66]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 51.

> Considering the nature of the work, it will not be expected, by the candid and judicious, that every thing in it should be original. It is, on the contrary, the business of a Lecturer, to bring into an easy and comprehensive view whatever has been observed by others: and in this respect I hope it will be thought that I have not acquitted myself ill; few works of criticism, of any value, having escaped my attention, at the time that I was engaged in those studies.[67]

In explaining why the published lectures were shorter than some might believe proper, Priestley described his method of using the lectures in the classroom:

> It may be thought by some, that these lectures are much too short, and too concisely written, for the purpose of public instruction: but they should be apprized, that it was my custom to write down only the outlines of what I delivered in the class; that, for the benefit of my pupils, I used to attend them provided with more copious illustrations, and a greater variety of examples; and, besides, always spent a considerable part of the time appropriated to every lecture in examining them on the subject of the preceding lecture, hearing their remarks or objections, and explaining more distinctly what they appeared not to have clearly understood.
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> Upon this plan (which I found by experience to be a very useful one, and which I mention so particularly here, with a view to recommend it to other tutors) it was not necessary for me to write out more than a short, though connected text, from which to discourse extempore; a method which engages the attention unspeakably more than formally reading everything from notes. It was my custom also to leave a fair copy of what I wrote in the lecture-room, that the pupils might have recourse to it, and study it at their leisure, so as to be better prepared for examination at the ensuing lecture.[68]

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[67] Joseph Priestley, A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (London, 1777), p. i-ii. These Lectures will be treated in detail in Chapter III, below.

[68] Ibid., pp. v-vi.

One of Priestley's students, a Mr. Simpson, writing in the Monthly Repository, described this method in action:

> What Dr. Priestley added in discoursing from his written lectures (most of which are since published to the world) was pointedly and clearly illustrative of the subject before him, and expressed with great simplicity and distinctness of language, though he sometimes manifested that difficulty of utterance which he mentions in the Memoirs of his Life. At the conclusion of his lecture he always encouraged the students to express their sentiments relative to the subjects of it, and to urge any objections to what he had delivered without reserve. It pleased him when any one commenced such conversation. In order to excite the freest discussion, he occasionally invited the students to drink tea with him, in order to canvass the subjects of his lectures. I do not recollect that he ever shewed the least displeasure at the strongest objections that were made to what he delivered; but I distinctly remember the smile of approbation with which he usually received them; nor did he fail to point out in a very encouraging manner the ingenuity or force of any remarks that were made, when they merited these characters. His object, as well as Dr. Aikin's, was to engage the students to examine and decide for themselves, uninfluenced by the sentiments of any other person. His written lectures he used to permit each student to take and read in his own lodgings. Those on Rhetoric he gave them the liberty of copying, those on History of reading only, as he intended them for publication.[69]

This method of lecturing from notes and inviting questions, comments, and objections from the students is also recommended in Priestley's Miscellaneous Observations on Education,[70] and in his Essay on a Course of Liberal

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[69] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 50-51, quoted from Monthly Repository, VIII, p. 229.

[70] Joseph Priestley, Miscellaneous Observations Relating to Education. More especially, as it respects the mind. To which is added, An Essay on a Course of Liberal

Education for Civil and Active Life.[71]

A third course which Priestley taught at Warrington, and which is of particular interest here, is a course in elocution.

> Finding no public exercises at Warrington, I introduced them there, so that afterwards every Saturday the tutors, all the students, and often strangers, were assembled to hear English and Latin compositions, and sometimes to hear the delivery of speeches, and the exhibition of scenes in plays. It was my province to teach elocution, and also logic and Hebrew. The first of these I retained; but after a year or two I exchanged the two last articles with Dr. Aikin, for the civil law, and one year I gave a course of lectures in anatomy.[72]

In the elocution course, special care was taken to form the delivery of the young men at the Academy, particularly through oral criticisms of their efforts.[73]

Although Priestley received what he termed "nothing more than a bare subsistence,"[74] he was happy during his stay at Warrington, and enjoyed his associations with the other tutors.[75] In his opinion, however, the Academy was not altogether successful; nor did it, primarily because of a

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Education for Civil and Active Life (Bath, 1778), pp. 218-219.

[71]Works of Priestley, XXIV, 20-21.

[72]Ibid., I, Part I, 53-54.

[73]For a detailed account of the procedure and significance of this course, see Chapter VII, below.

[74]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 62.

[75]Ibid., p. 59.

lack of funds, show great promise for the future.[76] Partly for this reason, partly because of his wife's illness, and also perhaps because he desired to spend his time in other pursuits, Priestley accepted an invitation to preach at the Mill-hill Chapel at Leeds, and moved there in September, 1767.[77]

John Seddon, who became Rector Academicus at Warrington the same year, took over Priestley's courses in oratory and grammar.[78] Johann Reinhold Forster, a recent immigrant from Danzig, replaced him in natural history and modern languages.[79] Seddon died in 1770, and was, in turn, replaced both in the local church and at the Academy by William Enfield, who remained until the school was closed in 1783.[80]

IV. The Years After Warrington. Priestley remained in Leeds for six years, and wrote that he was "very happy with a liberal, friendly, and harmonious congregation, to

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[76]Ibid., p. 61.

[77]Ibid., pp. 61-62.

[78]Four volumes of his lectures in longhand are preserved in the Manchester College Library. Davis, History of Manchester College, p. 44.

[79]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 61-62.

[80]The connection between Priestley and Enfield is discussed at length in Chapter VII, below.

whom my services (of which I was not sparing) were very acceptable."[81] Here he had three classes of catechumens, "and took great pleasure in instructing them in the principles of religion."[82] While in this situation he wrote to his friend Theophilus Lindsey:

> Theology, notwithstanding my other pursuits, is my favourite study; and if I live to complete my other schemes, I shall with pleasure devote myself almost entirely to the study of the Scriptures. I believe there is in them enough to employ and reward the application of us all.[83]

Leeds became the site of some of Priestley's most significant scientific discoveries. His first home in the city was near a brewery, and the bubbling action going on in the large vats aroused his interest. This curiosity led to experimentation, and in 1772 he published his first paper on pneumatic chemistry. It described a method for impregnating water with fixed-air (carbon dioxide), and thus Priestley became the father of "soda-water." This paper won for him the Royal Society's highest award, the Copley medal, conferred in 1773.[84] At the same time, he continued his

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[81] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 68.

[82] Ibid., p. 73.

[83] Priestley to Theophilus Lindsey, Leeds, November 1, 1770, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 121.

[84] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 77; Edgar F. Smith, Priestley in America (Philadelphia, 1920), p. 6.

experiments in electricity, and wrote a History of Discoveries Relating to Vision, Light, and Colours.

It was also at Leeds that Priestley first became involved in the theological and political controversies that were to play such an important role in shaping the remaining years of his life. He recalls:

> The first of my controversial treatises was written here in reply to some angry remarks on my Discourse on "the Lord's Supper," by Mr. Venn, a clergyman in the neighbourhood. I also wrote Remarks on Dr. Balguy's Sermon on Church Authority, and on some paragraphs in Judge Blackstone's "Commentaries on the Laws of England, relating to the Dissenters."[85]

In addition to these works, he wrote An Address to Protestant Dissenters; An Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity, which went through thirty thousand copies by 1787; and the Essay on the First Principles of Government; not to mention "some anonymous pieces, in favour of civil liberty, during the persecution of Mr. Wilkes, the principal of which was an Address to Dissenters on the subject of the difference with America, which [he] wrote at the request of Dr. Franklin and Dr. Fothergil."[86]

During 1772, Priestley received repeated invitations from Lord Shelburne to become his "librarian," to "superintend the education of his sons," with the help of a tutor under him, and to "collect information for him with

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[85] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 73.

[86] Ibid., p. 75.

respect to subjects of parliamentary discussion."[87] He was to receive 250 pounds a year, plus forty pounds annually to help in his scientific investigations. By 1773, Priestley had accepted, and assumed the post of literary companion to Shelburne. In this capacity he became acquainted with many of the leading governmental figures of the day, as well as with subjects of political interest. He divided his time between Bowood, Shelburne's home, nearby Calne, where his own home was located, and London, for sessions of Parliament.

In 1774, Priestley made his memorable discovery of oxygen,[88] by heating mercuris calcenatus per se with a burning glass. He observed that the gas given off greatly enhanced the burning of a candle, and that when breathed, it was invigorating. Through further experimentation, he discovered the balance that nature maintains between carbon dioxide and oxygen by the collaboration of plants and animals. Interestingly enough, though his discovery of oxygen was the event which ultimately proved the "phlogiston theory" to be incorrect, Priestley never relinquished his belief in it, his last scientific work being "The Doctrine of Phlogiston Established."

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[87]Priestley to Rev. T. Lindsey, no date, but probably from Leeds, September, 1772, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 180-181.

[88]Smith, Priestley in America, p. 7.

While with Lord Shelburne, Priestley continued his theological writings and also published the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism.[89] Moreover, although he held no regular pulpit, he occasionally preached in the Baptist Chapel at Calne.[90]

By 1780, relations between Priestley and Lord Shelburne had grown somewhat strained. Consequently, Priestley left his service, and, after a brief stay in London, moved to Birmingham. Here he preached and taught classes for the young people of his congregation on Sundays, while reserving the rest of the week for writing and experimentation. Each month he attended the meetings of the Lunar Society, where "he could exchange thoughts with such men as Watt, Wedgewood, Darwin, and Boulton."[91] It was also at Birmingham that the most tragic event of his life, the previously mentioned destruction of his house, laboratory, and library, occurred. Though Priestley and his family escaped with their lives, they left Birmingham, never to return.[93]

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[89]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 201.

[90]Gillam, Crucible, p. 103.

[91]Huxley, "Joseph Priestley [1874]," p. 16.

[92]Works of Priestley, I, Part II, 338-340.

[93]Huxley, "Joseph Priestley [1874]," p. 18.

After moving to London, where he found safety but experienced coldness from some of his former friends, Priestley was invited by the congregation of the Gravel Pit Meeting to succeed the recently deceased Dr. Price as their pastor. On December 4, 1791, he took up his new charge, and not only preached, but taught classes for young people at his church and lectured on "History and General Policy" and "Experimental Philosophy" at the New College in Hackney.[94]

After remaining here for a time, Priestley, feeling pressure from those who opposed his views, decided to follow two of his sons who had emigrated to America. On April 8, 1794, he sailed with his wife, for New York on the Sansom. He remained in New York two weeks after his arrival on June 4, 1794, and also spent three weeks in Philadelphia.[95] Then Priestley and his wife journeyed to Northumberland, Pennsylvania, where they made their home.

Although Priestley visited Philadelphia and other places during the next ten years, his home was always Northumberland. During this period, he continued his scientific experiments, preached and lectured both in Northumberland and Philadelphia--where Adams and Jefferson heard

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[94]Gilliam, Crucible, p. 217.

[95]Smith, Priestley in America, pp. 47, 52.

his lectures on the "Evidences of Christianity"--and wrote a good deal in the field of theology. Thomas Jefferson invited him to teach at a new college he was establishing in Virginia, and after Priestley's refusal, Jefferson wrote for advice concerning this educational venture. Priestley replied with four pages of "Hints Concerning Public Education," in which he recommended that one of the nine tutors teach "The Belles Lettres, including universal Grammar, Oratory, criticism and bibligraphy."[96]

On Monday, February 6, 1804, after three years of ill health, Priestley died. He was active until the end, and only an hour before his death had dictated some changes in proof sheets from the printer.

Throughout the seventy-one years of his life, Priestley's quick, versatile mind had led to accomplishments in many fields. While the tremendous scope of his undertakings often made for superficiality--even in chemistry, where his accomplishments were most notable, he failed to recognize the theoretical implications of his own discoveries--few men can boast so many important accomplishments in so many varied fields.

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[96]Priestley to Jefferson, Northumberland, May 8, 1800, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, CVII, 18282-18284.

Samuel Parr, the noted English divine, has left this accurate appraisal of the character and work of Dr. Priestley:

> Let Dr. Priestley be confuted where he is mistaken; let him be exposed where he is superficial; let him be repressed where he is censorious. But let not his attainments be depreciated, because they are numerous, almost without parallel. Let not his talents be ridiculed, because they are superlatively great. Let not his morals be vilified, because they are correct without austerity, and exemplary without ostentation; because they present even to common observers, the innocence of a hermit, and the simplicity of a patriarch; and because a philosphic eye will at once discover in them the deep-fixed root of virtuous principle, and the solid trunk of virtuous habit.[97]

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[97]Quoted in Carrington Bolton (ed.), Scientific Correspondence of Priestley (New York, 1892), p. 220.

CHAPTER II

PRIESTLEY'S RUDIMENTS AND UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

I. Introduction. Although this study is focused primarily upon Priestley as a rhetorician--and thus is mainly concerned with his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism--for at least two reasons it is appropriate that we begin with a survey of Priestley as a grammarian. First, in the Preface to the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, as we shall see, Priestley expresses the belief that one must be skilled in grammar before rhetorical training will be of value to him; thus, a review of his grammars will, in a sense, help prepare the way for a better understanding of his rhetorical theory. Second, and perhaps even more important, as will be specifically mentioned in later chapters, the grammars contain numerous passages that bear directly upon doctrines in Priestley's rhetorical system.

It is also interesting to note that since Priestley's work in his own grammar school at Nantwich was largely the reason for his being offered the tutorship at Warrington, where he actually had the occasion to develop a rhetorical

theory, had he not been a grammarian it is unlikely that he would ever have become a rhetorician.

II. The Rudiments of English Grammar. Priestley's first and most important work as a grammarian was The Rudiments of English Grammar.

A. Facts of Publication. The Rudiments, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was written in 1761 for use in Priestley's grammar school at Nantwich. Because of his move to Warrington late in that year, however, this work was not off the press in time for him to give it a trial in his own school. The Rudiments, which originally sold for one shilling, six pence, was out of print by 1766, but Priestley did not, at that time, expect any further editions.[1]

There were, however, other editions. In fact, the second came only two years later, shortly after Priestley had left Warrington Academy to preach at Leeds. In the Preface to this 1768 edition, he says that he did not intend to republish the Rudiments until he had completed an extensive study of the language, with a view to composing a large work on the subject. But, he explains,

> being frequently importuned to republish the former Grammar, and being so much employed in studies of a very different nature, that I cannot accomplish what I had proposed, I have, in this treatise, republished

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[1]Priestley to Rev. Caleb Rotheram, Warrington, May 18, 1766, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 64.

> that work, with improvements, and so much of the materials I had collected for the larger, as may be of practical use to those who write language. These materials, therefore, I have reduced into as good an order as I can, and have subjoined them to the former Grammar, under the title of "Notes and Observations, for the Use of those who have made some Proficiency in the Language" (p. 3).[2]

This enlarged edition evidently met with some approval, for it was twice reprinted the next year, 1769.[3]

The third and, according to both Cooper[4] and Rutt,[5] the last edition prepared by Priestley himself, appeared in 1772. Fulton and Peters, however, list a fourth edition, printed at Dublin in 1784--probably an issue without revision by the author, and perhaps even without his knowledge.[6]

By 1785 the grammar was no longer available, though it was "frequently inquired for" (p. 13). On April 5, of that year, Priestley replied to Rev. Joseph Bretland of Exeter:

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[2]All page references inserted parenthetically in the text of this chapter are to the Works of Priestley, XXIII.

[3]John F. Fulton and Charlotte H. Peters, Works of Joseph Priestley, 1733-1804; Preliminary Short Title List (New Haven, 1937), p. 17.

[4]Thomas Cooper, "Observations on the Writings of Joseph Priestley," Memoirs of Dr. Joseph Priestley, to the year 1795, written by himself; with a continuation, to the time of his decease, by his son, Joseph Priestley (Northumberland, 1806), II, 378.

[5]Works of Priestley, XXIII, 3n.

[6]Fulton and Peters, Preliminary Short Title List, p. 17.

> I shall be much obliged to you if you will take my English Grammar under your own care, as if it was your own, and make whatever additions or alterations you think proper; and if you choose, I will write you a short letter, which you may insert in the preface, requesting it as a favour that you would do so. I cannot attend to these matters now.[7]

On July 4, 1786, he wrote Bretland, "I thank you for the copy of the Grammar. I have no doubt that I shall like it, and wish that it may answer your purpose."[8] This somewhat enlarged edition was twice reprinted, in 1789 and 1798.[9]

John T. Rutt, the collector of Priestley's Theological and Miscellaneous Works, made the final printing of the grammar. It is included in Volume XXIII of that work, published in 1824, copies being issued separately from the complete set again in 1826 and 1833. Rutt used the text of the 1798 printing--with Bretland's additions in brackets--and a Preface appearing in the 1768, 1769, and 1772 editions.

Both the first and second editions of the Rudiments were thought significant enough to deserve reviews in the Monthly Review. The unknown author who wrote about the first edition states:

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[7]Priestley to Bretland, Birmingham, April 5, 1785, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 379-380.

[8]Priestley to Bretland, Birmingham, July 4, 1786, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 391.

[9]Fulton and Peters, Preliminary Short Title List, p. 17.

> The Rudiments of English Grammar are exhibited with great accuracy and clearness in this little treatise, by Mr. Priestley. Upon the whole we commend his brief manner of explaining and laying down his Precepts; but we could wish that he had been a little more diffuse in the Syntactical Part.[10]

The remainder of this review, about two pages, deals with the "Observations on Style," appended to the grammar. Although the reviewer thinks Priestley is in error in his doubts as to whether the ancient poets intended the structure or sound of their verses to be expressive of the sense, he commends these observations as being, "in general, judicious and ingenious."[11]

The review of the second edition, in 1768, was done by Andrew Kippis, one of Priestley's close friends. He confines his remarks almost entirely to the "Notes and Observations" which were added to the first edition, and his comments on these are generally favorable. He concludes by saying, "Such as are critics in the English language will, we believe, generally, though, perhaps, not universally, agree with our author in his remarks and strictures. . . ."[12]

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[10]"The Rudiments of English Grammar, adapted to the Use of Schools; with Observations on Style. By Joseph Priestley," Monthly Review, 1809 ed., XXVI (January, 1762), 28.

[11]Ibid.

[12][Andrew Kippis], "The Rudiments of English Grammar, adapted to the use of Schools; with Notes and Observations, for the use of those who have made some Proficiency in the use of Language. By Joseph Priestley," Monthly Review,

B. Summary of the Contents of the Rudiments. The Rudiments of English Grammar falls naturally into three divisions: the Preface, a systematic grammar of the English language, and various notes and observations on grammatical matters.

1. The Preface. In the Preface, particularly of the second and third editions of the Rudiments, Priestley reveals much about the purpose of the work and his approach to the subject. First, he makes it clear that he hopes to contribute to a simplification of English grammar. "I own I am surprised," he says, "to see so much of the distribution, and technical terms of the Latin grammar, retained in the grammar of our tongue; where they are exceedingly awkward, and absolutely superfluous; being such as could not possibly have entered into the head of any man, who had not been previously acquainted with Latin" (p. 4). For example, he suggests that since English verbs have no inflectional variations to represent a future tense, there is no reason to impose the future tense of the Latin upon English. He contends, "We should no more have given a particular name to the combination of the verb with the auxiliary shall or will,

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1809 ed., XXXIX (September, 1768), 186. Kippis is identified as the author of this article in Benjamin C. Nangle, The Monthly Review, First Series, 1749-1789; Indexes of Contributors (Oxford, 1934), p. 180.

than to those that are made with the auxiliaries do, have, can, must, or any other" (p. 4). Priestley recognizes that some may think he has "leaned too much from the Latin idiom," but, he says, "I think it is evident, that all other grammarians have leaned too much to the analogies of that language, contrary to our modes of speaking, and to the analogies of other languages more like our own" (p. 5). In short, he states, "I cannot help flattering myself, that future grammarians will owe me some obligation, for introducing this uniform simplicity, so well suited to the genius of our language, into the English grammar" (p. 5).

A second service which Priestley hoped to render to English grammar was the detection, "in time, [of] a very great number of gallicisms, which have insinuated themselves into the style of many of our most justly admired writers" (p. 5). He believes these "forms of speech," borrowed from the French and incorporated into English--such as the use of the English "of" in imitation of the French de (p. 52), and the substitution of the oblique case for the nominative in some constructions (pp. 69, 71)--"tend greatly to injure the true idiom of the English language, being contrary to its most established analogies" (p. 5).

Also in the Preface, Priestley sets forth what he regards as the proper standard for grammar. He says:

> It must be allowed, that the custom of speaking is the original and only just standard of any language. We

> see, in all grammars, that this is sufficient to establish a rule, even contrary to the strongest analogies of the language with itself. Must not this custom, therefore, be allowed to have some weight, in favour of those forms of speech, to which our best writers and speakers seem evidently prone; forms which are contrary to no analogy of the language with itself, and which have been disapproved by grammarians, only from certain abstract and arbitrary considerations, and when their decisions were not prompted by the genius of the language; which discovers itself in nothing more than in the general propensity of these who use it to certain modes of construction. I think, however, that I have not, in any case, seemed to favour what our grammarians will call an irregularity, but where the genius of the language, and not only single examples, but the general practice of those who write it, and that almost universal custom of those who speak it, have obliged me to do it. I also think I have seemed to favour those irregularities, no more than the degree of the propensity I have mentioned, when unchecked by a regard to arbitrary rules, in those who use the forms of speech I refer to, will authorize me (p. 5).

Priestley, then, recognizes the usage of "the best writers and speakers" as the real authority in the grammar of a language. Upon this basis, he opposes those grammarians who would fix the language by setting themselves up as authorities to legislate the rules of language; and, by the same token, he opposes the establishment of a public Academy, "invested with authority to ascertain the use of words," and to "reform and fix a language" (pp. 9-10). While Priestley does not hesitate to give his opinion on matters relating to grammar, he does so realizing that this opinion must be confirmed or refuted by time and future usage (pp. 8-9).

When the usage among "good authors" is contradictory, Priestley attempts to resolve the question by a study of "the analogy of the language." And if this still fails to provide a suitable answer, he believes that the question should remain undecided, "till all-governing custom . . . declare in favour of the one or the other" (p. 9).

In attempting to determine current usage--by which to decide questions on points of grammar--Priestley says he did not return to "Swift, Addison, and others, who wrote about half a century ago, in what is generally called the classical period of our tongue" (p. 6). Rather, he refers to his contemporaries, so that the present character of the language may be seen. A comparison of this current usage with that of preceding periods makes it possible to determine existing trends (p. 6).

Priestley also makes an appeal that Englishmen study their own native tongue; for, he says, it is now much more useful to students, in general, than Greek or Latin. He further points out that even though the English language is being more widely used and accepted, still it is not taught in the schools. He suggests, therefore, that teachers introduce into their schools, "English grammar, English composition, and frequent English translations from authors in other languages" (p. 11).

Finally, he concludes the Preface to the 1768, 1769, and 1772 editions of the Rudiments with an acknowledgement to those writers whom he has found most useful. First, he mentions Johnson, whose "admirable Dictionary" has been of great benefit; but at the same time, he censures this author's grammar, saying, "It is [a] pity he had not formed as just and as extensive an idea of English grammar" (p. 12). Second, Priestley refers to Lowth's grammar:

> I must, also, acknowledge my obligations to Dr. Lowth, whose short Introduction to English Grammar was first published about a month after the former edition of mine. Though our plans, definitions of terms, and opinions, differ very considerably, I have taken a few of his examples (though generally for a purpose different from his) to make my own more complete. He, or any other person, is welcome to make the same use of those which I have collected. It is from an amicable union of labours, together with a generous emulation in all the friends of science, that we may most reasonably expect the extension of all kinds of knowledge (p. 12).[13]

2. Systematic Grammar of English. This second division of the Rudiments begins with a brief section titled, "The General Distribution," in which Priestley defines and partitions his subject. Language, he calls "a method of conveying our ideas to the minds of other persons"; and grammar, he defines as "a collection of observations on the

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[13] McLachlan, Warrington Academy, pp. 85-86, tells that "Priestley, when engaged upon his Rudiments of English Grammar . . . enlisted the help of Thomas Barnes, who supplied him from his reading with examples of false grammatical constructions in celebrated authors."

structure of [a language], and a system of rules for the proper use of it" (p. 13). Also in this preliminary section, he lists the letters of the English alphabet and divides them into various types of vowels and consonants.

Moreover, it is here that Priestley distributes words into eight parts of speech: nouns, adjectives, pronouns, verbs, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections (p. 14). He explains, in a footnote, that he has followed other grammarians in this division, except that he has replaced participles with adjectives, which he thinks are "more evidently a distinct part of speech" (p. 14).

Following these introductory matters, Priestley divides the subject matter of grammar into five parts, each of which becomes a major division of the Rudiments: inflections of words, grammatical use and signification of certain words, syntax, prosody, and grammatical figures. Each of these he takes up in order, and in the treatment of each he follows the catechetical, question and answer method.

a) Inflections of Words. First, Priestley deals with the inflection of nouns or substantives, which he divides into proper and common. "The terminations of nouns," he says, "are changed on two accounts [,] principally, Number and Case, and sometimes also on account of Gender" (p. 15). He then gives examples of various nouns in the singular and plural, nominative and genitive, and masculine and feminine.

Next, Priestley presents the inflections of adjectives, which he defines as "words that denote the properties or qualities of things" (p. 17). These, he says, "change their terminations on account of Comparison only," and for adjectives he lists endings corresponding with the positive, comparative, and superlative degrees (p. 17).

Pronouns, the third part of speech discussed under inflection, are divided into personal, possessive, relative, and demonstrative. Personal pronouns, he says, are inflected in the first, second, and third persons, and in the nominative and oblique cases; possessive pronouns, like adjectives, are indeclinable, except when they are used as substantives; relative pronouns, which include interrogatives, are declined in the nominative, genitive, and oblique cases; and demonstrative pronouns are declined in the singular and plural.

By far the greatest space is given to the inflection of verbs, which are defined as words that express "what is affirmed of, or attributed to a thing," and which denote "action, or being, or the modes of being" (p. 19). Priestley divides verbs into transitive and neuter (intransitive), and suggests two tenses, present and preter (past). Each of these tenses has a conjunctive form for the expression of doubts or wishes. There are also two forms of the participle: the present, ending in "ing"; and the preterite, generally ending in "ed."

The most complicated aspect of the inflection of verbs occurs in connection with the use of auxiliaries. Since Priestley eliminates all but the present and preter tenses--on the grounds that these are the only tenses having a corresponding termination--he makes "compound tenses" perform all other tense functions. He explains this system, saying:

> The compound tenses of verbs may be commodiously distributed into three distinct classes or orders, according as the auxiliary verbs that constitute them require the radical form, the participle present, or the participle preterite to be joined with them. They are likewise single, double, or triple, according as one, two, or three auxiliary verbs are made use of (p. 26).

Thus, what others have called the "future tense," such as "I shall hear," Priestley "simplifies" to "the single compound of the first order"--single because it involves the use of only one auxiliary, and of the first order because it uses the radical form of the verb. A single compound of the second order, one which unites a single auxiliary with the present participle, he illustrates with the progressive present form, "I am hearing." "I shall be hearing," the progressive future, Priestley calls a double compound of the second order--two auxiliaries with the present participle; while "I shall have been hearing," the progressive future perfect, he terms a triple compound of the second order. Turning to the third order, which includes those compound forms utilizing the preterite participle, Priestley lists

the present tense in the passive voice, "I am heard," as an example of the single type; while the double compound of the third order is illustrated with "I shall be heard," future passive voice. Finally, the triple compound in the third order is exemplified by "I shall have been heard," usually termed the future perfect, in the passive voice (see pp. 26-28). While the simplicity of this system may be open to some question, it does provide a notable example of Priestley's attempt to avoid Latin terminology.

Under this same rubric of "inflection," Priestley defines the remaining parts of speech--adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections--even though he recognizes that they have only one form. Also included in this first division is a brief discussion of various prefixes and suffixes which may be used with verbs, nouns, and adjectives.

b) Grammatical Use and Signification of Certain Words. The complete title of this brief section of only three pages is "Of the grammatical Use and Signification of certain Words, especially such as the paucity of our Inflections obliges us to make use of, in order to express what, in other Languages, is effected by a change of termination." In this section, then, the author explains certain English words which he believes to be adequate substitutes for the inflectional forms found in other languages.

Under this heading Priestley first suggests the variations in meaning which are made possible by the use of the articles "a," "an," and "the." In general, he says, these suggest the "extent" of the words before which they are placed. "A" or "an" indicates "that one only of a species or some one single person is meant, but not any one in particular" (p. 32). "The," on the other hand, "limits the signification of a word to one or more of a species, or shews that some particular person or thing is referred to" (p. 33).

Second, Priestley explains the use of auxiliary verbs in expressing those ideas which other languages signify by a change in termination. The auxiliary "to do," he says, renders an affirmation "more emphatical." A form of "to be" joined with the present participle, "expresses the affirmation with the greater emphasis and precision"; while the preterite participle "to be" signifies "the suffering or receiving [of] the action expressed." "Shall" and "will" enable one to foretell; "can" signifies a power, "may" a right, and "must" a necessity. Moreover, "to have," employed as an auxiliary, "signifies that what is affirmed [,] is or was past" (pp. 33-34). In connection with verbal expressions, then, Priestley attempts to accomplish a considerable simplification of English grammar. Without ever referring, by name, to the emphatic and progressive forms of the present and

past, the passive voice, and the future, perfect, and pluperfect tenses, he attempts to explain the signification of each of these by a treatment of auxiliary verbs.

c) Syntax. The third major section of Priestley's systematic treatment of grammar deals with syntax, or "the Order of Words in a Sentence, and the Correspondence of one Word to another." The usual order of words in a sentence, he says, is subject, verb, and object, with adjectives immediately before the substantive, adverbs between the subject and the verb, and the pronoun relative immediately after its antecedent. As to agreement, he says that "adjective pronouns" must correspond with their substantives in number, that a verb and its subject must have the same number and person, and that the oblique case of the pronoun is used after transitive verbs and prepositions.[14]

d) Prosody. Prosody, the treatment of which occupies only one page, Priestley defines as "that part of grammar which teaches the rules of pronunciation and of versification" (p. 39). He asserts that pronunciation consists in "laying the accent upon the proper syllable of a word, and the emphasis upon the proper word of a sentence"; while

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[14]Joseph Bretland, evidently believing this section not sufficiently detailed to be clear on all matters, added three pages to the discussion, thus more than doubling the length of this portion of the Rudiments. Works of Priestley, XXIII, 34-38.

versification depends "upon arranging the syllables of words according to certain laws, respecting quantity or accent" (p. 39). Following these definitions, Priestley gives a brief explanation of various types of metre: trochaic, iambic, spondaic, and dactylic.[15]

e) Figures. The final portion of Priestley's systematic treatment of grammar consists of a mere half page of remarks on figures, which he defines as "those deviations from grammatical or natural propriety, which are either allowed or admired" (p. 41). Here are mentioned orthographical figures--such as aphoeresis, syncope, and apocope--and various types of ellipsis. Orthographical figures he allows only in familiar writing and verse, and an overuse of ellipsis he declares to be a fault.

Before going on to the next major portion of the grammar, Priestley includes a four-page chart of irregularly inflected verbs. It is also at this point that he presents his "Observations on Style," a section which appeared in the first edition only. While these remarks contain little that is not more fully treated elsewhere in Priestley's writings, they do include the "germs" of many ideas which appear later in the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism: the reduction of

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[15]Here again, Bretland augments Priestley's discussion with a page and a half of additional material. Works of Priestley, XXIII, 40-41.

a discourse to a series of propositions asserting the correspondence of a subject and predicate; the division of discourses into narrative and argumentative; an insistence upon perspicuity above adornment; the presence of certain Romantic tendencies in his critical thought; and a discussion of harmony and figures of speech (pp. 483-491).

3. Notes and Observations on Grammar. The third and concluding division of Priestley's Rudiments of English Grammar--appearing in all editions except the first--is titled "Notes and Observations for the use of those who have made some proficiency in the language." Occupying over sixty per cent of the total number of pages, this section is actually a collection of examples from many writers, primarily of the eighteenth century, which demonstrate "current usage" on certain grammatical matters.

These remarks, which, in large measure, follow the same organizational pattern utilized in the second part of the grammar, open with a treatment of various inflectional matters, then move through a discussion of articles and auxiliary verbs, and finally, to questions of syntax.

In connection with inflection, Priestley discusses the plural of nouns; the genitive case; the feminine form of certain nouns; the comparative and superlative degrees of adjectives; the declension of various types of pronouns; and the formation of different verb forms, particularly of

conjunctives, participles, and auxiliaries. Following inflection, he speaks of adverbs and conjunctions; the composition and derivation of certain words; the various meanings of the article found in contemporary authors; and the use of prepositions in general, and of certain frequently used ones in particular. Finally, in the closing portion of this third part of the grammar, Priestley treats various matters of syntax, giving particular attention to the correspondence of words expressing numbers, and to the correspondence of particles.[16]

Upon the subjects treated in this section, Priestley has collected over five hundred quotations, ranging in length from one word to a sentence, from current works. By far the most frequently quoted author is Hume, whose works are cited almost two hundred times, sometimes with approval and sometimes in censure. Rutt adds in a footnote that Hume told Mr. Griffith, a bookseller, that by reading Priestley's grammar he was "made sensible of the gallicisms and peculiarities of his style" (p. 7). Other authors and

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[16]For an analysis of Priestley's position on specific grammatical questions of the eighteenth century, see Sterling Andrus Leonard, The Doctrine of Correctness in English Usage, 1700-1800 ("University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature," No. 25. Madison, 1929); W. F. Bryan, "Notes on the Founders of Prescriptive English Grammar," Manly Anniversary Studies (Chicago, 1923), pp. 383-393; and Charles C. Fries, "The Rules of Common School Grammars," Publications of the Modern Language Association of America, XLII (March, 1927), 221-237.

works frequently mentioned are Addison, some fifty times; Smollett's Voltaire, thirty; Harris' Hermes and Three Treatises, eighteen; the Bible, fifteen; Macaulay's History, fourteen; Swift, thirteen; and Bolingbroke on History, twelve. Also he occasionally speaks of the works of Pope, Dryden, Shakespeare, Milton, Blackstone, and Locke, as well as those of less familiar authors.

4. Summary. The Rudiments of English Grammar, therefore, as the name suggests, is a presentation of the elementary elements of the English language. In it the author attempts to furnish a textbook for the classroom; and, at the same time, he seeks to bring about certain simplifications in the science of English grammar, especially by making it more independent of Latin and French. Of considerable importance, too, is the fact that he makes "usage," not "authoritative pronouncements," the standard for determining the laws of grammar. Although this work is by no means a comprehensive treatment of the English language, it does provide sufficient material for a beginning course in the subject--the purpose for which it was designed.

III. A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar. Priestley's second work on language, written only a year after the publication of the Rudiments, was A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar.

A. Facts of Publication. One of the courses which Priestley taught throughout his years at Warrington covered what he termed "the theory of language and universal grammar," and for this course he composed, in 1762, a series of nineteen lectures.[17] This work was privately printed for the exclusive use of his students, with the following advertisement attached:

> Lest the following performance should, by any accident, fall into other hands than those for whose use it is peculiarly calculated; it is necessary to advertise in this place, that it is only intended to furnish the lecturer with a convenient method for discussing the several subjects of it in a more diffuse and similar manner, and by no means to be a full and compleat set of lectures, that need no further enlargement.[18]

Although Priestley intended to have this work published,[19] his plan was not accomplished during his lifetime. These lectures were included, however, in the Rutt collection of The Theological and Miscellaneous Works of Joseph Priestley, where they appear following the Rudiments in Volume XXIII--originally published in 1824, and issued separately from the set in 1826 and 1833. On numerous incidental matters, Rutt's edition varies somewhat

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[17] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 51.

[18] Joseph Priestley, A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar (Warrington, 1762), p. ii.

[19] See Works of Priestley, XXIII, 121; Priestley, Lectures, p. 29.

from the original: the table of contents is reduced, blanks in which the student was to write the appropriate Greek and Hebrew words are filled in, a few sentences are reworded with the original meaning maintained, typographical errors are corrected, some paragraphs are combined, capitalization and punctuation are slightly modified, the section on references at the end of the work is rearranged, and Rutt includes in a footnote the advertisement mentioned above. In addition to the original footnotes by Priestley himself, notes by Rutt and Dr. Andrew Kippis are supplied.[20]

B. Summary of the Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar. "Language," begins Priestley, "whether spoken or written, is properly termed an art"; and as such, it is, like all other arts, founded upon a science which explains the basic materials that it uses. The science underlying language as an art--or as Priestley terms it, the "theory or rationale of language"--is the subject of this course of lectures. In them he takes "sounds and characters," his terms for phonetic and orthographic symbols, as the two basic linguistic elements, and attempts to point out (1) the powers of expression of which these are capable, (2) the

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[20]The notes by Dr. Kippis contain additional material which he supplied when using this work for a course at the Academy in Hoxton. Works of Priestley, XXIII, 121.

connection between these symbols and the ideas which they may be used to represent, (3) and the various modes of expression which may be employed in different languages in order to convey the same mental conceptions (pp. 122-124).

By comparing various languages in this manner, Priestley believes that it is possible to discover and to remedy deficiencies which may exist in any particular language. Moreover, he suggests that the study of the theory of language and universal grammar is valuable because of the fact that language is both "that art which is the means of preserving and bringing to perfection all other arts," and the faculty which is, to a great degree, "the measure of our intellectual powers" (p. 125).

Although the nineteen lectures in this work are not grouped into major divisions, the over-all plan is clear. Priestley begins with a discussion of the two basic elements of language--the first chapter dealing with articulation, and the next two with the origin of letters, hieroglyphics, characters, and alphabets. Having considered the phonetic and orthographic symbols which make up words, he then classifies words into different parts of speech, and treats each in some detail--this task occupying six lectures. Following the discussion of words, he turns to the combination of words into sentences, and for three lectures deals with various aspects of syntax. In the next five lectures he

relates the histories of various languages, particularly the Hebrew, Latin, and Greek, in an attempt to show the pattern by which languages develop, run their course, and then decay. He then discloses what he believes to be the essential characteristics of a perfect language, and makes a final comparison of different languages. Lastly, in the closing lecture, he gives his opinion as to how there came to be a diversity of languages, tells of what value this has been, and expresses the hope that some day there will be a universal philosophical language.

Having seen the general scope and organization of the Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar, we turn now to a more detailed consideration of their contents. In Lecture I, "Of Articulation," Priestley suggests that like all animals, man has been given the power of communicating with others of his species. This capability not only enables him to produce sounds, but by "varying the aperture of the mouth," and by "checking and stopping [the sound] in a variety of ways, by the action of the tongue, lips, palate, and teeth," he is able to produce vowels and consonants. These, in turn, may be combined into words, which stand as symbols for ideas. Although the particular sounds which may be produced are relatively few, the combinations of which they are capable are almost endless. In connection with these sounds, man also has the ability

to convey feelings and thoughts by using "gestures and postures of the body, and particularly motions of the hands, and of the features of the countenance" (pp. 127-129).

Having discussed the phonetic aspect of language, Priestley, in the next two lectures, considers the orthographic element. After suggesting that writing is superior to speaking from the standpoint of permanence, but that speaking is superior to writing in variety of expression, he attempts to establish how it was that man came to use written symbols to stand for spoken ones. He discounts the theory held by David Hartley and others, that writing is of divine origin; for, he says, it is not impossible that man himself could have invented writing. The beginnings were, of course, crude; and, perhaps, the first attempts utilized symbols for only a few of the more visible consonant sounds, such as labials, dentals, linguals, palatals, and gutterals. Vowels, according to this view, were introduced later. Moreover, it is probable that picture-writing preceded any sort of alphabet, and was eventually condensed into hieroglyphics, then into characters like the Chinese, and finally into an alphabet. Upon this basis, Priestley presents a brief history of alphabets, emphasizing the transition from the ancient sets of letters into the more modern ones.

With the history and uses of alphabets now set forth, Priestley turns to a discussion of words, and how the various parts of speech grew out of necessary language functions, presenting in this connection the argument common in discussions of universal grammar. Nouns, he says, were the first to be developed, for they are the names of things. Adjectives probably followed nouns, for after naming objects, man would next be likely to observe the properties which these objects have in common, such as hardness, softness, redness, and whiteness. Then, in order to assert that an object possessed a certain attribute, the development of the verb would be necessary. Following this would come, in order, prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, adverbs, and interjections, thus producing a classification of the parts of speech which is precisely the same as that found in the Rudiments.

In Lectures V through IX, Priestley treats these eight parts of speech in detail, defining each, and giving its various forms and uses. In general, the treatment is similar to that appearing in the Rudiments, except that it includes forms from other languages as well as English. In discussing verbs, however, a far more thorough analysis is given, for Priestley deals not only with the "simple" forms in English, but with the more complex forms in Latin and Greek. Thus he gives a rather complete list of the moods

or modes appearing in various languages--including indicative, imperative, subjunctive, potential, and optative, as well as the infinitive, participle, and gerund. Tense, likewise, is treated in considerable detail, for he explains the "present," "imperfect," "preterperfect," "preterpluperfect," and illustrates, though he does not name, the future and future perfect. For some reason, Priestley makes no mention of either the past tense or the aorist tense, both of which are at least as significant a s those named.

Lectures X and XI deal primarily with syntax. Here the author defines and illustrates simple and compound sentences, and relative clauses; and briefly comments on periods and paragraphs. In this section he also includes some material on the development of transitions in a language and on the general order of words in sentences in various languages.

With the conclusion of Lecture XI, Priestley proceeds to a wholly new subject. He has now considered the elements of language, and their combination into words and sentences. The remainder of the work deals primarily with the patterns that may be discerned in the growth and corruption of various languages, the desirable qualities in a perfect language, and a final comparison of languages.

If the users of a language, he writes, have many contacts with other nations, and if they make a considerable

use of speaking and writing in their governmental, social, and artistic functions, then their language will tend to become enlarged and embellished. As in architecture, dress, and even life itself, however, after a language has achieved considerable excellence, there is a tendency for ornament to be regarded above usefulness; and when this occurs, the language will fall into a state of decadence. This process is illustrated at length by references to the history of the Latin language.

Priestley also attempts to apply this pattern to the English language. During the reign of Queen Anne, the English tongue became "fixed," he writes, at least to an extent never before realized; and those works which contributed to this standardization, he calls "classical," in the sense that they were imitated by succeeding writers. Since, however, the English language has not reached perfection, its progress may be considerably accelerated by the work of grammarians and critics, so long as they keep within their proper sphere of analyzing and recommending, and do not attempt to become arbitrary authorities. As in the Rudiments, Priestley insists upon custom as the supreme arbiter in linguistic matters. "The general prevailing custom," he says, "whatever it happens to be, can be the only standard for the time that it prevails" (p. 198). He does state, however, that analogy both within a language itself, and with other languages, may be of use in its improvement.

The next three lectures, XIII, XIV, and XV, present Priestley's theory concerning the development of Greek and Latin into complex languages. He believes it was more through the accidents of climate, geography, and politics, than through design that these languages, particularly the Greek, became so highly inflected. After his explanation of the rise and development of these ancient languages, he considers their gradual decay and transition into the modern languages. Lecture XV is concluded with a few comments on the translation of one language into another.

In connection with these remarks on the progress of a language, Priestley undertakes to explain why in the history of many literatures metrical compositions tend to precede those in prose. The reason for this, he thinks, is that before any writing takes place, verse--since it is more easily remembered than prose--is used for the transmission of legends and history. When literature begins to be produced, therefore, it is only natural that the first compositions should be in the already familiar verse of legends and history.

Before making the final comparison of the languages he has thus far discussed, Priestley presents what he believes to be the criteria for determining the value of a language. A perfect language, he asserts, must meet the three following standards:

> In the first place it is necessary there be a sufficient copia of words; secondly, that there be no ambiguities of words or constructions; and, lastly, that the pronunciation of it be not grating, but pleasing to the ear. The two former of these criterions contribute to clear expression, and are therefore the fundamental properties of a good language: the latter is a matter of ornament only (p. 227).

Having set forth these criteria, the author proceeds to "characterize the several languages that gentlemen of a liberal education have occasion to make themselves acquainted with, or make use of" (p. 234). In this connection he presents rather detailed analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, among the ancient tongues, and French, Spanish, Italian, German, and English among the modern languages.

The final lecture in this grammar deals with "the origin, use, and cessation of diversities of languages." Diversity among languages, Priestley believes, had its beginning with the building of the Tower of Babel, and was "brought about by the interposition of the Divine Being"; but he thinks it no impiety to suppose that this occurrence might have been accomplished by some natural means (p. 243). Since, he supposes, the original language was not, by that time, highly developed, nor probably written at all, it is not unlikely that as men were dispersed into various climates where they followed different ways of living, they made almost completely different developments of the few rudiments existent at the time of their separation.

While admitting that this diversity of language has provided some inconvenience, Priestley thinks it has also had its advantages. The study of different languages, for example, has a broadening influence upon the human mind; and, moreover, the development of many languages has led to a better understanding of the rationale of language as a whole.

Priestley closes his final lecture with a few remarks on a universal philosophical language. Although he believes that in his day the time is not ripe for the completion of the plan, he is favorable to the idea of such a language, and expresses the hope that it may someday be accomplished.

Finally, the author provides a list of some of the more important works on the subject of these lectures, to which he would refer the student:

> A general and rational Grammar, by Messieurs de Port Royal; as also their Latin and Greek Grammars. Harris's Hermes [or Philosophical Enquiry Concerning Universal Grammar]. Bayley's "Introduction to Languages." Robertson's Method of reading Hebrew. (Introduction.) Hartley's "Observations on Man," Ch. iii. Sect. 1. "Of words, and the ideas associated with them." Du Fresne's Glossary of the Modern Greek. (Preface.) Hadrian Reland's Miscellaneous Dissertations, Vol. III. Richard's Welsh Grammar and Dictionary. Wilkins's "Essay towards a real Character and a Philosophical Language." Brerewood on Languages. Sharpe's Two Dissertations on the Origin, Construction, Division, and Relation of Languages, and the Original Powers of Letters (p. 251).

IV. The Significance and Influence of Priestley's Grammars. Following the publication of Johnson's epoch-making dictionary, in 1755, great interest developed in the grammar of the English language. While previous grammarians had been mainly concerned with teaching the English tongue to foreigners, the grammarians of this period desired to settle questions of correctness for the benefit of Englishmen themselves. Standard histories of the English language invariably list Jospeh Priestley among the most significant of these grammarians.

A. Priestley's Insistence on Usage as the Standard of Correctness. The most frequently mentioned reason for Priestley's importance as a grammarian is his insistence upon "usage" as the standard of correctness. The majority of eighteenth-century grammarians--men such as Robert Lowth[21] and Lindley Murray[22]--attempted to be prescribers, passing judgment or setting up rules without a careful consideration of current usage.[23] Priestley, on the other hand, vigorously opposed this authoritarian view, and strongly championed usage as the standard. S. A. Leonard, in his study of the

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[21]A Short Introduction to Grammar (1762).

[22]English Grammar (1795).

[23]Margaret M. Bryant, Modern English and Its Heritage (New York, 1948), p. 78.

doctrine of correctness in English usage between 1700 and 1800, concludes:

> Only one writer, Joseph Priestley, appears to have held to a clear conception of the force of usage, as presented by Horace and Quintilian and by Locke and his followers. His work, marred of course by his lack of training for specifically linguistic research, is, almost alone in the eighteenth century, a precursor of modern study of these problems.[24]

Fries also has noted Priestley's protest against the general tendency of the grammarians toward arbitrary rules,[25] and Baugh calls Priestley the person who, "more whole-heartedly than anyone else," advocated the doctrine of usage.[26] Bryan's comparative study of Priestley, Lowth, George Campbell, and Noah Webster, likewise, reveals that on most matters where these writers failed to agree, Priestley was in the more liberal position; and this writer concludes that "Priestley had more regard for the observed facts of usage than for the rules of grammar."[27] With this sentiment Bryant concurs, saying, "In the eighteenth century . . . the chief exponent of this doctrine [of usage] was the philosopher, theologian, and chemist, Joseph Priestley."[28]

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[24]Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness, p. 14.

[25]Fries, "Rules of Common School Grammars," pp. 231-232.

[26]Albert C. Baugh, A History of the English Language (New York, 1935), p. 349.

[27]Bryan, "Notes on the Founders of Prescriptive Grammar," p. 387.

[28]Bryant, Modern English and Its Heritage, p. 265;

Numerous writers have also pointed out the connection between Priestley's position and that of George Campbell, author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776). Campbell, like Priestley, believed language to be "purely a species of fashion," established by the consent of the people, in which "certain sounds come to be appropriated to certain things"; and "certain ways of inflecting and combining those sounds come to be established, as denoting the relations which subsist among the things signified." Campbell further states, "It is not the business of grammar, as some critics seem preposterously to imagine, to give law to the fashions which regulate our speech. On the contrary, from its conformity to these, and from that alone, it derives all its authority and value."[29]

In explanation of usage, Campbell gives his three famous standards: first, the use must be reputable, that is, general, and in vogue with the well educated; second, the use must be national, as opposed to both a provincial and a foreign use; and third, the form must be in present use. In presenting these views, Campbell writes, "I

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see also Mario Pei, The Story of English (Philadelphia, 1952), p. 329.

[29]George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York, 1834), p. 141. See also Bryant, Modern English and Its Heritage, p. 265; George H. McKnight, Modern English in the Making (New York, 1928), p. 391.

entirely agree with Dr. Priestley, that it will never be the arbitrary rules of any man, or body of men, whatever, that will ascertain the language, there being no other dictator here but use."[30]

Although Priestley and Campbell agree on the standard for deciding grammatical questions, Priestley appears to apply this principle with greater consistency than does Campbell.[31] Leonard calls Campbell's work "an amazing instance of attempted adherence to the principle [of usage] and its utter betrayal."[32] Baugh, likewise, states, "The difference between Priestley and Campbell is that whereas Campbell expounded the doctrine of usage with admirable clarity and then violated it, Priestley was almost everywhere faithful to his principles."[33]

B. Priestley's Attempt to Free English from Foreign Influence. Charles Fries, in his study of eighteenth-century school grammars, concludes that, to some

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[30]Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 150.

[31]For discussion of the points of difference between Priestley and Campbell, see Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric, pp. 156, 159, 161-162, 182, 194, 208, where Campbell himself points out certain differences; Bryan, "Notes on the Founders of Presciptive Grammar," passim; and Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness, passim.

[32]Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness, p. 16.

[33]Baugh, A History of the English Language, p. 351.

extent, all grammarians of the period use the apparatus of the Latin grammars. He recognizes, however, that Priestley made a very definite attempt to "lean" as far as possible from the Latin, and states, "This very independence of Priestley was perhaps one reason why his grammar had so little influence."[34] Leonard, likewise, takes cognizance of Priestley's efforts to free English grammar from unnecessary Latin influence, and believes that he--along with William Ward, and Robert Lowth--played an important role in winning the "battle for independence from Latin."[35] This same writer considers Priestley and Campbell as two of the leaders in the fight for "national" usage, as opposed to the intrusion of Latin and French constructions and idioms.[36]

C. Priestley's Classification of the Parts of Speech. It will be recalled that in his Rudiments, Priestley states that he believes it wise to make the adjective a separate part of speech, while classifying the participle as merely a form of the verb. Thus, with this innovation, Priestley designates nouns, adjectives, pronouns, verbs, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections as the parts of speech. Although this classification is not

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[34]Fries, "Rules of Common School Grammars," p. 228n.

[35]Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness, pp. 52-53.

[36]Ibid., p. 151.

an extensive departure from that employed by previous grammarians, it is significant because it is the distribution which has prevailed to the present time. As Charles Fries says, "The current conventional classification of words into the particular eight parts of speech now common seems to have begun with Joseph Priestley and to have been generally accepted in the grammars since 1850."[37]

D. Priestley's Influence as a Grammarian. Priestley's influence as a grammarian was not so great as that of some of his contemporaries, men such as Lowth and Murray, nor were his grammars so widely used. As already intimated in the statement from Fries, the very independence and originality which make him significant today, were probably the primary reasons why his grammars exerted relatively little influence.[38] With this observation Leonard agrees, saying that because Priestley's Rudiments was "so remote from the general trend of thought in his time," it was "without important influence." "It did not," he continues, "often figure in the ireful combats in which the other grammarians engaged, but was obscured by the brilliance of Lowth's completely logical grammar, published only a

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[37]Charles Carpenter Fries, The Structure of English (New York, 1952), p. 66.

[38]Fries, "Rules of Common School Grammars," p. 228n.

month after Priestley's, and was completely buried under Lindley Murray's eclectic productions."[39]

Priestley's grammars, however, were not entirely without their effect, for they undoubtedly exerted some influence on those who used them as textbooks, and probably upon other grammarians as well. As already suggested, George Campbell was familiar with the Rudiments; and, since he refers to it often, it is possible that his knowledge of Priestley's position on the doctrine of usage had some influence on his adoption of a similar stand. Perhaps to a lesser degree, the same is true of Noah Webster--also a proponent of usage as a standard--who appears to have been familiar with Priestley's Rudiments by the time of his later writings.[40] A more positive connection may be seen between Priestley and Lindley Murray's English Grammar (1795). In the Preface to this work, Murray wrote: "It is, however, proper to acknowledge, in general terms, that the authors to whom the grammatical part of this compilation is principally indebted for its materials, are Harris, Johnson, Lowth, Priestly [sic], Beattie, Sheridan, Walker, and Coote."[41]

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[39]Leonard, Doctrine of Correctness, p. 14.

[40]See Bryan, "Notes on the Founders of Prescriptive Grammar," passim; Fries, "Rules of Common School Grammars," pp. 231-232; Harry R. Warfel, Noah Webster: Schoolmaster to America (New York, 1936), p. 81.

[41]Lindley Murray, An English Grammar (New York, 1819), I, vii.

Bryan's study corroborates Murray's use of Priestley, saying that it was primarily to Lowth, Priestley, and Campbell that he was indebted. Bryan also points out that, since Murray's grammar was the "almost unquestioned authority in England and America during the first half of the last century," as well as the "progenitor" of most of the formal grammars which provided the basis of English instruction for well over a century, Priestley's influence was thus transmitted to succeeding generations.[42]

In addition, therefore, to influencing those students at Warrington and elsewhere who used his grammars as textbooks, Priestley also had some effect on subsequent grammarians.

V. Summary. As a grammarian, Priestley occupies a place of considerable importance. Although his works were not so widely used as some others in his period, he does stand as a leader in two important trends: the movement toward freeing the English tongue from the unnecessary influence of Latin and French, and the establishment of usage as the standard of correctness. As such, he may be regarded as a precursor of many modern grammarians.

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[42]Bryan, "Notes on the Founders of Prescriptive Grammar," p. 393.

CHAPTER III

PRIESTLEY'S LECTURES ON ORATORY AND CRITICISM

I. Introduction. Of even greater significance in this study than the two grammars just discussed, is Priestley's A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, for it is in this work that he presents a systematic treatment of rhetorical theory. Composed in 1762, upon his arrival at Warrington Academy, the Lectures contain the text from which he lectured extemporaneously to his class in "Oratory and Criticism." Although he allowed his students to copy these lecture notes,[1] they were not published until 1777, ten years after Priestley had left Warrington, and while he was in the service of Lord Shelburne. The reasons why he finally decided to make them public are given in the Preface to the work:

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[1] Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 50-51. McLachlan, Warrington Academy, p. 56, records: "An extant letter to [John] Seddon from Benjamin Vaughan (25 July, 1767) speaks of the lectures on 'Oratory and Criticism,' which he and another student had copied, and how he resented a letter from Mrs. Priestley requiring them to be kept private, as, he urged, the copies had been made by permission and at great trouble."

> The plan [of these lectures] is rather more comprehensive than anything that I have seen upon the subject, and the arrangement of the materials, as a system, is new, and the theory, in several respects, more so.
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> For this reason I have been frequently urged to make the Lectures public; and having postponed it so long, I have been induced to do it at this time, partly with a view to the illustration of the doctrine of the association of ideas, to which there is a constant reference through the whole work (in order to explain facts relating to the influence of Oratory, and the striking effect of Excellencies in Composition, upon the genuine principles of human nature) in consequence of having of late endeavoured to draw some degree of attention to those principles, as advanced by Dr. Hartley [by publishing his own edition of Hartley's Observations on Man in 1775]. Another reason for publishing these Lectures at this time is, for the sake of the young Nobleman [Edmond George Petty, Lord Fitzmaurice, the son of Lord Shelburne] to whom they are dedicated, in whose improvement my best services are, on many accounts, due (pp. i-ii).[2]

The Lectures, then, were published for three reasons: (1) because they were thought to be comprehensive and novel, (2) because they afforded an opportunity for illustrating the doctrine of association, and (3) because they might be beneficial to Lord Fitzmaurice, whom Priestley was helping to tutor. The novelty and comprehensiveness of these lectures, as well as their connection with the association psychology, will be considered in later chapters. The point here deserving emphasis is that, at least to Priestley, these were valid reasons for making them public.

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[2]All page references inserted parenthetically in the text of this chapter are to Joseph Priestley A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (London, 1777).

During the fifteen years between the composition of the Lectures and their publication, it would appear that Priestley had ample time for reworking and improving them. Actually, however, he made few alterations. He admits that, while he had studied almost all the valuable works on criticism at the time he was composing the lectures, he knew little of the later publications of this kind, for he had "been generally engaged in pursuits of a different nature" (p. ii). Essentially the same admission is contained in a letter from Priestley to Rev. N. Cappe, dated April 13, 1777:

> I hope you have received a copy of the Greek, as well as of the Lectures, and the third volume on Air, which I meant for your son.
>
> I am afraid you will think I have not taken so much pains to finish the Lectures as you could have wished; but I did as much as I well could, without studying the subject afresh, and I could not bring my mind to it, it is so long since I gave any attention to things of that nature. I struck out a good deal that I thought superfluous.
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> My manner has always been to give my whole attention to a subject till I have satisfied myself with respect to it, and then think no more about the matter. I hardly ever look into any thing that I have published; and when I do, it sometimes appears quite new to me.[3]

Priestley did, however, make some changes during these intervening years. He says, "A considerable part of what I had composed for the use of my pupils in the first part of this work, which is, in its own nature, more trite than the rest, I have here omitted; retaining only as much

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[3]Priestley to Cappe, Calne, April 13, 1777, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 298-299.

as was necessary to preserve the appearance of an uniform system in the whole, and those parts which were the most original" (p. iv). He also states, "what I now publish is the text [for class lectures] above mentioned, with some improvements which have since occurred to me" (p. vi).

The first edition of the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism was printed in London, for J. Johnson, No. 72, St. Paul's Church Yard, and sold for 10/6 in boards, or 14s. bound. This quarto volume contains 313 pages of text, plus a dedication, a six-page Preface, a two-page Table of Contents, and one page of errata. Appended is a catalogue of books written by Priestley and printed for J. Johnson.

While Priestley believed the Lectures contained some valuable material, he did not express his usual optimism over their reception by the public. In a letter to Rev. Joseph Bretland, on December 28, 1777, he wrote:

> I wish, however, very often that you were nearer to me, because, of all my acquaintance, I consider you as most likely to enter deeply into Hartley's theory, and contribute to the farther [sic] investigation of that important subject, and should like to converse with you about such matters. I am satisfied from what you say that you clearly understand his theory, which few do, and are apprized of the very extensive application of it. By this time you may observe the use that I have made of it in the business of criticism [in the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism], though it is very probable that you expected more than you found in it. It is a very delicate subject.[4]

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[4]Priestley to Bretland, Calne, December 28, 1777, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 302.

Another letter to Bretland, only dated 1777, but probably written about the same time as the one above, states:

> I am glad that my "Lectures on Criticism" gave you any pleasure; but, though I much approve of your hints for an improved edition, I fear I shall hardly be able to give the attention to it that will be necessary to execute them. Besides, I do not imagine that there will be much demand for the work, so as to require a new edition, at least soon.[5]

In 1781, however, just four years later, there was a second edition, published at Dublin for William Hallhead, No. 63, Dame-street. This octavo volume of 374 pages--which may have been issued without the knowledge or consent of the author--is, so far as can be determined, never mentioned either by Priestley or by his editor, Rutt. Although the date on the dedication page is omitted, typographical errors corrected, and the catalogue of books printed by the rival publisher left out, the text is not altered. Even the divisions of the book, lecture numbers, paragraphing, footnotes, italics, spacing of lists and quotations, etc., are exactly the same. This second edition would make it appear that there was some demand for the book, but the publication gives no explanation for the reprint, nor is there any indication of how many copies were printed. The number may have been small, however, for Fulton and Peters located copies of the 1781 edition only in the library of

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[5]Priestley to Bretland, 1777, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 307.

Dr. J. F. Fulton, New Haven, Connecticut, and the Library of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The 1777 edition is somewhat more plentiful, nine copies having been located by these authors.[6]

The Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, like the two grammars previously mentioned, are included in Volume XXIII of Rutt's collection of Priestley's works, printed in 1824, and reissued separately in 1826 and 1833. For this purpose, Rutt used the 1777 edition, keeping the text precisely the same, except for the correction of typographical errors. He adds many useful footnotes giving more complete references to some of Priestley's quotations, and suggesting other works with which to compare Priestley's ideas.

The original publication of the Lectures was believed significant enough to warrant reviews in two of the leading periodicals of the day. An unknown author in the Critical Review for July, 1777, praises the work for containing many "valuable remarks." Although he disagrees with some of

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[6]Fulton and Peters, Preliminary Short Title List, p. 6. Copies of the 1777 edition are listed as being in the Library of Dr. J. F. Fulton, New Haven, Conn.; Yale University Library; Library of Congress; Columbia University Library; Harvard University Library; Library Company, and American Philosophical Society Library in Philadelphia; Library of Mrs. Joseph Priestley Button, Philadelphia; and the British Museum. There is also a copy in the Library of the University of Florida.

Priestley's critical observations, he recommends the Lectures to those "who wish to form their style, and their taste for polite literature" (p. 17).[7]

The other review, which appeared in the Monthly Review for August, 1777, was written by William Enfield, whose connection with Priestley will be considered at length in Chapter VII. In a penetrating analysis, he makes particular mention of the fact that Priestley builds his critical theory on the Hartlian principles of association. This critical theory, he writes, "is interwoven with a large collection of valuable materials on the subjects of oratory and criticism, which the Author has, with his usual industry and judgment compiled, and digested into the form of a course of lectures."[8] The general tone of the review is commendatory, but Enfield calls the Lectures "materially defective" because of the fact that Priestley failed to write a separate section on "elocution" which in Lecture I he had called the fourth "part" of rhetoric.[9]

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[7]"A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. By Joseph Priestley, LL.D, F. R. S.," Critical Review, XLIV (July, 1777), 17.

[8][William Enfield], "A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, by Joseph Priestley," Monthly Review, 1809 ed., LVII (August, 1777), 90. Enfield is identified as the author of this article in Nangle, The Monthly Review . . . Indexes of Contributors, p. 179.

[9]Ibid., p. 98.

Although, as we have already seen, the Lectures went into a second edition in 1781, they apparently were never used as a textbook by anyone except Priestley himself.[10] There are, however, several indications that moderate interest in the work continued for some years after its publication. The fact that a publisher in Dublin believed that demand was sufficient to enable him to profit from a second edition only four years after it was first published, is evidence that some attention was being given to it. Another circumstance demonstrating the notice being received by the Lectures is the use made of them by John Walker in the third edition of A Rhetorical Grammar (1801). In his discussion of rhetorical invention, he agrees with Priestley on the use of topics, and quotes almost three pages directly from Lecture IV of the Lectures. Specifically, it is upon the basis of Priestley's "good reasons" and "authority" that Walker approves of the topics and other devices for invention.[11] Not only does Walker's use of the Lectures indicate that they were still available at the time he wrote, but it likewise was a means of preserving, for a time, the influence of Priestley's rhetorical thought.[12]

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[10]See Harding, "English Rhetorical Theory, 1750-1800," p. 179.

[11]John Walker, A Rhetorical Grammar (Boston, 1822), pp. 300-303.

[12]See Douglas Ehninger, "John Ward and His Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, XVIII (March, 1951), 13.

There is also evidence that Priestley's Lectures were known in America. Guthrie reports that a copy was ordered from England by Brown University in 1783.[13] Moreover, Noah Webster was acquainted with this work as well as with Priestley's grammars. In writing to a Mrs. Holt, he gave a series of citations from what he terms "eminent authors," in an attempt to show various uses of verbs. Between quotations from Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism and Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, he includes a passage from Lecture XXV of the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism.[14] These two instances, of course, do not constitute evidence of a widespread use of the Lectures in America, but they do indicate that within ten years of their publication, the book made its way across the Atlantic, and thus had the opportunity of influencing American as well as English students of rhetorical theory.

II. General View of the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. Before considering in detail the system presented in the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, let us first take a brief panoramic view of the work as a whole.

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[13]Warren Guthrie, "Development of Rhetorical Theory in America, 1635-1850," Speech Monographs, XIV (1943), 44.

[14]Noah Webster, to Mrs. Holt, Hartford, July 22, 1784, quoted in Letters of Noah Webster, ed. Harry R. Warfel (New York, 1953), p. 18.

The Lectures open with a Dedication to Lord Fitzmaurice and a Preface containing remarks on the circumstances surrounding their composition, delivery, and publication. Lecture I introduces the subject, defining oratory, delimiting its scope, and describing its functions.

Lectures II through V are devoted to the doctrines which comprise Priestley's system of Invention. In the first three of these lectures, he explains, illustrates, and defends the use of the topics; in the last, he describes the values and methods of "amplification."

The next major division of the Lectures, titled "Of Method," deals with the disposition of materials. Under this rubric, the author devotes one lecture to "method" in narrative discourses, two and a half lectures to "method" in argumentative discourses, and a lecture and a half to a description of various contemporary works which exemplify the types of organization he has suggested.

The last, and by far the longest and most detailed division of the book, occupying Lectures XI through XXXV, is titled "Of Style." In this section, Priestley devotes an introductory lecture to taste and the nature of figurative language, three lectures to the connection between the passions and style, two lectures to the work of style in gaining belief, fifteen lectures to stirring the imagination by various figures of speech, one lecture to

perspicuity in style, another to the resemblance between sound and sense, and one each to harmony in verse and prose.

Although Priestley mentions a fourth major division of rhetoric, elocution, there is no separate section of the Lectures dealing with this subject. As we shall see, however, Priestley does make scattered remarks throughout this work, as well as in the grammars, which reveal his ideas on this subject.

Having seen the over-all plan of the Lectures, we turn now to a detailed consideration of Priestley's system of oratory and criticism as presented in the Lectures, supplemented, on occasion, by related passages from his grammars. (See Appendix I for figures illustrating each major division of Priestley's system.)

III. Priestley's Introduction to Oratory. "Oratory," begins Priestley in Lecture I, "is the natural faculty of speech improved by art; whereby the use of it is perfected, facilitated, and extended, and consequently, its value and influence greatly increased" (p. 1). By their natural faculties most persons can adequately manage a single sentence or two; but to compose and deliver a speech of considerable length, they need assistance from the art of oratory. Nor is this art, contrary to a widespread view, merely a means for embellishing a discourse; its ultimate purpose, rather, is "to inform the judgment, and thereby to influence the practice" (p. 69). The orator should

attempt to "please" or "affect" only insofar as these ends are necessary to the final goal of persuasion.

Moreover, before one turns to rhetoric, he must already have acquired "a perfect knowledge" of the subject upon which he is going to speak or write. Oratory cannot tell one what to say, or even where to search for information; it can only help one who has previously stored in his mind all the material he needs for composing a particular discourse. In the same way, before one comes to rhetoric he must be well grounded in the principles of grammar, reasoning, and human nature. Each of these is important, but none is a part of the instruction that can be received from the art of oratory (pp. 3-4).

Supposing a person, then, to be proficient in grammar, logic, and ethics, and to have acquired a knowledge of his subject, what may he expect from rhetoric? Priestley outlines four ways in which this art may be of assistance, and these constitute the four major divisions of his system.

> 1. [The art of oratory is useful] to assist him in the habit of recollection, or to direct him which way to turn his thoughts, in order to find the arguments and illustrations with which his mind is already furnished; and likewise, when a general topic, or head of discourse, is found, in what manner to confirm or illustrate it, in order to have materials for the bulk or body of the discourse. In this manner oratory may assist the invention; but it is not in finding things with which the mind was wholly unacquainted, but in readily recollecting, and judiciously selecting, what is proper for his purpose, out of the materials with which the mind was previously furnished.

> 2. The art of oratory teaches in what order to dispose of these topics. It shews what disposition of the materials of a discourse will give them the greatest force, and contribute the most to produce the effect intended by it.
>
> 3. To contribute still farther [sic] to the effect of a discourse, the art of oratory teaches what style, or manner of expression, will best become, adorn, and recommend it.
>
> 4. If the discourse is to be pronounced, the art of oratory teaches what tone of voice, or what gestures of the body, will best become, and add grace to the delivery of it.
>
> The four great objects, therefore, that fall within the province of the orator, are, RECOLLECTION, METHOD, STYLE, and ELOCUTION (p. 5).

IV. Priestley's Doctrine of Recollection. As the preceding quotation indicates, the first major division of Priestley's rhetorical system is designed to aid the speaker or writer both in remembering and in selecting materials which he has previously stored in his mind; and, thus, in bringing to bear ideas that will be useful in the composition of his discourse. In other words, rhetorical invention is not a means of searching out or discovering hitherto unobserved arguments and appeals, but merely a method of recalling for use that which has been previously found and is already stored in the memory.

A. Types of Discourses. Priestley's discussion of recollection begins with a division of all discourse into two basic types: narrative and argumentative. In narrative discourses one simply relates facts in order to communicate information; and under this heading Priestley includes natural and civil histories, travels, biographies,

geographies, didactic treatises, etc. He suggests that in the preparation of a narrative discourse, recollection is of little use; for those who present narrations need help only in "digesting and adorning their compositions," not in recalling material for them. For this reason, a consideration of narrative discourses is almost entirely excluded from his system of recollection.

In argumentative discourses, on the other hand, writers or speakers lay down some proposition and endeavor to prove or explain it; and in this, recollection is of particular value. Although the composers of argumentative discourses, such as philosophers, preachers, politicians, scientists, and lawyers, must have their minds "previously furnished with every argument and observation proper to be introduced," (p. 6) they need some method for summoning these materials from the memory in order to put them to use. In his system of recollection, Priestley attempts to supply this need.

B. Recollection and Topics.[15] In order to explain how recollection provides proofs, Priestley begins with an

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[15]Ancient rhetoricians devised a system of "topics" as an artificial means for aiding the orator in providing proofs. These "topics" were regarded as "places" where arguments could be found, or as "stimuli" which might lead the orator to a line of thought which would produce support for his contention. Topics are further explained in Chapter IV.

account of what he conceives to be the nature of the proof process. Every proposition, he says, asserts the agreement or disagreement of its two terms, the subject and the predicate. In some cases the coincidence of these terms is apparent; but in others it is not, and must be shown by the use of a middle term, which, by its connection with both of the given terms, makes evident the relationship that they bear to each other.

To illustrate the function of a "middle term" in proving a proposition, Priestley uses the statement, "Every good man is a wise man." Since the coincidence of subject and predicate is not immediately apparent, another idea--the middle term--is introduced: "the making use of the means of happiness." Both goodness and wisdom make use of the means of happiness: goodness bringing happiness, and wisdom seeking happiness. Therefore, the terms "good man" and "wise man" can be shown to coincide through the relationship which each is seen to bear to the intermediate idea of "happiness."

But how and where did Priestley discover this middle term, by means of which he "proved" his proposition? He found it, as he tells us, by thinking of possible relationships which might exist between the two stated terms. Happiness is the <u>effect</u> of a good course of action, and the <u>means</u> for determining a wise one. Furthermore, the

definitions of wisdom and goodness will show that both are related to happiness. It was, then, by considering the ideas of effect, means, and definition that he discovered "happiness" to be a connecting link between the terms "good man" and "wise man"; and, by this means, he was able to establish the proposition, "Every good man is a wise man."

Thus it is apparent that arguments to prove a given proposition may be recalled from material already in the mind by thinking over the various relationships which may exist between the subject and the predicate, or between both the subject and predicate, and a middle term. "These [possible relationships] are called Common Places, Topics, or General Heads, under which arguments of all kinds may be classed, and an attention to them may suggest the arguments that fall under them" (p. 8). Moreover, "it belongs to the art of oratory to point out these topics, common places, or general heads, to which all arguments may be reduced; that, whenever we undertake to prove any thing, by running over the titles of them in our minds, our thoughts may be directed to what suits our purpose" (p. 8).

As for the propositions which are to be proved in argumentative discourses, these may be divided into two categories: universal, "those which have no relation to particular persons, times, or places, but are at all times, in all places, and with regard to all persons, true or

false"; and particular, "those which have relation to, and are limited by, particular persons, times, or places" (p. 9). Under the head of "universal" fall all propositions of metaphysics and mathematics--"man is mortal," "virtue makes the happiness of man," "the angles of a right lined triangle are equal to two right triangles," etc. Particular propositions include "all historical debates, geographical and chronological knowledge, consultations about the interest of particular states at particular times, judicial inquiries into the actions of particular persons, and all personal panegyric or invective" (p. 9).

Corresponding with this division of propositions into universal and particular, is a similar division of topics. As a general rule, arguments for universal propositions are suggested by universal topics, and arguments proving particular propositions are found by referring to particular topics.[16]

Lecture III is devoted to a classification and explanation of universal topics, and while Priestley admits

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[16] On some occasions, however, particular topics may be used in connection with a universal proposition, for, says Priestley, "things which relate to particular persons, times, or places, may often, with propriety, be introduced into a discourse upon a [universal] proposition"; and, likewise, "since every thing that is particular, is comprehended in that which is universal, arguments relating to particular persons, places, and times, may be fetched from those topics, which are peculiarly adapted to universal propositions" (p. 9-10).

that the categories into which he divides this subject may not be mutually exclusive, he thinks them useful, so long as they lead the mind to the proper arguments. Nine universal topics are recognized: definition, adjuncts or properties, antecedents or previous circumstances, consequents, means, analogy, contraries, example, and authority or testimony. Priestley illustrates each universal topic by stating various propositions with which it might be used; but many of his examples for these universal topics, it is to be observed, are particular propositions--probably because he set down whatever examples first occurred to him without carefully analyzing them. It is also of interest to note that the majority of the illustrative propositions deal with so-called questions of "fact" rather than of "policy," perhaps because the idea of proof by demonstrating the coincidence of subject and predicate is somewhat better suited to propositions of this type.

In turning to particular topics in Lecture IV, Priestley says that he will not attempt to give a complete list, but will merely make some suggestions which anyone can further subdivide, according to his own need. With respect to particular propositions, a person may, we are told, consider the particular topics of "the person, the time, the place, the motive, the instrument, the evidence, the law concerning it, &c. &c. &c." (p. 19). A few of these possibilities are briefly elaborated.

Before concluding the subject of topics, Priestley feels it necessary to defend the use of these artificial aids to recollection. This he does by recourse to the doctrine of association. First, he says, it is manifestly impossible to compose without some method of remembering or recalling, and recollection is always accomplished through introducing one idea into the mind by means of another idea with which it has been associated. This, he points out, is exactly the task performed by "topics," which recall particular ideas by means of certain general ideas with which they have been connected. No one can make a voluntary effort to recall without using some key idea to release a chain of associated ideas. Whether conscious of it or not, therefore, everyone who has composed has used something similar to topics as a tool of recollection. Second, inasmuch as everyone who composes thus makes some use of topics, it is better to have an explicit, complete list of them formalized and set down, than to have only an implicit, incomplete one in the mind. In particular, a complete and formal list makes it possible for the composer to form a better idea of the extent of his subject. Third, topics are useful to a critic in determining whether a writer or speaker has covered all of the important phases of his subject, and has selected the best possible arguments. Fourth, those who compose moral essays and

sermons, where original thought is not required, will find topics useful to insure that they are never at a loss for matter, and to aid in arranging their material in the best order. Fifth, the practice of the famous orators of antiquity, according to the writings of Cicero and Quintilian, would lead one to adopt the use of topics.

After these arguments favoring topics, however, Priestley makes some rather damaging admissions:

> I am very ready, however, to acknowledge, that rhetorical topics are more useful in the composition of set declamations on trite subjects, and to young persons, than in the communication of original matter, and to persons much used to composition. Original thoughts cannot but suggest themselves, so that all the assistance a person can want in this case, is a proper manner of arranging them. And a person much used to composition will have acquired a habit of recollection, without any express attention to topics; just as a person used to the harpsichord, or any other instrument of music, will be able to perform without an express attention to rules, or even to the manner of placing his fingers (pp. 24-25).

Even with these limitations, however, Priestley believes the doctrine of topics so important that he makes it the basic tool in his system of recollection.

C. The "Form" or "Manner" of Arguments. In addition to the use of universal and particular topics, Priestley suggests that one may "take hints of arguments from the manner in which they are generally introduced, or the form into which they are thrown. One form of argument, for instance,is from greater to less, or from less to greater" (p. 21).

Other methods are also indicated:

> Matter for discourse may also occur to a person who considers what may be said by way of objection to what he hath advanced, and what concessions he may make to his opponent. His invention may also be assisted by considering whether he can, with propriety, introduce any thing in the form of irony, of a question, of an exclamation, and of every other possible form of address. Moreover, what will be advanced in these Lectures upon the subject of method, will tend greatly to help the invention (p. 22).

D. Amplification. Up to this point, the Lectures have been largely centered on the discourse itself, with emphasis on proving propositions by means of arguments suggested through the use of topics. In Lecture V, "On Amplification," the audience is brought into consideration, for Priestley here recognizes that an argumentative discourse will have to be longer or shorter depending upon the nature of the hearers or readers. If the audience is a learned one and skilled in the subject being discussed, the speaker or writer can be concise, and still prove his proposition satisfactorily. If, however, the audience is unlearned, he will have to supply certain intermediate arguments, or amplify his remarks by a more copious induction of particulars. This additional material may be found by employing the topics already mentioned, as well as by the use of fuller explanation, a division of the subject in a preview fashion, and elaboration on the strength of a particular argument.

The only direct mention of narrative discourses under the heading of recollection comes in connection with this matter of amplification. If the author wishes "barely to inform his reader of the reality of the event," he need mention only a few particulars, thus presenting a concise narration. If, however, the narration is to "interest" and "affect," it must be enlarged by including observations and reflections along with the bare statement of facts. Moreover, narrative discourses, as well as those which are argumentative, may be amplified by longer transitions, more copious illustrations, diversified expression, and simple repetition.

Priestley mentions two common faults in amplification: introducing an idea under a heading to which it bears no relation, and which it does not tend to confirm or illustrate; and illustrating that which is already plain.

In one paragraph of the section on amplification, he makes this interesting comparison between writers and speakers:

> It is of some importance to observe, on the subject of amplification, that persons of a very exact judgment are generally the least copious in composition; and notwithstanding they have the greatest knowledge, compose with peculiar difficulty; their nicer discernment, which makes them attend to all the relations and connexions of things, rejecting every thing that doth not in every respect suit their purpose. Whereas those persons who are unattentive to the minuter proprieties of things, find no difficulty in admitting a great variety of thoughts that offer themselves in composition; a slight association of any ideas with the

> subject in hand being sufficient to introduce them. In general, the latter are more proper for public speakers, and the former for writers. The want of close connexion, small improprieties, or even inconsistencies, pass unnoticed with most persons when they hear a discourse. Besides, no person can so well depend upon his memory in comparing one part of a discourse that he had only heard with another. But all these little inaccuracies are exposed to observation, when a good judge of composition hath the whole discourse before him in writing (pp. 30-31).

Priestley closes his discussion of recollection with the admonition that one should compose freely as the ideas enter the mind in order that they will appear natural and animated; correction can come later.

E. Summary. Briefly stated, then, Priestley's doctrine of recollection, which occupies some seven per cent of his work as a whole, is designed to aid the speaker or writer in obtaining the materials for his discourse. By the use of various artificial mnemonic devices, particularly the topics, he can recall propitious arguments and illustrations from information previously stored in his mind. This inventional system, concerned only with "recall" and not "discovery," deals almost exclusively with logical proof, while ethical and pathetic proof are, for all practical purposes, omitted from this division.

V. Priestley's Doctrine of Method. Once the orator has recollected and selected the material for his discourse, his next problem is to arrange it to the best advantage. In Part II of the Lectures, which comprises about twelve

and a half per cent of the work, Priestley sets forth his rules for Disposition, or as he terms it "method," again dividing his discussion in terms of the two general types of discourses--narrative and argumentative.

A. In Narrative Discourses. In order for a speaker's thoughts to gain an easy admission into the mind and to leave a lasting impression upon the memory, the crucial consideration is that the relationships between ideas be clear; for it is, says Priestley, "by means of their mutual relations that ideas introduce one another, and cohere, as it were, in the mind" (p. 34).

From this principle may be inferred certain basic rules of order.

> In general, the order of nature, or of their real existence, will be found to be, at the same time, both the easiest, and in every respect, the best manner of reciting them, viz. the order of time for events, and that of place, for the subjects of what is called natural history.
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> Thus the chronological succession of events hath generally supplied the writers of civil history, biography, and travels, with the most natural and useful method of communicating information. The geographer, having finished one country, naturally thinks of passing into a neighbouring one; and, in natural history, we always expect an entire and unbroken account of some one of the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdoms, before we be led to another (p. 34).

The chronological, spatial, and topical orders, then, are most desirable as the basic plans for narrative discourse, for they take advantage of those transitions and associations to which we are already accustomed, thus attaining the easiest admission into the mind and the best retention in the memory.

Occasionally, however, one may deviate from this sequence of nature in order to introduce material associated with some particular detail of the narrative. A historian, for example, may pause to trace the causes of a certain event, or a biographer may digress from his regular order to point out the effects in later life of certain circumstances in the education of his subject. These deviations are beneficial because they "relieve the attention, please the imagination, [and] refresh and assist the memory" (p. 35). Generally they tell of a cause or an effect of some event in the narrative, or point to similarities and contrarieties. But there is also danger in these digressions; for if they stray too far, the writer will have difficulty finding an easy transition back to the original theme, and the reader will lose sight of the main narrative.

In order to illustrate what he believes to be the proper use of method in narrative discourse, Priestley reviews both ancient and contemporary authors. Thucydides he finds excessively chronological, while Herodotus has too many digressions. Tacitus receives commendation both as a historian and a biographer. Just as certain historians, among them Xenophon, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus, have effectively used time order, with deviations, so Priestley believes this order will also be effective for fiction and

romance. He likewise approves of the practice of using footnotes as a means of including incidental items; and he applauds Bayle for his skilled use of such notes, while Harris,[17] he thinks, has not employed them well.

The section on method in narrative discourse closes with the suggestion that writers in the mechanic and liberal arts ought "to divide the subject into its proper distinct parts, and to give an account of what is most essential in the first place, and what is only ornamental afterwards" (pp. 40-41). This, of course, is the plan which Priestley himself employs in these Lectures on Oratory and Criticism.

B. In Argumentative Discourses. Priestley follows a rather common practice among the logicians[18] and rhetoricians[19] of his day in suggesting two species of method

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[17]Apparently Priestley here refers to Pierre Bayle, author of the Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697), and James Harris, author of Hermes or a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Universal Grammar (1751), and Philosophical Arrangements (1775).

[18]See, for example, Isaac Watts, Logick; or the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth (London, 1747), pp. 302-303, where the author divides natural method into analysis and synthesis. Priestley read Watts' Logick at an early age and used it as a textbook for his course in logic at Warrington Academy. Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 13, 54; McLachlan, Warrington Academy, p. 51.

[19]See John Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory (Dublin, 1759), pp. 135, 285; Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (London, 1825), p. 382.

suitable to argumentative discourses: analysis, which proceeds from particular observations to a more general conclusion, after the manner of induction; and synthesis, which begins with general and comprehensive propositions, and descends to particular propositions contained within them, following the manner of deduction.

1. Synthetic Method. Synthesis, or the order of explanation, is especially well adapted to pedagogy and the transmission of knowledge. This is because the synthetic method, as developed in particular by the geometers, gains "the readiest and most irresistible admission into the mind." Priestley, therefore, proceeds to explain this method, and to show "how far it may be adopted, or imitated with advantage, by writers in general, and particularly by divines and moralists" (p. 45).

Geometricians, he says, demonstrate every proposition either from axioms, which are self-evident truths, or from other propositions which have been previously demonstrated from axioms. Speakers, too, should appeal to self-evident truths: "in moral subjects, to consciousness, or internal feelings; and in matters of revelation, to the plain sense of scripture" (p. 46). Furthermore, in order to prevent any misunderstanding of terms, these axioms should be preceded by definitions of all the words representing "complex ideas."

> Besides, this method is, in a manner, the very touchstone of truth; and therefore, if our view really be to promote the interest of truth, (and sooner would I teach the art of poisoning than that of sophistry,) this method hath another great advantage to recommend it. For if these definitions and axioms be laid down with due accuracy and circumspection, they not only introduce the easiest, the most natural, and cogent method of demonstrating any propositions, but lead to an easy method of examining the strength or weakness of the ensuing arguments. If the argument in such a methodical discourse be not conclusive, it contains within itself the principles of its own confutation (pp. 46-47).

Priestley is quick to point out, however, that he is not asking rhetoricians to use such technical terms as "axiom" and "definition," or to employ without modification the exact and precise method of the geometrician. His plea is merely that a writer or speaker, insofar as possible and reasonable, follow the practice of stating at the outset the maxims which are fundamental to his argument and of defining any terms which may not be clearly understood.

Moreover, just as the principal proposition of the geometrician is sometimes preceded by lemmas--necessary preliminary propositions that clear the way--and is then subdivided into several separately demonstrable heads, so must the writer or speaker, upon occasion, anticipate objections by setting forth preliminary propositions, before stating and dividing the principal thesis of his work. When a long and circumstantial narration is essential for understanding the point to be proved, it should be introduced along with the proposition.

After these preliminaries, the geometrician presents the proof that the subject and predicate of his proposition actually coincide. The mathematician, who is concerned with matters fixed and invariable, has to give only one proof, but the moralist and divine, who deal with probabilities, usually must supply a "variety of arguments," the united strength of which will gain assent. And since they wish their propositions to hold the highest degree of probability attainable, the order in which the proofs are presented is of consequence. Arguments of a similar nature, drawn from similar considerations, should be placed together. Weaker arguments should be introduced incidentally as epithets, metaphors, comparisons, or illustrations, rather than as of an equal rank with strong arguments. When all arguments are of nearly equal weight, they should be placed in the natural order suggested by the subjects from which they are derived.

After the proof, it is sometimes necessary to introduce certain miscellaneous remarks, called scholia by the geometrician. These are designed to throw further light on the subject by illustrating the nature and force of the evidence, or by pointing out similar processes in other subjects. Scholia further confirm the proposition by indirect means.

"Lastly, in the form of corrolaries, the geometrician deduces from his proposition, now fully

proved, other truths which flow from it" (p. 51). When there is no danger of presenting too many objects of attention, "the extensive and happy influence" of the principle now proved may, through this means, be pointed out.

Having explained and applied the general method of geometric demonstration, Priestley summarizes:

> The meaning of the terms of the proposition should be accurately fixed, principles made use of in the demonstration distinctly noted, and, if there be occasion, proved; the question stated in the most intelligible manner, with a circumstantial relation of every fact that may contribute to set it in the clearest point of light, and the subject divided into the distinct parts of which it consists. The order of nature must chiefly be consulted in arranging the arguments brought to support each of them, and slight probabilities should be introduced in an indirect manner. Observations relating to the nature of the proof that is made use of, with the connection and mutual influence of the several arguments, and other miscellaneous remarks that may naturally occur, come next; and the whole discourse closes with a view of the extent of the doctrine, in all the valuable inferences and uses that may be drawn from it (pp. 51-52).

Thus, while Priestley leaves considerable flexibility, he recommends these parts for a discourse organized according to the synthetic method: introduction, proposition, proof, miscellaneous observations, and conclusion.

Recognizing common faults in the synthetic method, Priestley next warns: (1) do not define terms that are already clear; (2) select carefully the principles you take for granted as a basis for arguments, and rarely use

argumenta ad hominem; and (3) be certain that divisions are equal, distinct, and exclusive.

When a great variety of arguments are used, a preview and review will make them more intelligible and unite their force. Moreover, introductions will be found useful for procuring a more favorable hearing, for preparing the way for arguments, for showing the importance of the subject or why it is being discussed at this time, in this place, and in this manner, as well as for removing prejudices and answering objections. In order to attain these ends, introductions should vary according to the subject, speaker, and occasion.

2. Analytic Method. Having explored the synthetic method for argumentative discourses, in Lecture IX Priestley turns to the analytic method, which, he says, is used by the generality of writers. This type of organization, which he calls the order of investigation, may be used for presenting a conclusion in the exact sequence of its discovery, or for asserting a proposition not fully ascertained or generally accepted. Those who employ this method "begin with observations or experiments, and show how they lead to the principles they intend to establish" (p. 55). While stating that "the more minute delineation of this process is best referred to logic," Priestley does observe that unsuccessful steps in the

actual process of investigation--unless they help answer prejudices, objections, or mistakes--need not be included. Further, he suggests that the account of the final and conclusive discovery should be opened and developed gradually, so that the discourse may reach a climax in the crucial experiment.

In order to exemplify the use of both the analytic and synthetic methods, the works of several contemporary authors are examined. Locke's Treatise on the Human Understanding proceeds by analysis, with some didactic narration, in the first part, and by synthesis in the last. Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, Hume's Inquiry into the Principles of Morals, and Harris's Hermes are all largely analytic. Hartley's Observations on Man and the Port Royal General and Rational Grammar employ the synthetic method.

C. In Sermons, Essays, and Odes. Priestley also directs some admonitions on method to preachers and writers of essays and odes. Sermons on controversial subjects should use the analytic method, first presenting and examining scriptures bearing on the point, and then stating the conclusion. The best organized sermons, he says, are generally of two kinds. Topical sermons are those in which the text serves only as a motto, and a particular doctrine is presented by the synthetic method. To introduce some variety into this type, a preacher may

take only one part of a demonstration as the subject for an entire discourse; for example, a whole sermon may deal with the definition of a certain teaching, another may present only the proof of the doctrine, while still another may point out its effects or inferences. Textual sermons are those in which the divisions of the text become the heads of the discourse.

Turning, lastly, to the field of literature, Priestley suggests that when dealing with a subject that requires no proof because of its general acceptance, the writer may have considerable breadth in the arrangement of materials. He must use special care, however, in transitions from sentiment to sentiment so that the train of thought will appear natural, easy, and agreeable. This same latitude may be granted the writers of odes and most other poems, although they must be sure to maintain unity throughout their compositions.

D. Summary. Under the heading of method, then, Priestley presents that part of his system which deals with the effective arrangement of materials. For narrative discourses, he suggests a natural order--chronological, spatial, or topical--with relief through digressions that point out causes, effects, similarities, or contrarieties. When the discourse, on the other hand, is argumentative, he advises either the inductive order of analysis, or the

deductive order of synthesis, with particular emphasis on geometric progression. The closing remarks of the section advise preachers to make their sermons topical or textual, and writers of essays and odes to give special attention to transitions and unity.

VI. Priestley's Doctrine of Style. Although Priestley regards recollection and method as the two "essential" elements of his rhetorical system, he thinks an orator will also find it greatly to his advantage to consider style, the traditional third "part" of rhetoric. From this division of the science, he will learn a manner of expression which will effectively focus the attention of the audience on the materials he has recollected and arranged.

Basically, style may be divided into two kinds, "plain" and "figurative." A "plain" style calls everything by its proper name, using no more words than are necessary to express the sense, and placing words in their usual order in a sentence; on the other hand, employing words in an unusual sense and order produces a style that is "figurative." While the figurative style is, of course, more highly embellished than the plain, each makes some use of ornament. Moreover, each may be regarded as "natural," when it corresponds to the emotional condition of the speaker; figurative suiting an aroused state, and plain, a state of tranquility.

Priestley's treatment of style, occupying twenty-five of his thirty-five lectures--some seventy-five per cent of the total number of pages--is primarily designed to lead the writer or speaker to knowledge and skill in the use of "ornament," thus making it possible for him to achieve excellence in either the plain or figurative style, as the occasion may demand. The major divisions of this section of the Lectures are: ornament of sentiment, that is adorning thoughts so they may appear lively and beautiful to the mind; and ornament of diction, arraying words so they may appear harmonious to the ear.

A. Ornament of Sentiment. Sentiments or thoughts must be ornamented if they are to appear lively and beautiful, and this ornamentation is accomplished by making the thoughts pleasing and perspicuous.

1. Making Sentiments Pleasing. In this section, which covers over sixty per cent of his book, Priestley suggests that the speaker's sentiments will please an audience when they (1) arouse their passions, (2) gain the assent of their judgments, and (3) stir the pleasures of their imaginations. It is here, in his discussion of these three divisions of a "pleasing" style, rather than in connection with recollection, that Priestley presents his doctrines of two of the three classical modes of proof. His views on pathetic proof appear under the discussion

of style as it relates to the passions, while his treatment of ethical proof is found under the analysis of style as adapted to the judgment. The section on imagination is largely a discussion of various figures of speech.

a) By Arousing the Passions. A knowledge of the passions may be of great service to a writer or speaker, for by arousing the emotions of his audience, he can both please them and lead them to believe his message. Such an arousal of the passions may best be accomplished by a vivid presentation of the subject, for readers and hearers respond emotionally in direct proportion to the degree of vividness with which they perceive ideas. This vitalization, which moves an audience to "just and vigorous action" without "the slow intervention of reason" (p. 80), may be attained through the use of the historic present and through detailed descriptions in particular words so as to produce sensible images. On some occasions, however, the speaker should use as few words as possible in order merely to suggest circumstances designed to raise a lively, tender sentiment.

b) By Gaining the Assent of the Judgment. Thoughts may also be made pleasing by the use of certain "forms of address" which tend to gain the assent of the judgment. In other words, the power of an argument may be augmented by introducing and expressing it in such a way as to leave the audience more favorably disposed.

First among these "forms of address" Priestley lists earnestness; for when a speaker appears strongly convinced of the truth and importance of what he contends for, his hearers naturally tend to agree with him, unless prejudice intervenes. This appearance of earnestness may result from (1) an appeal to the judgment of another person, particularly an opponent; (2) an exclamation expressing wonder, astonishment, and indignation; and (3) "the appearance of present thought, and extempore unprepared address" (pp. 110-111).

A second "form" which tends to increase ethical appeal is for the speaker or writer, through his ability to answer objections and his skill in turning the tables on his opponent, to appear to have a complete mastery of the subject. Third, a redundancy of proofs adds weight to the support of a proposition. Here, material on which one does not intend to lay "the chief stress of his argument," may be mentioned in a slight and incidental manner so that it appears to be selected from a vast store of arguments. In this case the imagination "is apt to give more than their just weight to those which [are passed] over in silence." This slight mention may also be used when one refers to himself, so as to give the appearance of modesty.

The fourth "form of address" that aids in gaining the assent of the judgment is an appearance of candor.

This attitude may be shown by seeming to be in doubt, by giving as much weight as possible to the objections of opponents, by frankly retracting what was too hastily advanced, and by appearing to be completely impartial.

c) By Stirring the Imagination. The third stylistic method for making sentiments pleasing to the mind is that of stirring the pleasures of the imagination. These pleasures are finer, more delicate sensations than the gross feelings of the passions, and may be perceived only through the eyes and ears, while those of the passions are received also through the senses of touch, taste, and smell. Furthermore, since it is a fundamental law of human nature that the mind "conforms" to ideas which it perceives, "a person, for the time, enters into, adopts, and is actuated by, the sentiments that are presented to his mind" (p. 127). This conformation of the mind to the ideas it is conscious of at a given moment--a reaction which takes place instantaneously, mechanically, and outside the control of the individual--is the basis of empathy, so important in both speaking and writing.

The pleasures of the imagination are stirred, first of all, by stylistic techniques which occasion a "moderate exertion of our faculties." The two extremes of sensation are prefect languor of mind, on the one hand, and, on the other, actual pain; both extremes being unpleasant.

For example, neither intense cold nor intense heat is agreeable, but moderate temperatures are pleasing. Likewise, the pleasures of taste lie between the extremes of the insipid, and the acrid and pungent. The nearer the appropriate limit, the greater the pleasure, but the shorter the time that the stimulation can be borne. For this reason the mind cannot be held at a climax for a great length of time; rather "the more exquisite strokes of genius" should be used sparingly so that the reader or hearer can fully appreciate them. Attention to "the exercise of the faculties" will enable a writer to find a proper medium between "the concise and diffuse in style," filling a short composition with matters which require great mental exertion, and making a longer discourse less concentrated.

Turning now to specific figures of speech which stir the imagination by exercising the faculties of the mind, Priestley first mentions novelty. Any perception necessitates some exercise of the mind, but the first perception of an object, which makes a much stronger impression than any subsequent one, requires a special exertion. Thus, Priestley suggests that while man's continual search for happiness may lead him to examine a new object, it is usually the charms of novelty that serve as "springs of action" or motivation to keep him interested. The sensation of a perfectly new or "unfamiliar" object

is called wonder; and if unexpectedness be substituted for absolute novelty, surprise is produced.

The use of great objects to arouse a feeling of the sublime is the second method of exercising the faculties. This method rests upon the principle that the conception of a great object expands the mind. Thus the feeling of sublimity may be introduced by utilizing objects of great physical magnitude, or those sentiments and passions which relate to great objects. For example, "large rivers, high mountains, and extensive plains," as well as "fortitude, magnanimity, generosity, patriotism, and universal benevolence," strike the mind with the idea of the sublime (p. 154). Through the power of association, an object not sublime in itself may borrow greatness from its cause, adjunct, or effect.

The third general method of exercising the faculties is that of analogy, which is the foundation of both comparison and contrast. This figure is a source of pleasure because grasping similarities and differences in objects requires the appropriate amount of mental exertion.

Comparison, the first type of analogy, is the basis for four of Priestley's figures: simile, in which, he says, the object under consideration is shown to be similar to something generally thought to bear no resemblance to it; metaphor, "a simile contracted to its smallest dimensions,"

in which a "new name" is given to an object; catachresis, a harsh metaphor where there is but little similarity between the two objects compared; and allegory, a continued metaphor. These figures should be used by a speaker or writer only when they correspond to his emotional state: the stronger the emotion, the bolder the figure. Each is most striking when there appears at first to be the greatest difference between the two ideas compared, but afterwards the greatest resemblance is seen.

Contrast, another type of analogy, is divided into the serious and the humorous. Special emphasis is placed on the humorous, for Priestley hopes to promote increased uniformity and precision among critics in classifying the amusing effects of contrast. As shown on the accompanying diagram, he lists two types of serious, and ten varieties of humorous contrast.[20]

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[20]The ten species of humorous contrast, with their definitions are: the risible, the appearance of a great incongruity or disproportion without a serious object; the ridiculous, the risible with an added degree of design and contempt; burlesque, the sudden transition from a very high to a very low object that is similar to it with the result that the high object suffers a loss of respect; mock-heroic, the contrary of burlesque, in which one passes from a low object to a very high one under the guise of seriousness thus giving a low object an air of grandeur and importance; humour, the same as mock-heroic except the subject is lower and in a lower style; wit, the treatment of a subject which is gay and easily admits a smile; parody, the application of a passage of any author to a foreign and generally a lower purpose, a kind of burlesque of a serious author; irony, a statement which says one thing and means another intended to expose and ridicule, under the appearance of

Novelty, sublimity, and analogy, then, are the means of stirring the pleasures of the imagination by exercising the faculties of the mind.

As contrasted with these, the second general means for stirring the pleasures of the imagination includes those techniques of style which make the sentiment more pleasing by a "transfer of ideas." In this species, an impression is conveyed from one word to another related to it; and the transfer, proceeding according to the principles of association, provides clarity and emphasis.

Metonymy, the first figure mentioned in this connection, occurs when, instead of the actual name of an object, a name is borrowed which will give some additional meaning to the object under consideration. This new name may be based on any relationship except that of actual resemblance (which would make a metaphor). Some of the possible relations providing a basis for metonymy are: "cause and effect, in all its varieties; the subject and its attributes, or circumstances; the agent and the instrument; general and particular, abstract and concrete terms;

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gravity; riddle, in general a strong, harsh metaphor or allegory, with the pleasure received from the solution of it in proportion to the greatness of the analogy between two things which are very different; and a pun, or play on words occurring when a verbal contrast arises from the different meanings of the same term.

and the whole and its part, which alone is referred to synecdoche" (pp. 231-232).

Another figure that improves the sense through a transfer of ideas is hyperbole, a statement exceeding the actual truth. Here, the idea under consideration is made to appear larger through being associated with an idea that exceeds it, and thus the greater is said to transfer meaning to the lesser. In many figures something is said which is not literally true, but a hyperbole appears as a greater violation of truth because in it the untruth lies in the affirmation itself, while in the others it is concealed in an epithet. Priestley quickly points out, however, that the intent of a hyperbole, as well as of all other figures, is not to deceive, but rather to heighten and improve the perception of an object.

Personification is a third figure utilizing the transfer of ideas. Here things human are alluded to in treating inanimate objects and animals, thus appearing to convert them into thinking and acting beings. There are two types of personification: the ideal, and the serious. Ideal personification is the result of a mind at ease, which first sees inanimate objects as they actually are, and then afterwards is struck with their resemblance to human beings, thus transforming them by a voluntary effort of the imagination into real persons. The serious, on the other hand,

occurs in a mind that is under a temporary deception, the personification obtruding itself upon the speaker without being made or aided by him. "The effect of a real [or serious] personification is a real passion; but an ideal, or rhetorical personification, presents only the ideas of thought, sense, and passion; which are sufficient to enliven a composition, please the fancy, but can never reach the heart" (p. 254).

A type of pleasure closely related to personification is that which we receive from "the effects of the human understanding"; that is, from the ability of the human mind to accomplish certain feats. This principle accounts for the pleasure derived from seeing the design and execution of artistic imitation; and the more difficult we imagine it is to perform the imitation, the greater our pleasure from seeing it done. This principle applies in painting, music, and literature, and is one of the reasons why an audience appreciates extempore speaking above memorized delivery, and memorized delivery above reading from manuscript (pp. 261-266).

The mind also receives satisfaction from a sense of completeness and from climax. Both of these methods result in a transfer of ideas to the object under consideration; completeness conveying to it a feeling of resolution and relief, and climax building for it a sense of greatness.

Climax likewise provides an opportunity for objects to be compared and contrasted, and serves to heighten the poignancy of wit and humor.

2. Making Sentiments Perspicuous. With the conclusion of Lecture XXXI, Priestley finishes his lengthy discussion of the means of making style pleasing, and proceeds to consider perspicuity, the second general method for ornamenting the sentiment. Although he devotes only one rather brief lecture to this subject, he asserts that it is actually more essential than pleasing. His suggestions on how to achieve clarity include comments on indefinite antecedents, misplaced modifiers, word order in sentences, and the use of articles, copulatives, and synonyms. With this advice on perspicuity, Priestley closes his first major division of style--ornament of sentiment--and turns to a brief discussion, occupying three lectures, of ornament of diction.

B. Ornament of Diction. Methods by which a speaker or writer may array his words so as to make them more harmonious to the ear, Priestley labels "ornaments of diction." He lists three means for attaining this sonority.

1. Resemblance Between Sound and Sense. Some words are not merely arbitrary signs of ideas, but actually bear an acoustical resemblance to the idea they represent. For example, a combination of words somewhat difficult to

pronounce may represent an action requiring effort or difficulty; short syllables may represent speed, and long syllables slowness. Pauses and tone of voice also contribute to this similarity. To make sound and sense thus resemble each other, is to ornament the diction.

2. Harmony in Verse. Since all speech naturally divides itself into long and short syllables, the art of versification consists in the disposition of long or short syllables, according to some rule. This regular disposition brings feet into each line, and the harmony of a verse is most distinctly perceived when these portions are kept as distinct as possible. Verse should be pronounced according to the sense, but sense and meter should largely coincide.

3. Harmony in Prose. While harmony in prose does not depend on any regular return of long or short syllables, it does demand that the syllables be disposed so that they favor the sense and are easily pronunciable. Prose is most sonorous when numerous long or short syllables do not come together; when there is a climax both in the length of the words and in the length of the clauses that compose a period; and when objects compared or contrasted occupy similar positions in the sentence and begin with the same letter.

In summary, then, Priestley considers style as that part of rhetoric which enables the orator to arrest the

attention of his audience by ornamenting the sentiment and diction of his discourse. Although the great preponderance of space is given over to instructions for making the discourse pleasing and harmonious, Priestley closes the section with the warning that primary regard should always be paid to sense and perspicuity.

VII. Priestley's Doctrine of Elocution. When Priestley divides the subject of oratory, in Lecture I, he says the fourth part, called "elocution," "teaches what tone of voice, or what gestures of the body, will best become, and add grace to the delivery" (p. 5). But there is no separate section of the Lectures devoted to a systematic discussion of this subject. Priestley explains, as we have seen earlier, that he taught a weekly class in elocution, where the students delivered various types of oral discourses; and that since he gave detailed criticisms here, he did not find it necessary to write out lectures on this subject (p. iv). There are, however, many passages dispersed throughout Priestley's works on language which deal with such items as pronunciation, extempore speaking, articulation, naturalness, pause, and gesture. From these scattered references it is possible to draw a composite picture of this portion of his system.

Two requisites lie at the basis of all techniques of delivery. First, the orator must understand the meaning

of what he says, for "the true art of pronunciation," says Priestley, "is governed wholly by the sense" (p. 300). Second, the speaker must feel the sentiment of his message, and never attempt to use any form of address to which his temper does not truly correspond. By observing this rule, "he will seldom fail in point of propriety." Since a state of mind is strongly associated with its corresponding attitudes and gestures, these will be excited mechanically and justly when the emotion is present (pp. 114-115). Thus, "if we feel the sentiment, we unavoidably . . . give the language all the assistance we can from pronunciation" (p. 296). With this, then, as a foundation, Priestley partitions the subject of delivery into the usual divisions of voice and body.

A. Use of Voice. The power of pronunciation, through sound and silence, can do much to assist expression. The orator, first of all, must have proper articulation, which Priestley defines as the power of "modulating" the voice through "varying the aperture of the mouth" for the production of vowels, and checking and stopping the passage of sound "in a great variety of ways, by the action of the tongue, lips, palate, and teeth" for the formation of consonants.[21] Stress is also important, as noted in the

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[21] Works of Priestley, XXIII, 127.

Rudiments of English Grammar, where Priestley says the art of pronunciation consists of "laying the accent upon the proper syllable of a word, and the emphasis upon the proper word of a sentence."[22]

Rhythm and harmony, both of which may be produced by the combination of sound and silence, are other elements of pronunciation contributing to effective expression.

Priestley frequently mentions what he calls tone of voice, by which he means a combination of timbre and inflection. He observes, for instance, that the words "great" and "little" may be pronounced according to the degree intended, thus aiding the sense by the sound of the word. Further, he recommends that the words "Fallen, fallen, fallen, fallen," in Dryden's Alexander's Feast, "be pronounced with a tone of voice growing continually more and more languid, to preserve the beauty of the passage in which they are introduced. Indeed no person, who reads the poem with any feeling and taste, can avoid doing it" (p. 297). In another passage, this one also in the Rudiments, Priestley mentions the "tone and inflection of the voice," on which "the most important part of the meaning depends: for, in conversation, we attend as much to the manner in which a thing is said, as to the words themselves."

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[22] Ibid., p. 39.

He continues:

> By the tone of the voice we can vary and modify our ideas in a manner that no power of letters can ever equal. In irony, the meaning of words is quite reversed. In mentioning a person's name, or only the word Sir, we either simply call to him, or, in the strongest manner in the world, without any additional words, express our tenderness, respect, anger, contempt, reproach, and almost every other passion, and degree of passion, that the human mind is capable of.[23]

Priestley is also conscious of the importance of the pause. Although many of his comments on this subject in the Lectures deal with the pause in writing and varieties of metre, he does include some suggestions for the oral reader of prose and poetry. In poetry, a break is "always as near to the metrical pause (namely, after the second long syllable in the line) as a regard to the sense will admit" (p. 301). But there are some lines of poetry in which the grammatical construction of the words is so close that there is no place to pause in the entire line; and in this case, there is little distinction between poetry and prose.

Turning now to prose, he says:

> Pauses must be made in reading prose as well as verse; and since the voice must rest, it is convenient that provisions be made for its resting at proper intervals. Since neither in verse nor prose ought those words to be separated by the least interruption of sound, which together present but one idea, it is proper that, at least, words so closely connected should not be so many, as that it would be difficult to pronounce them in a breath. Moreover, since the syllables preceding

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[23] Ibid., p. 132; see also the Lectures, p. 218.

> the pause are more distinctly heard, and more attended to than any others, it is peculiarly necessary that their natural and mechanical effect upon the mind should be considered by the composer. A pause preceded by a long syllable is always vigorous, and preceded by a short syllable feeble. If the long syllable be preceded by other long syllables, it is solemn, if by short ones, lively. On the other hand, if a short syllable preceding a pause (which is in itself feeble) be itself preceded by a long one, it makes a close easy and graceful (p. 310).

In his illustrative lines of both prose and poetry, Priestley indicates the places to pause by inserting vertical marks.

B. Use of Body. The second part of elocution is concerned with the use of the body.

> It is observable that dogs and other animals, not having the power of articulation, make use of various gestures and motions to express their meaning. With men, too, gestures and postures of the body, and particularly motions of the hands, and of the features of the countenance, are strongly associated with particular states of mind; and being in a less degree voluntary, are often a surer indication of a man's real internal feelings than words, which are more at his command. These gestures being equally significant with words, we often have recourse to them to express a passion, or a simple intention, with more force.[24]

The hands, the countenance, and various postures of the body, then, are the tools for bodily expressiveness, and through them, one can produce attitudes, motions, and looks, "which are infinitely more expressive of sentiments and feelings than words can possibly be" (p. 77).

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[24] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

Pronunciation, gesture, and the content of the discourse, should all correspond and fit well together. "When these things, which have so strong a connection in nature are not united, the whole must appear extremely unnatural, the imperfect artifice will be easily seen through, and the imposter be deservedly exposed" (p. 114). This correspondence is best achieved, Priestley asserts, through extemporaneous delivery. Though recognizing manuscript and memorized delivery to have some merit, he believes "the perfection of speaking is, certainly, to speak extempore" (p. 112). An audience, realizing the difficulty of this mode, will listen with wonder, admiration, and pleasure when the speaker delivers his message fluently without notes (pp. 112, 263). But not only does extempore delivery build ethical appeal; it also "engages the attention unspeakably more than formally reading every thing from notes" (p. v). Quick conception and animated delivery are natural to extempore speaking.

Priestley describes expressive delivery as just, earnest, graceful, and above all, natural. While he does not rule out the idea of training in either pronunciation or gesture, he realizes that "the external expressions of passion, with all their variations, corresponding to the different degrees of their emotions, are too complex for any person in the circumstances of a public speaker to be

able to attend to them." At the same time, he asserts that since "the difference between a genuine automatic and a voluntary motion," is too apparent to escape notice, any "prudent" person will not attempt a mode of address which he does not actually feel (p. 115).

> It is said that when a player was asked by a bishop why plays were heard with more attention than sermons, he answered, "The reason is, that we speak fiction as if it were a reality, while preachers speak of things real as if they were fiction." [A]ll the words and gestures of a preacher must be nature unmixed with any appearance of art, which it is impossible to conceal from an observer of tolerable discernment. . . . He must deliver himself as well as if he had prepared every word and gesture, and yet no appearance of preparation must appear in either (p. 267).

In short, Priestley recognizes the importance of delivery in accomplishing the speaker's goal, and, beyond doubt, accords it an important place in his rhetorical system. Based on a foundation of understanding and feeling, he envisions delivery as a natural, just, earnest, and graceful combination of skillful pronunciation and gesture.

VIII. Summary. We have now examined in its entirety Priestley's rhetorical blueprint for the construction and presentation of a written or oral discourse. Materials are secured through the process of recollection, by which one is able to recall, with the help of artificial topics if necessary, what has previously been stored away in the mind. By this means he can obtain enough matter to make his composition either concise or enlarged, as the occasion may

demand. Method directs him how to arrange this material, in chronological, spatial, or topical order for narration, or according to analysis or synthesis in argumentation. In order to make the composition appealing and arresting, style will furnish the composer with ornaments of thought and diction. And finally, from elocution the orator receives the power to deliver the oral discourse effectively, through the proper use of voice and body.

CHAPTER IV

DOMINANT TRENDS IN LATER EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH RHETORIC

I. Introduction. Since the aim of this study is to view Priestley's doctrines of language, oratory, and criticism within the framework of later eighteenth-century English rhetorical thought, it is necessary at the outset of our analysis to present and describe the dominant trends in the rhetoric of the period. From an examination of eighteenth-century English rhetorics and a perusal of investigations by Sandford,[1] Harding,[2] Edney,[3] Parrish,[4]

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[1]W. P. Sandford, English Theories of Public Address, 1530-1828.

[2]Harold Harding, "English Rhetorical Theory, 1750-1800."

[3]Clarence Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in Nineteenth Century America," A History of Speech Education in America, pp. 80-104.

[4]W. M. Parrish, "The Concept of Naturalness," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVII (December, 1951), 448-454.

Haberman,[5] Robb,[6] Howell,[7] Keesey,[8] Guthrie,[9] and Ehninger,[10] it would appear that four distinct threads made up the fabric of rhetorical thought in that country between 1758 and 1828: the classical, the belletristic, the elocutionary, and the psychological-epistemological.

I. The Classical Trend. The term "classical" is applied to that general body of theory found in the writings of the ancient Greek and Roman rhetoricians, especially Aristotle, Cicero, the unknown author of the Rhetorica ad

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[5]Frederick W. Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution," A History of Speech Education in America, pp. 105-126.

[6]Mary Margaret Robb, Oral Interpretation of Literature in American Colleges and Universities (New York, 1941).

[7]Wilbur S. Howell, "English Backgrounds of Rhetoric," A History of Speech Education in America, pp. 1-47.

[8]Ray E. Keesey, "John Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory," Speech Monographs, XX (March, 1953), 49-57.

[9]Warren Guthrie, "The Development of Rhetorical Theory in America 1635-1850. V, The Elocution Movement--England," Speech Monographs, XVIII (March, 1951), 17-30.

[10]Ehninger, "Selected Theories of Inventio in English Rhetoric, 1759-1828"; "George Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional Theory," The Southern Speech Journal, XV (May, 1950), 270-276; "John Ward and His Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, XVIII (March, 1951), 1-16; "Dominant Trends in English Rhetorical Thought, 1750-1800," The Southern Speech Journal, XVIII (September, 1952), 3-12; "Campbell, Blair, and Whately: Old Friends in a New Light," Western Speech, XIX (October, 1955), 262-269; also Ehninger and James Golden, "The Intrinsic Sources of Blair's Popularity," The Southern Speech Journal, XXI (Fall, 1955), 12-30.

Herennium, and Quintilian. Although there were, of course, significant variations among these theorists, there is enough similarity on fundamental points to enable us to make certain generalizations concerning their doctrine.

First, and perhaps of prime importance, is the fact that they regarded oratory as exclusively persuasive in nature, and generally divided speeches into three classes, according to the function of the listener: deliberative, before an assembly charged with selecting an expedient action for the future; forensic, before a court seeking to determine the justice or injustice of a past action; and epideictic, before an audience on a ceremonial occasion, concerned with honoring or dishonoring an individual or a group.

In structure ancient rhetoric was, as Cicero stated it, "an art made up of five great arts";[11] inventio, amassing persuasive matter on the question at hand; dispositio, arranging this matter into certain divisions, such as proem, statement, argument, and peroration; elocutio, utilizing the proper language to express thoughts in a high, medium, or low style, and with due attention to both perspicuity and ornament; memoria, remembering information as it is gathered and the speech as it is presented; and

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[11]Cicero, Brut., 6.

pronunciatio, making the best use of voice and gesture in delivering the speech.

By and large, the ancients placed their greatest emphasis on inventio and gave it an elaborate machinery, mostly of an "artificial" nature, with a view to making it possible for any speaker to secure enough proofs to establish his case. Specifically, they divided proofs into artistic, those devised by the orator's own skill; and inartistic, those supplied by pre-existent matter which the orator merely appropriates to his use, such as witnesses, forced confessions, and contracts. They made each element of the speaking situation--speaker, audience, and speech--a source from which the orator could draw artistic proofs: the utilization of his own personality and character so as to gain the confidence of his hearers was labeled ethical appeal; the engaging of the emotions of the auditors was termed pathetic appeal; and the substantiation of a proposition with argument was called logical appeal. Logical proof, in turn, could be developed by two methods: the example, which corresponded to the induction of dialectic; and the enthymeme, analogous to the syllogism of dialectic. To aid the speaker in finding proofs, the ancients devised a system of "places" or stimuli called topics. These were designed to lead the mind of the speaker to thoughts applicable to the particular cause in hand. For example,

a consideration of "motive" might suggest a proof in some cases, and so might "cause," "consequence," or "definition" suggest proofs in others. Topics capable of inciting thoughts on every sort of question were called universal, while those suitable to only one branch of knowledge or one type of case were denominated as particular. Two post-Aristotelian additions to inventional machinery were: the division of the subject matter of oratory into theses, or general questions, and hypotheses, or questions involving particular persons and situations; and second, the development of the status, an elaborate analytical procedure for discovering the major issue in a dispute and outlining the various stages through which a dispute passes.

Elocutio was also given considerable attention in classical works on rhetoric. Orators generally were advised to make their style correct, clear, and appropriate, and to ornament it in the proper degree. As an aid to this last requirement, many of the ancient treatises contained extensive discussions of figures of speech, often divided, as in the case of Quintilian, into tropes, on the one hand, and into figures of thought and of diction, on the other.

Dispositio, memoria, and pronunciatio, though not regarded as unimportant, were usually accorded comparatively less space in ancient rhetorical writings, upon the theory that they were less susceptible of systematic treatment.

By the second century after Christ, the classical rhetoric, as just described, had degenerated into the so-called "Second Sophistic," an age of highly embellished "declamation," lasting until the fifth century. After this time, ancient theory largely passed from the scene, not to be revived until the beginning of the modern period. One bright spot appeared when Augustine, about the end of the fourth century, wrote his De Doctrina Christiana, the last part of which was primarily an adaptation of Ciceronian rhetoric to the problems of Christian preaching.

As scholars of the Rennaissance were beginning to revive classical rhetoric, a sixteenth-century French educator, Peter Ramus, developed a doctrine that was to have tremendous impact on the theory of communication. Ramus, as part of a general reform of the liberal arts, formulated a so-called "principle of justice," which denounced all overlapping in academic studies. After his axe fell on rhetoric, only two of the five original canons, elocutio and pronunciatio, remained. He gave all of inventio and dispositio to logic or dialectic, and made of memoria a separate and independent discipline. During the same period, other writers, while not removing any of the five canons, perverted ancient theory by placing the great weight of their emphasis on elocutio, or style. By an elaborate classification of figures of speech, under the broad headings of

schemes and tropes, these theorists made style serve all five of the ancient functions of rhetoric. Such works as Richard Sherry's A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550) and Henry Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577) fell into this class.

In spite of the Ramistic and stylistic trends, however, some writers of the sixteenth century expressed the essence of the ancient views--Leonard Cox's The Arte or Crafte of Rhethoryke (1529) and Thomas Wilson's The Arte of Rhetorique (1553), to name only two of the most important ones. In the seventeenth century, the works of such men as Francis Bacon and Thomas Farnaby, along with translations of Archbishop Fénelon's, Charles Rollin's, and Bernard Lami's rhetorics from the French, helped to restore the classical doctrine in England. Numerous reprints and translations of Aristotle, Cicero, the Ad Herennium, Longinus, and Quintilian, published in the first half of the eighteenth century, also provided a strong impetus for the movement back to classicism.[12]

It was, however, in the eighteenth century, in the works of John Holmes, John Lawson, and John Ward, that the restoration of classical doctrine was completed, and that this doctrine again became strong enough to constitute a

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[12]Ehninger, "Dominant Trends," p. 5.

major trend in rhetorical thought. Holmes' The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy (1739) was little more than a condensation of certain standard ancient rhetorical concepts. Book I of this work, relying heavily on Cicero and Quintilian, was organized according to the canons of invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation, with emphasis on elocution, under which some two hundred and fifty figures are presented. Book II, a summary of Longinus' On the Sublime, continued the emphasis on style.

Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory (1758), delivered at Trinity College in Dublin, derived their theoretical basis from the works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Although not organized along strictly classical lines, the Lectures considered invention, disposition, style, and pronunciation to be the four divisions of the art of oratory, and treated each of these in a fundamentally classical fashion. According to Keesey, Lawson, in addition to his part in restoring ancient doctrine, made contributions to the rhetorical theory of the period by his emphasis on the need for "conversational quality," and his criticism of "mechanical systems" for teaching delivery.[13]

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[13]Keesey, "John Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory," p. 57.

The movement to restore the classical rhetoric in eighteenth-century Britain reached its culmination in John Ward's A System of Oratory (1759), for the eight hundred and sixty-three pages of this two-volume work contain the most comprehensive statement of classical doctrine ever written in English.[14] The author's avowed purpose in this rhetoric--published posthumously from a manuscript of the lectures delivered for thirty-eight years at Gresham College in London--was to form a system of oratory by collecting precepts from "Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus, and other celebrated authors," with "proper examples taken from the choicest parts of the purest antiquity."[15]

This aim of restating the ancients is continually evident throughout the System. The work opens with a careful definition of oratory and an explanation of its relationship to both grammar and logic, and then proceeds through invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation--each of which is treated in the standard classical fashion. Well-chosen illustrations accompany almost every precept.[16]

The System occupies a noteworthy place in the history of rhetorical thought because it "culminates the

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[14]Ehninger, "Dominant Trends," p. 5.

[15]John Ward, A System of Oratory (London, 1759), I, 15.

[16]Ehninger, "John Ward and His Rhetoric," p. 7.

reversionist movement chronologically as well as logically."[17] While the work was neither original, well adapted to its age, nor entirely accurate in its interpretation of the ancients, it was both the pinnacle of the restoration of classical theory, and, at the same time, the foundation for certain developments that were soon to follow. After Ward's System, rhetorical theory began to move in other directions; but, in large measure, these new developments were possible only because through it "the full scope of the classical rhetoric had been firmly established."[18]

II. The Belletristic Trend. One of these new directions taken by rhetoric, was the tendency to view oratory as one aspect of the broad field of belles lettres. The term "belles lettres," borrowed from the French, literally means "polite letters" or "polite literature," with a connotation much like the more modern term "humanities." Believing that all literary forms involved applications of the same basic compositional and critical principles, the theorists of this tradition tended to expand rhetoric to include the whole range of literary

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[17] Ibid., p. 16.

[18] Ibid.

activities.[19] Thus, oratory, poetry, drama, historical writing, and other modes, as well as the criticism of each of these, were all regarded as facets of a single gem by the collective name of belles lettres.

A. Characteristics of the Belletristic Trend. A course or textbook of the belletristic type usually exhibited three dominant characteristics. First, the theories of oral and written discourse tended to be fused into a single, coherent body of doctrine, thus obscuring the traditional distinction between these two theoretically independent disciplines. This tendency, of course, resulted from the belief that certain basic principles of language and style had equal application to all types of discourse, whether written or spoken; or, to put it in another way, the writers in this tradition thought of "the various forms of discourse [as] generically related branches growing out of a common parent trunk--a trunk which itself [was] rooted in a subsoil of language and style."[20]

Belletristic theorists, however, attempted to treat not only the underlying principles but also to trace their use in specific types of discourse. Anselm Bayly, for

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[19]Thomas De Quincey, The Collected Writings of Thomas DeQuincey, ed. David Masson (London, 1896-7), X, 85, Editor's note.

[20]Ehninger and Golden, "Intrinsic Sources," p. 17.

example, summarized the scope of his Introduction to Languages (1758) by saying, "In short, here is an attempt to give a rational and universal view of language from its elements through the several combinations and powers in writing and speaking. . . ."[21] In order to accomplish this end, writers generally began their works with a discussion of the simpler elements of language, such as diction and syntax, and proceeded through the more advanced elements of style, concluding with an application of these rules and principles to the various forms of spoken and written discourse.[22] Under such a plan, both the line between oral and written discourse and the ancient distinction between rhetoric and poetic, or persuasive and imaginative discourse, became almost indistinguishable.[23]

The second major characteristic of the belletristic tradition was that, by and large, rules and principles were made to serve a double function, standing, on the one hand, as guides to production and, on the other, as standards for criticism. Thus, a treatise on belles lettres was designed to aid both the composer and the critic--to provide a

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[21]Anselm Bayly, An Introduction to Languages, Literary and Philosophical (London, 1758), Preface, n. p.

[22]See Ehninger and Golden, "Intrinsic Sources," pp. 17-18.

[23]Ehninger, "Dominant Trends," p. 11.

pattern for the one and a yardstick for the other. Blair, for example, wrote:

> Of those who peruse the following Lectures, some, in consequence either of their profession, or of their prevailing inclination, may have the view of being employed in composition, or in public speaking. Others, without any prospect of this kind, may wish only to improve their taste with respect to writing and discourse, and to acquire principles which will enable them to judge for themselves in that part of literature called the Belles Lettres.
>
> With respect to the former, such as may have occasion to communicate their sentiments to the public, it is abundantly clear that some preparation of study is requisite for the end which they have in view.
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> . . . . . .
>
> But as there are many who have no such objects as either composition or public speaking in view, let us next consider what advantages may be derived by them, from such studies as from the subject of these Lectures. To them rhetoric is not so much a practical art as a speculative science; and the same instructions which assist others in composing, will assist them in discerning and relishing, the beauties of composition.[24]

This double function of the principles of belles lettres was evident in the analysis of "taste" and "genius," offered by all writers of this school. Jamieson, in a statement typical of the school made the crucial distinction when he declared: "Taste consists in the power of judging; genius, in the power of executing."[25] "A genius for any

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[24]Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, pp. 3, 5.

[25]Alexander Jamieson, A Grammar of Rhetoric and Polite Literature: Comprehending the Principles of Language and Style, the Elements of Taste and Criticism; with Rules for the Study of Composition and Eloquence (New Haven, 1826), p. 202. This statement is almost an exact repetition of Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, p. 23.

of the fine arts," he continued, "always supposes taste; it is clear, that the improvement of taste will serve both to forward and to correct the operations of genius."[26] The composer, in other words, must develop his taste so that he can produce a discourse which will please and not offend; while, at the same time, the critic must develop his taste so that he can judge a discourse as pleasing or offensive.

In short, according to the characteristic view of the rhetoric of belles lettres, the principles of language formed a single coin, with composition on the one side and criticism on the other.

The third characteristic of a belletristic work was that the subjects of language and style were given both a spatial and a doctrinal emphasis. This predominance of style over the other canons was a natural outgrowth of the first two characteristics--the fusion of the theories of oral and written discourse, and the attempt to serve both composer and critic--for each of these demanded considerable stress on the language aspects of communication. Moreover, since writers holding the belletristic point of view frequently tended to minimize the traditional function of invention, leaving the material of a discourse more to "genius" than to art, expression rather than substance

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[26] Ibid., p. 203.

tended to become the focal point of their theory.[27] Delivery, too, was given comparatively meagre treatment, not because it was thought unimportant, but because it applied to only a few of the many types of composition within the scope of belles lettres.[28]

B. Writers in the Belletristic Trend. These three hallmarks of the rhetoric of belles lettres may be seen in a large number of works published during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The most famous and widely used of these, as well as the master model after which many of the others were patterned, was the previously mentioned Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783) by the Edinburgh preacher and professor, Hugh Blair.

Some English works falling into this trend were John Brightland's second edition of A Grammar of the English Tongue (1712), which contained sections on grammar, poetry, rhetoric, and logic; Anselm Bayly's An Introduction to Languages (1758); Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism (1762); William Barron's Lectures on Belles Lettres and Logic (1806); George Gregory's Letters on Literature, Taste,

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[27]Ehninger, "Dominant Trends," p. 11.

[28]Also, as we shall see, the elocution movement was taking over the teaching of delivery, and courses in belles lettres and elocution were often taught concurrently.

and Composition (1808); and Alexander Jamieson's A Grammar of Rhetoric and Polite Literature (1816).[29]

IV. The Elocutionary Trend. A second direction taken by post-Wardian English rhetoric was the result of two important currents in eighteenth-century English thought. The first of these was a desire to advance and standardize the English language; and the second was a disposition to improve the delivery of preachers, lawyers, and other public speakers.

During the seventeenth century the English language had been brought to its full stature,[30] and by the beginning of the eighteenth century, had begun to replace Latin as the standard tongue of the classroom.[31] With a growing pride in their native tongue, Englishmen wanted "to make the language an even more noble instrument by standardizing and improving it in all its aspects, both written and spoken."[32] There were even appeals for the establishment of a national Academy to legislate on the "purity and beauty" of the

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[29]For others see Ehninger and Golden, "Intrinsic Sources," p. 13.

[30]Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution," p. 106.

[31]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, pp. 27-28.

[32]Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution," p. 106; cf. Baugh, A History of the English Language, pp. 321-325.

tongue, although none was founded until 1901. Moreover, the publication of dictionaries and grammars became quite common.[33]

At the same time, there was a growing attack on the standards of delivery prevailing among public speakers, especially preachers. Published criticisms were common; the most often mentioned being those of Richard Steele, Lord Chesterfield, Jonathan Swift, and Joseph Addison.[34] Most of the complaints charged speakers with lifeless delivery, poor gestures, slovenly articulation, incorrect pronunciation, and with "burying the nose" in a manuscript.[35]

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[33]See Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution," pp. 106-107; Baugh, A History of the English Language, pp. 325-344; McKnight, Modern English in the Making, Chapters XIV, XV; Arthur G. Kennedy, A Bibliography of Writings on the English Language (Cambridge, 1927).

[34]See Robb, Oral Interpretation of Literature, p. 20; Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution," pp. 105-106; Sandford, English Theories of Public Address, 1530-1828, p. 134; Guthrie, "The Elocution Movement--England," p. 20.

[35]Haberman summarizes these forces, saying: "Practical need for expertness in delivery, as presented by complaining auditors or felt by ambitious speakers; philological and linguistic investigations into pronunciation and inflectional patterns; recognition of the persuasive effect of pleasing delivery; the emergence of a new convention of dramatic presentation that invested delivery of spoken language with a new liveliness; the acknowledgement of competence in speaking as a part of general education--all these forces acting together in the eighteenth century inspired the most intensive study of delivery ever undertaken." Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution," p. 108.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, various lecturers and writers had begun to develop doctrines designed to serve the double function of advancing the English language and improving the standard of delivery. While some were, of course, more interested in one of these areas than in the other, most of them showed an interest in both. As a designation for their movement, they found the ancient terms pronunciatio and actio too limited in meaning to include their interests in both philology and delivery; so they selected the term "elocution" as an appellation both etymologically broad enough to comprehend their discipline, and traditionally respectable enough to be desirable.[36]

John Mason was the first to write a book with the word "elocution" in the title. In 1748 he published An Essay on Elocution, or Pronunciation, which was a brief treatise dealing with "the right Management of the Voice in reading or speaking."[37] His interest in the language aspect of the movement was shown by two short works on prosody, one dealing with poetry and the other, with prose.[38]

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[36]See Haberman, "English Sources of American Elocution," pp. 112-113.

[37]John Mason, An Essay on Elocution, or Pronunciation (London, 1748), p. 5.

[38]John Mason, An Essay on the Power of Numbers, and the Principles of Harmony in Poetical Composition (1749), and An Essay on the Power and Harmony of Prosaic Numbers (1749).

This combination of the desires to advance English as a language and to improve the delivery of public speakers is seen even more clearly in the writings of Thomas Sheridan, another important figure in the origin of the elocutionary movement. Sheridan's first work in this area was entitled, British Education: Or, the Source of the Disorders of Great Britain. Being an Essay towards proving, that the Immorality, Ignorance, and False Taste, which so generally prevail, are the natural and necessary Consequences of the present defective System of Education. With an attempt to show, that a revival of the Art of Speaking, and the Study of Our Own Language, might contribute in great Measure, to the cure of these Evils (1756). His other works in this tradition were: A Discourse Being Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Elocution and the English Language (1759); Lectures on Elocution (1762); Lectures on Reading (1775); and A General Dictionary of the English Language (1780), which was one of the first to give systematic attention to pronunciation.[39]

John Walker was the most prolific writer among the early elocutionists, his most important works being: Elements of Elocution (1781), A Rhetorical Grammar (1785),

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[39]McKnight, Modern English in the Making, pp. 437-438; Robb, Oral Interpretation of Literature, p. 33.

and A Critical Pronouncing Dictionary of the English Language (1791). The first two of these were designed primarily as aids in the improvement of delivery, while the last was an attempt to further the standardization of English pronunciation.

Other works of importance in this trend were James Burgh's The Art of Speaking (1762), John Rice's An Introduction to the Art of Reading with Energy and Propriety (1765), William Enfield's The Speaker (1774), Joshua Steele's Prosodia Rationalis (1775), William Cockin's The Art of Delivering Written Language (1775), William Scott's Lessons in Elocution (1779), and Gilbert Austin's Chironomia (1806).

Of course, the elocutionists were not the first to regard delivery as an important aspect of effective oral communication. Centuries earlier, the ancient rhetorical writers, believing pronunciatio to be of major significance,[40] had made it one of the five canons of their art. At the same time, however, with the single exception of Quintilian, they presented a relatively small amount of specific instruction on the subject, and on more than one occasion admitted doubt concerning the possibility of improving delivery by systematic instruction.

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[40]See Aristotle, Rhet., 1403b; Ad Her., 11. 19; De Orat., 3. 56. 213; Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 11. 3. 2, 5-7.

Aristotle, for example, mentioned delivery only "because of the sorry nature of an audience," although he did recognize that "success in delivery is of the utmost importance to the effect of a speech." He considered rhetorical delivery, as he tells us, to be much like acting, in that it is a "natural gift, and hardly within the province of art." Consequently, he devoted only two pages to a treatment of it.[41]

The Rhetorica ad Herennium attempts a more systematic discussion, but the unknown author of this work also recognized the difficulty of such a task. He wrote:

> Therefore, because no one has written carefully on this subject--all have thought it scarcely possible for voice, mien, and gesture to be lucidly described, as appertaining to our sense-experience--and because the mastery of delivery is a very important requisite for speaking, the whole subject, as I believe, deserves serious consideration.[42]

Then, after some brief suggestions on voice management and bodily action, and the referral of the orator to a singing teacher for voice cultivation,[43] he concluded:

> I am not unaware how great a task I have undertaken in trying to express physical movements in words and portray vocal intonations in writing. True, I was not confident that it was possible to treat these matters adequately in writing. Yet neither did I suppose that,

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[41]Aristotle, Rhet., 1404a.

[42]Ad. Her., 3. 11. 19.

[43]Ibid., 3. 11. 19-15, 27.

> if such a treatment were impossible, it would follow that what I have done here would be useless, for it has been my purpose merely to suggest what ought to be done. The rest I shall leave to practice.[44]

Cicero, likewise, recognized the importance of delivery, but has little to say about how to achieve success in this aspect of oratory.[45] In closing De Oratore, for example, he made only brief mention of the use of voice, gesture, and countenance in expressing the emotions, and gives passing suggestions on the care of the voice.[46]

Quintilian, alone among ancient theorists, dealt with the subject of delivery at any appreciable length, not only making many specific suggestions about the care and management of the voice, but also giving precise descriptions of various types of gestures.[47] Even he, however, it should be observed, recommended that the orator receive training in delivery from the actor and gymnast.[48]

Paradoxically, then, the classical writers considered delivery to be extremely important; but--believing that it did not lend itself to theoretical analysis, they tended to give it only brief and somewhat grudging development.

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[44] Ibid., 3. 15. 27.

[45] Cicero, De Orat., 3. 55. 213; Brut., 38.

[46] Cicero, De Orat., 3. 56. 213-227.

[47] Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 11. 3. 1-184.

[48] Ibid., 1. 11. 1-17.

As Howell says, among the ancients delivery "was considered to be of overwhelming importance in the process of communication, but was not thought to be particularly susceptible to theoretical treatment."[49]

The writers in the elocutionary movement, on the other hand, while not regarding any of the other canons of rhetoric as unimportant, centered their interest almost exclusively in the field of delivery, unanimously believing that it could be analyzed, treated in detail, and taught either by lectures or printed works. Consequently, they set about to correct what they regarded as the previous neglect. Austin, in a clear statement of this aim, said in the Preface to his Chironomia:

> Although the ancient writers have left various and complete systems of rhetoric, as far as relates to the four first divisions, viz. invention, disposition, elocution, (that is, choice of language), and memory, and although modern writers have expounded, and detailed, and added to all these precepts, insomuch that in every language abundant instructions can be obtained in all these divisions, the public speakers have arrived at distinguished excellence; yet it is a fact, that we do not possess from the ancients, nor yet from the labours of our own countrymen, any sufficiently detailed and precise precepts for the fifth division of the art of rhetoric, namely, rhetorical delivery, called by the ancients actio and pronunciatio. . . . My object in this work is therefore to contribute my share of labour towards the completion of the rules for the better study and acquisition of rhetorical delivery, the fifth,

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[49] Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton, N. J., 1956), p. 73.

> and least cultivated, but if we are to believe ancient authorities, not the least important division of the art.[50]

The elocutionists took the basic ingredients of their systems of delivery from the ancients. Almost every elocutionary work was built around such matters as articulation, pronunciation, accent, emphasis, inflection, tone, pause, looks, gesture, and expression of passions--each of which was mentioned in the classical works. Particularly did they draw from Quintilian, who almost qualifies as "the elocutionist of the ancients." As we have already indicated, however, these borrowed elements, were given a more elaborate, analytical treatment by the eighteenth-century writers than they had received at the hands of the ancients. Indeed, some elocutionary writers even devised complicated notation systems for all the elements of voice and gesture.[51]

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[50]Gilbert Austin, Chironomia; or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery (London, 1806), pp. ix-x; see also John Walker, A Rhetorical Grammar (Boston, 1822), pp. xi-xii; Guthrie, "The Elocution Movement--England," p. 17; James Burgh, The Art of Speaking (London, 1772), pp. 1-2.

[51]Particularly in the works of Steele, Walker, and Austin. Elocutionists have often been divided into two schools--the "natural" and the "mechanical." As Parrish has observed, however, since all elocutionists sought "natural delivery" as an end product, it was primarily in method rather than purpose that they differed. Therefore, he rightly advises against forcing rigid classifications, and no attempt will be made to do so here. Parrish, loc. cit.

Perhaps the most concise statement of the basic views of the elocutionists is found in Sheridan's definition of a just delivery:

> A just delivery consists in a distinct articulation of words, pronounced in proper tones, suitably varied to the sense, and the emotions of the mind; with due observation of accent; of emphasis, in its several gradations; of rests or pauses of the voice, in proper places and well measured degrees of time; and the whole accompanied with expressive looks, and significant gesture.[52]

The terms they most often used to describe the type of delivery they sought were: "natural," "earnest," "vigorous," "graceful," "just," and "easy."[53]

As this brief survey of the writers of the movement reveals, the elocutionists, then, sought to adapt the term "elocution" to a somewhat new use. They developed a doctrine designed to advance the English language and improve current standards of delivery, treating in a detailed way, such matters as articulation, pronunciation, accent, emphasis, inflection, tone, pause, looks, gesture, and the expression of the passions. In general, they desired a type of delivery that would be natural, earnest, vigorous, graceful, just,

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[52]Thomas Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution (London, 1762), p. 10.

[53]See Mason, Essay on Elocution, p. 22; John Walker, Elements of Elocution (Boston, 1810), p. 18; James Burgh, The Art of Speaking, pp. 9, 12, 27, 41, 42; William Enfield, The Speaker (Philadelphia, 1799), pp. 5, 7, 15; Austin, Chironomia, p. 86; Haberman, "Sources of American Elocution," p. 115.

and easy. This new doctrine, while based to some extent upon the works of the ancients, not only surpassed them in detail and specialization, but, more significantly, attempted to reduce the matter of oratorical delivery to a teachable art or science. As a result, the lecturers and writers of this movement effected a new balance among the "parts" of rhetoric--"a balance which tended to give delivery a position equal in importance and dignity to those traditionally enjoyed by invention and disposition."[54]

V. The Psychological-Epistemological Trend. The third, and in some respects, the most far-reaching, post-Wardian development in English rhetorical thought was the "re-thinking" of rhetorical theory in the light of contemporary doctrines of psychology and epistemology.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed what amounted to a revolution in philosophy, led by such thinkers as John Locke, Bishop Berkeley, David Hume, David Hartley, and Thomas Reid. Their "concerted effort to examine and describe conscious processes," says Ehninger, "produced three distinct theories of mind which exerted important influences on rhetorical doctrine. The first two--provided we remember that a nineteenth-century term [psychology] is being appropriated--may most conveniently

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[54]Ehninger, "Dominant Trends," p. 10.

be called the 'psychology of association' and the 'psychology of the faculties.' The third is usually known as the 'common sense philosophy.'"[55]

The champion of associationism was David Hartley, who built upon a foundation laid by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. In his Observations on Man (1749) he attempted to explain how all mental phenomena arise from "simple" sensations, "these, in turn, [being] organized by the mind according to the 'laws' of association--continuity in space, succession in time, and contrast in relation. Secondary associations and affections result [he argued] in those pleasures and pains which are the more complex components of mental life."[56]

The psychology of association had far-reaching effects on rhetorical theory. Under its influence, George Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), described experience as comprised of "retention and association,"[57] and also based much of his treatment of the passions on the association of ideas.[58] Furthermore, he named "resemblance, identity, equality, contrariety, cause and effect,

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[55]Ibid., p. 6.

[56]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[57]Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric p. 55.

[58]Ibid., Book I, Chapter VII, Section 5.

concomitancy, [and] vicinity in time or place," as the associational relationships which lead "to various combinations of ideas" in the mind,[59] and maintained that these were the pathways which should guide the writer or speaker in selecting and arranging materials. Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism (1762) also made wide use of the theory of association, though Kames preferred to use the terms "succession" and "ideas in a train."[60] Likewise, John Ogilvie, in discussing imagination and memory, utilized associationism in his Philosophical and Critical Observations on the Nature, Characters, and Various Species of Composition (1774). John Rippingham, in The Art of Extempore Public Speaking (1813), pointed to association as the basis of memory and artifical mnemonic devices. Archibald Alison's Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste (1790) were an instance of the use of association in a treatise of a somewhat different nature.

A second theory of mind utilized by English rhetoricians of the eighteenth century was the "faculty psychology," which divided the mind into a hierarchy of inter-related functions. Francis Bacon, as early as 1605,

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[59] Ibid., pp. 250-251.

[60] Helen Whitcomb Randall, The Critical Theory of Lord Kames, Smith College Studies in Modern Languages, XXII (1944), 30.

had spoken of the mind as composed of the will, affections, imagination, and understanding, and suggested that the function of rhetoric was to "apply reason to the imagination for the better moving of the will."[61] The great impact of this psychology on rhetoric came, however, more than a century and a half later in the writings of such theorists as Sheridan, Rice, Campbell, Ogilvie, Blair, and Whately.

Thomas Sheridan, the elocutionist, made important use of the psychology of the faculties, stating in his Lectures on Elocution (1762) that he would treat primarily the relationship between language and the two faculties of the imagination and the passions. John Rice, in his Art of Reading (1765), also based his analysis of rhetoric on the faculties, asserting that the reader should reach the heart through the understanding, rather than by confounding the imagination.[62] From this same philosophy, George Campbell drew his famous classification of the "ends" of speaking; "every speech," as he tells us in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, "being intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will."[63] Hugh Blair in his Lectures

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[61]Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, XVII, 2.

[62]John Rice, An Introduction to the Art of Reading (London, 1765), p. 388 (erroneously paged 288).

[63]Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 11.

on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), and Richard Whately in the Elements of Rhetoric (1828), joined Campbell in employing the faculty psychology as the basis for their doctrines of the duality of "conviction" and "persuasion." Lastly, the divisions and entire development in the first volume of Ogilvie's Observations on Composition were based on the faculties of the understanding, imagination, discernment, and memory.

The "common sense philosophy" was the third psychology that exerted considerable influence on English rhetorical theory during the eighteenth century. This "common sense philosophy," usually connected with the Scottish thinker, Thomas Reid, was primarily a reaction against the skepticism of David Hume. "Reid posited the existence of certain 'common' presuppositions, or conditions, which underlie all human knowledge; and which, because they are instinctive, are unassailable by doubt."[64] George Campbell, in basic agreement with Reid, his friend and colleague, utilized the "common sense philosophy" in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, where it furnished "much of the theoretical groundwork," and "accounts for his analysis of 'evidence.'"[65] Moreover, as Harding correctly states,

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[64]Ehninger, "Dominant Trends," p. 8.

[65]Ibid.; see also Ehninger, "Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional Theory," pp. 271-272.

both Blair and Kames based their discussions of "'good sense' in determining taste" on the common sense doctrine.[66]

In short, English rhetoricians of the last half of the eighteenth century, frequently modified the classical rhetoric to a very considerable degree by taking into account new theories concerning the nature of the human mind. Ehninger states:

> Taken as a whole, the major works in the psychological-epistemological tradition are of first importance in the history of rhetorical theory. For not only did they help break the hard shell of classicism, but in so doing they laid many of the foundation stones upon which rest our present-day theories of writing and speaking. Thus, for example, our custom of classifying speeches according to the end sought by the speaker rather than according to the circumstances under which they are delivered (deliberative, epideictic, forensic); our distinction between "conviction" as resting upon logical argument and "persuasion" as resting upon psychological appeal; and our general emphasis upon the importance of the audience as a factor in the total speaking situation may all be directly traced to the doctrines of associationism, the faculty psychology, or the philosophy of common sense.[67]

V. Summary. These, then, were the four threads of thought that were being woven into the fabric of English rhetoric during the years between 1762 and 1767, while Joseph Priestley was serving as Tutor of Languages and Belles Lettres at Warrington Academy. John Ward's System had already been published, marking the culmination of

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[66]Harding, "English Rhetorical Theory, 1750-1800," p. 351-352.

[67]Ehninger, "Dominant Trends," p. 8.

the return to classicism; the philosophical works of Locke, Hume, Hartley, and others were by then available; John Mason and Thomas Sheridan already had works in print on elocution; Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism was published the very year Priestley began lecturing on oratory and criticism; and George Campbell and Hugh Blair were, during those very years, delivering their famous lectures which were to be published a few years later. The ensuing chapters will explore Priestley's connection with each of these four trends present in the rhetoric of late eighteenth-century England.

CHAPTER V

PRIESTLEY AND CLASSICISM

I. Introduction. It is fitting that we begin our analysis of Priestley's rhetorical system by comparing it with the classical rhetoric, for it was the ancient theorists who initially erected what we might call the "house of rhetoric." Subsequent rhetoricians have largely employed themselves in expanding, remodeling, restoring, and adapting the original structure. In this chapter, therefore, those features of Priestley's system that are basically classical in nature will be specified, and each will be traced, in so far as possible, to the source from which Priestley drew it.

II. The Classical Features of Priestley's Rhetorical System. An examination of Priestley's rhetoric reveals a number of similarities to the doctrines presented by such major ancient rhetorical writers as Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and the unknown author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium.

A. Nature and Purpose of Oratory. First, Priestley's doctrine of the nature and purpose of oratory--concepts basic in every rhetorical system--is much like

that found among ancient theorists. Like them, he believed oratory to be an art, particularly in the sense that it was a skill which could be developed by adherence to an organized and universally applicable body of doctrine. Priestley also shared the ancient view of the boundaries of this art; for, while emphasizing the value of logic and grammar in the training of an orator, he made these subjects prerequisites to, not parts of, the instruction one should receive from the rhetor.[1]

Most important of all, however, Priestley, like the ancients, conceived of oratory not as a matter of adornment, but as the art of rendering discourse effective, with a view toward persuasion.[2] He wrote:

> Let the first, and principal view of every orator . . . be to inform the judgment, and thereby direct the practice; and let him only attempt to please, or affect, when it is subservient to that design; when the occasion itself, in a manner, prompts to it, and the bent of his own genius leads him to comply with such an invitation.[3]

B. Rhetorical Canons and Organization. An examination of the structure and "parts" of Priestley's system reveals further resemblances to the classical treatises.

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[1]Priestley, Lectures, p. 3. See Aristotle, Rhet., 1354a; Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 1. 4. 1-9. 6.

[2]Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 2. 15. 1-38.

[3]Priestley, Lectures, p. 69.

As we have already suggested, the classical rhetoric may be described as an art composed of five separate but dependent arts--invention, disposition, style, memory, and delivery--working in concert to attain a desired end. Of these, the classical rhetoricians invariably took invention as their point of attack in developing their systems, dealing with this canon first, and then working through disposition, style, memory, and delivery, although the order among these officia was sometimes varied. Invention, generally, was regarded by the ancients as first in importance,[4] although in such treatises as the De Oratore and the Institutio Oratoria, style was accorded the greatest amount of space.

Priestley, for his part, followed this ancient pattern very closely. The framework of his system is composed of four basic elements: recollection, method, style, and elocution[5]--his names for the classical canons of invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation. Moreover, he begins by presenting his doctrine of invention, and then proceeds through arrangement, style, and delivery, in that order, preserving, by and large, the same relative emphasis among these parts that had characterized ancient doctrine. This he accomplishes by giving the most space

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[4]See Ad Her., 2. 1. 1; and Cicero, De Inv. 1. 7. 9.

[5]Priestley, Lectures, p. 5.

to style, while categorically asserting that invention and disposition are the prime or "necessary" tasks of the speaker.[6]

This organizational similarity to the ancient treatises, especially to those of the so-called Hellenistic type, is a particularly strong link with classicism in view of the fact that Priestley is the only major English rhetorician between 1760 and 1828 to arrange his work according to this classical pattern.[7] George Campbell, for example, had structured his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) in terms of an analysis of the mental nature of the audience, rather than by following the five standard parts. Hugh Blair, as we have seen, departed from the classical pattern by organizing his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783) in a typically belletristic fashion. Moreover, none of the major elocutionary works, with one possible exception, was designed to treat the entire scope of rhetoric as the ancients conceived of it, for they limited themselves almost entirely to the canon of delivery.

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[6]Ibid., p. 69. It should be mentioned that, in all probability, Priestley's emphasis on style was, as we shall see, connected with his interest in belles lettres; but, regardless of the reasons why, his spatial emphasis on style tends to give his rhetorical system a resemblance to classical doctrine.

[7]See Ehninger, "Campbell, Blair, and Whately," pp. 264-265; Ehninger, "Whately on Dispositio," pp. 439-441.

The one work among them which may be regarded as an exception is John Walker's A Rhetorical Grammar (1785) which, in addition to discussing delivery, gives some attention to style and invention; but even this essay begins with delivery and places on it the preponderant emphasis, while the material on the other canons is copied, sometimes at length and verbatim, from Priestley, Ward, and Blair. Richard Whately, author of the important Elements of Rhetoric (1828), reduced considerably the scope of rhetoric by making it treat primarily of argumentation; and along with this limitation in the scope of ancient rhetoric, he also departed from its five canons in organization, by arranging his treatise in the four divisions of conviction, persuasion, style, and delivery.

Priestley, in sum, stands as the only major rhetorical theorist writing in English between 1760 and 1828, who adopted the standard classical divisions as the framework for his system. He is also the only rhetorician in this period to use the typical classical point of attack upon the subject, beginning with invention, and then proceeding in order through the other officia of rhetoric.

C. Doctrine of Invention. In addition to accepting the ancient view concerning the place held by invention in the total organizational pattern of an art or science of rhetoric, Priestley also treated this canon in a basically classical manner.

Classical rhetorics of the Hellenistic type, as part of their inventional machinery, divided disputable "questions" into two fundamental classes: theses, or general questions, uncircumscribed as to persons, time, or place; and hypotheses, those concerning particular circumstances. Priestley, likewise, presents such a classification:

> Universal propositions are those which have no relation to particular persons, times, or place, but are at all times, in all places, and with regard to all persons, true or false; . . . Particular propositions are those which have relation to, and are limited by, particular persons, times, or places.[8]

A second, and even more significant similarity to the ancients, is Priestley's doctrine of topics, which is the core of his entire inventional system. Like classical theorists, he regards the use of topics as an artificial or artistic procedure aimed at supplying the want of natural aptitude in securing proofs. Like them, too, he classifies topics as universal and particular; and each of the seventeen topics he suggests--definition, adjuncts, antecedents, consequents, means, analogy, contrariety, example, authority, person, time, place, motive, manner, instrument, evidence, and the law concerning it--may be found in the writings of classical rhetoricians.[9] His list probably bears more

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[8]Priestley, Lectures, p. 9.

[9]The following is a suggestive, not exhaustive, list of where Priestley's seventeen universal and particular topics are mentioned by Aristotle's Rhetorica, the Ad

resemblance to that of Quintilian than to any other author among the ancients, but there are also similarities to Aristotle, Cicero, and the Rhetorica ad Herennium, as well. Equally significant is the fact that Priestley, like the ancients, appears to divide particular topics into those useful in deliberative, forensic, and epideictic discourses.[10]

A third aspect of Priestley's inventional system that bears a close resemblance to ancient doctrine in his treatment of amplification. Though appearing in different positions in various classical works,[11] this concept was a

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Herennium, Cicero's De Oratore, and Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria: Definition--Rhet., 1398a; Ad Her., 2. 12. 17; De Orat., 2. 29. 164; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 54-57. Antecedents--Rhet., 1398b; Ad Her., 2. 13. 19; De Orat., 2. 29. 166; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 71-72. Analogy--Rhet., 1399a; Ad Her., 2. 12. 18; De Orat., 2. 29. 166; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 73. Adjuncts--Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 58-61. Consequents--Rhet., 1399a, b; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 75-86. Means--Ad Her., 3. 2. 3. Contrariety-- Rhet., 1397a; De Orat., 2. 29. 166; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 73. Example--Rhet., 1398a, b; Inst. Orat., 5. 11. 1-35. Authority--Ad Her., 2. 7. 10; Inst. Orat., 5. 11. 36-44. Person--Ad Her., 2. 6. 10; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 23-31. Time--Rhet., 1397b; Ad Her., 2. 3. 7; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 42-48. Place--Ad Her., 2. 3. 7; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 37-41. Motive--Rhet., 1399b; Ad Her., 2. 2. 3; 3. 3. 5; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 33-36, 46. Manner--Ad Her., 2. 3. 5; Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 52. Instrument--Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 51. Evidence--Inst. Orat., 5. 10. 103. Law concerning it--Ad Her., 2. 9. 13-11. 16.

[10]Priestley, Lectures, p. 9.

[11]Cicero and the author of the Ad Herennium place amplification primarily under dispositio, and to some extent under elocutio and pronunciatio. Cicero, De Part. Orat.,

definite part of ancient theory. Like the classical writers, Priestley believed that amplification was of aid in adapting the discourse to the audience and in stirring their emotions;[12] and, like Cicero, he thought that amplification might be employed in any part of the speech.[13] The methods for amplifying which Priestley suggested are basically the same as those found in ancient treatises: reference to the same topics which provide arguments,[14] reasoning,[15] the use of language in repetition, illustration, diversified expression, extended transitions,[16] and the addition of details and observations.[17]

D. Doctrine of Disposition. Although allowing considerable latitude in the organization of materials, when Priestley comes to list the parts of a synthetical discourse,

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8. 27; 15. 52; Ad Her., 2. 30. 47-31. 50; 3. 13. 23-14. 25. Quintilian considers amplification mainly under style. Inst. Orat. 8. 4. 1-29.

[12]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 26-28; Cicero, De Part. Orat., 15. 52; Ad Her., 2. 30. 47.

[13]Priestley, Lectures, p. 29; Cicero, De Part. Orat., 8. 27.

[14]Priestley, Lectures, p. 26; Cicero, De Part. Orat., 16. 55.

[15]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 26-27; Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 8. 4. 15-26.

[16]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 28-29; Cicero, De Part. Orat., 15. 52-16. 56; Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 8. 4. 1-29.

[17]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 28-29; cf. Ad Her., 2. 30. 47-49.

he suggests introduction, statement, proof, miscellaneous remarks, and conclusion.[18] These divisions are, of course, similar to those recommended in the classical treatises where the ancients, who ranged from Aristotle's four parts to Quintilian's eight, all mentioned introduction, statement, proof, and conclusion, as essential parts of the speech and prescribed that they follow in this order.[19]

E. Treatment of Style. Although no two of the ancient writers treated style in exactly the same fashion, certain basic characteristics were common among them, and, in several instances, Priestley's discussion of style exhibits these characteristics.

In general, the ancients suggested that an orator's style should be correct, clear, appropriate, and ornamented in the proper degree. Each of these qualities is also recommended by Priestley. As we have seen, Priestley's grammars were largely concerned with the question of correctness, and Lecture XXXII in the Lectures deals with both correctness and perspicuity. Moreover, ornamentation and appropriateness are discussed at length in Part III of the Lectures, where Priestley deals primarily with various

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[18]Priestley, Lectures, p. 52.

[19]Aristotle, Rhet., 1415a-1420b; Ad Her., 3. 9. 16-10. 18; Cicero, De Orat., 2. 19. 78-81; Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 4. 1. 1-6. 5. 11.

figures of speech. Also of significance is the fact that to a rhetorician of the second century A. D., or even of the first century B. C., a list of Priestley's figures would appear quite familiar: antithesis, apostrophe, question and answer, period, climax, indecision, metonymy, hyperbole, synecdoche, catachresis, metaphor, allegory, frankness, comparison, contrast, simile, personification, periphrasis, humor and wit, novelty, and sublimity.[20]

Likewise, Priestley's division of his discussion of style into ornamenting the thought and ornamenting the diction would not have seemed unusual to the ancients. The author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, for example, had divided his discussion of figures into those of thought and those of diction,[21] and Quintilian's division of this subject recognized figures of thought and of speech.[22] Like Quintilian, too, Priestley believed perspicuity of style to be more essential than adornment.[23]

F. Classical Concepts and Expressions. When one who is familiar with classical rhetoric reads the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, he encounters certain isolated

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[20]Cf. Ad Her., 4. 1. 1-56. 69; Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 8. 6. 1-9. 4. 147.

[21]Ad Her., 4. 13. 18-19.

[22]Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 9. 1. 16.

[23]Priestley, Lectures, p. 313; Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 8. 2. 1-23.

expressions and concepts, which, though they appear only incidentally or in an indirect form, seem to betray a classical origin. Priestley does not, for example, actually state that speeches may be divided into forensic, deliberative, and epideictic; but he does show a familiarity with this common classical division. When making the application of particular topics, he mentions "all historical debates, geographical and chronological knowledge, consultation about the interest of particular states at particular times [deliberative]; judicial inquiries into the actions of particular persons [forensic]; and all personal panegyric or invective [epideictic]."[24] He also writes of discourses in which facts are to be proved or disproved, persons accused or defended, and individuals praised or blamed.[25] One statement seems to indicate some acquaintance with the "state" of definition:

> Thus in order to prove a person, whose actions are well known, to be guilty of any particular crime; as sacrilege, burglary, &c. we merely define what those particular crimes are. If the definition be allowed, the proof is complete; as it shews that the action in question and the crime are the same.[26]

Moreover, his statement that "Laws may be considered as to their precision or ambiguity, their intention, their

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[24]Priestley, Lectures, p. 9.

[25]Ibid., p. 20.

[26]Ibid., p. 11.

customary forms, &. &c." is reminiscent of two of the classical quasi-states.[27]

G. Classical Illustrations. By the same token, Priestley's frequent use of the orators of antiquity for illustrative purposes gives his work a classical flavor. His favorite, apparently, is Cicero, whose orations are referred to no less than twenty times;[28] Demosthenes[29] and Marc Antony[30] are each mentioned twice; and Junius Brutus is quoted once.[31]

Citations of ancient writers are even more numerous. Virgil is the most often used, being quoted twenty-two times, usually in Latin.[32] Other classical writers frequently mentioned are Homer,[33] eight times; Tacitus,[34] Livy,[35] and

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[27] Ibid., p. 20; cf. Ad Her., 1. 11. 19.

[28] Priestley, Lectures, pp. 21, 24, 54, 110, 114, 118, 119, 121, 124, 142, 203, 234, 255, 256, 276, 284, 286.

[29] Ibid., pp. 118, 121.

[30] Ibid., pp. 122, 123, 142.

[31] Ibid., pp. 117-118.

[32] Ibid., pp. 76, 86, 101, 102, 140, 175, 180, 182, 183, 232, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 244, 256, 292, 306.

[33] Homer's Iliad is mentioned or quoted in Ibid., pp. 82, 83, 140, 168, 169, 176, 240; the Odessee [sic] is mentioned on p. 140; general statements about Homer are made on pp. 86 and 227.

[34] Ibid., pp. 36, 38, 40, 141.

[35] Ibid., pp. 36, 103, 141, 284.

Horace,[36] four times each; and Pliny,[37] Thucydides,[38] and Herodotus,[39] three each.[40]

H. Conclusion. With this evidence before us, therefore, we would appear to be justified in concluding that Priestley's lectures definitely show some elements of the classical rhetoric. His conception of the nature and function of oratory is basically classical. The framework of his system is composed of the traditional canons of invention, disposition, style, and delivery; and, like the ancients, he makes the problem of invention his initial point of attack and likewise his point of major emphasis. His treatment of the nature of invention is also similar, in many respects, to the classical pattern; for it is centered chiefly in the topics and hence is essentially artificial in nature. Lastly, his comments on style and disposition, as well as a number of incidental remarks scattered throughout the Lectures, show some resemblance to ancient doctrine.

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[36] Ibid., pp. 68, 152, 285, 306.

[37] Ibid., pp. 21, 203.

[38] Ibid., pp. 37, 128, 142.

[39] Ibid., pp. 37, 96, 232.

[40] Other ancient authors mentioned in Priestley's Lectures are: Polybius, p. 28; Xenophon, pp. 36, 38; Sallust, pp. 36, 54; Suetonius, p. 40; Curtius, p. 40; Plutarch, p. 40; Pindar, p. 68; Ovid, pp. 102, 180; Seneca, pp. 142, 266; Lysias, p. 226; Aristophanes, p. 214; Theocritus, p. 255; Caesar, p. 286; Ennius, p. 306; Lucretius, p. 306.

III. The Sources of Priestley's Classicism. The question now arises as to how Priestley came into contact with classical rhetorical doctrines. Did he return to the original sources and learn them at first hand from the treatises of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian; or did he draw these ideas from some point downstream, as they were expressed by later theorists?

A. Priestley's Use of Classical Rhetorics. That Priestley was familiar with many Greek and Latin authors, we may be certain; for, as a young man, he studied both of these languages extensively. He records, for instance, that by the age of twelve or thirteen, he had made some progress in Latin and had begun to learn the elements of Greek;[41] and his brother, Timothy, recalled that by the age of thirteen, Joseph had read "the common Latin authors."[42] Priestley mentions, too, that while at Daventry, and afterwards, he and his friend, a Mr. Alexander, "read every day ten folio pages in some Greek author, and generally a Greek play in the course of the week besides." He claims, moreover, to have been "very well acquainted with . . . [Greek], and with most valuable authors in it."[43]

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[41]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 7.

[42]Timothy Priestley, Funeral Sermon, p. 36, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 7.

[43]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, p. 26.

In spite of all this, however, it is very probable that Priestley had little first-hand knowledge of the classical works on rhetoric. While citations of ancient authors are frequent in most of his writings, and even in the Lectures, there is only slight mention of the rhetorical works themselves. He refers to Aristotle's Rhetoric but once,[44] a reference which criticizes the Greek philosopher for encumbering rhetoric with material on human nature and the passions. Likewise, he mentions Quintilian on only one occasion,[45] when his work is said to indicate that the ancient orators actually did use topics as part of their preparation. Twice in the Lectures, Priestley cites the writings of Plato,[46] but these passages speak of him only as one who excelled in personification, and show no acquaintance with his work as a rhetorical theorist. In the same way, Priestley frequently uses Cicero's orations for illustrative purposes, while mentioning the Roman author's rhetorical works only twice--once in support of topics,[47] and once as the source of an illustration on wit.[48] Throughout the whole

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[44]Priestley, Lectures, p. 4.

[45]Ibid., p. 24.

[46]Ibid., pp. 255, 256.

[47]Ibid., p. 24.

[48]Ibid., pp. 276-277.

of the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, therefore, the classical rhetorics are specifically referred to only four times; and, as we shall now see, there is strong evidence for believing that even these four references were taken, not from original sources, but from the writings of contemporary authors.

B. Priestley's Use of Ward and Lawson. In a previous chapter, the Lectures Concerning Oratory (1758) by John Lawson and the System of Oratory (1759) by John Ward were classified as essentially restatements of classical doctrine. That Priestley was acquainted with both of these contemporary works on rhetoric, we may be certain. In the Preface to his Lectures, he acknowledges his indebtedness to Ward with the simple statement: "Several of the examples in the first part of this work are borrowed from Dr. Ward's Oratory."[49] No such acknowledgement is made to Lawson, but his Lectures Concerning Oratory are criticized for their run-on paragraphs--a reference which in itself verifies Priestley's acquaintance with this work.[50] Now the hypothesis which, upon an examination of all the available evidence, seems most probable, is that the similarities between Priestley's doctrines and the classical rhetoric

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[49] Ibid., p. iii.

[50] Ibid., pp. 287-288.

are due, in a large measure, to Priestley's familiarity with and use of the works of Ward and Lawson.

1. The Four References to Classical Rhetorical Works. Priestley's four references to classical rhetoricians, as noted above, may well have been taken from the works of Lawson and Ward, rather than from the original sources. His reference to Aristotle's Rhetoric as containing material on the passions, could easily have come from Lawson, who in his summary of that work, briefly reviews Aristotle's description of human nature.[51] His references to Quintilian and Cicero in support of the value of topics could have been taken from either Lawson[52] or Ward;[53] for they both mention these two authors in this same connection. Moreover, Priestley's quotation from De Oratore concerning wit is almost certain to have been borrowed from Ward,[54] who uses the same quotation for the same purpose, and with a similiar introductory comment.

It is even more probable that many of Priestley's references to ancient authors and speakers, mentioned above, were drawn from Ward and Lawson. At least half of

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[51]John Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory (Dublin, 1759), p. 46; see also pp. 54, 166.

[52]Ibid., p. 128.

[53]Ward, System, I, 52.

[54]Ibid., II, 206.

Priestley's illustrations from Cicero, which are found largely in the section on style, were apparently taken directly from the pages of Ward's System.[55] From Ward, too, came one reference to Sallust,[56] two to Pliny,[57] one to Caesar,[58] two to Virgil,[59] and five to Biblical writers.[60]

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[55]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, p. 21 with Ward, System, passim; Lectures, p. 24 with System, I, 54; Lectures, p. 110 with System, II, 99, 100; Lectures, p. 110 with System, II, 104; Lectures, p. 118 with System, II, 66-67; Lectures, p. 119 with System, II, 71; Lectures, p. 121 with System, II, 82; Lectures, p. 124 with System, II, 94-95; Lectures, p. 124 with System, II, 72; Lectures, p. 203 with System, II, 150-151.

[56]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, p. 54 with Ward, System, II, 283.

[57]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, p. 203 with Ward, System, II, 149, 152.

[58]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, p. 286 with Ward, System, II, 50.

[59]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, pp. 76, 182-183 with Ward, System, I, 390; II, 184.

[60]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, p. 111 with Ward, System, II, 104; Lectures, pp. 121-122 with System, II, 83; Lectures, p. 218 with System, II, 13; Lectures, p. 223 with System, II, 29. That these references to Cicero and other authors were taken from Ward, rather than from a source common to both Priestley and Ward, seems obvious from such facts as the following: (1) Both Priestley and Ward, almost without exception, use these quotations and allusions to illustrate the same figure of speech; (2) the quotations often start and stop on the same word, and when they do not, Priestley's quotations invariably contain less than Ward's; (3) citations appearing in close connection in Ward sometimes appear in the same close connection and in the same order in Priestley. For example, between pages 118 and 124 Priestley makes five references to Cicero which appear in Ward's second volume between pages 66 and 95, and with one exception, they are in exactly the same order;

From Lawson, Priestley drew two references to Virgil.[61]

2. Nature and Purpose of Oratory. Since both Ward and Lawson present a basically classical view of the nature and purpose of oratory, and since Priestley was familiar with both of their works, it seems logical to conjecture that his classical conception of the scope and function of oratory came from them also. There is more than conjecture, however, to support such an attribution. Ward's Lecture II defines oratory, proves it to be an art, sets forth the boundaries between oratory, grammar, and logic, and suggests persuasion as the basic "end" of oratory. Lecture I of Priestley's work presents almost exactly these same matters, in the same order, and with essentially the same conclusions--thus making it appear that Ward's System may actually have been open beside Priestley as he wrote.

Priestley's later statement that the end of oratory is to "inform the judgment, and thereby direct the practice," and that the orator should attempt to "please" or "affect"

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while on pp. 110 and 111 Priestley cites, in this order, Cicero's orations on Milo and Pompey, and then gives two Biblical references from Isaiah and Jeremiah, while Ward quotes exactly the same excerpt from the oration against Milo on p. 100, refers to the identical passage in the oration on Pompey on p. 104, and gives precisely the same Scripture references on page 104.

[61]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, p. 101 with Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 181; Lectures, p. 102 with Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 182.

only when it is "subservient to that design,"[62] may have been suggested by a similar statement in Lawson: "Its [eloquence's] chief End is to instruct; and Pleasure being often a necessary means to Instruction, becomes here a subordinate End."[63]

Both Ward and Lawson, then, appear to have had a part in the development of those aspects of Priestley's conception of rhetoric that may be designated as "classical."

3. Doctrine of Invention. Priestley's obligation to Ward and Lawson for classical doctrine is further substantiated by a comparison of their respective treatments of invention. Both Ward and Lawson have much to say about topics,[64] and Ward stresses the status, quasi-states, theses, and hypotheses[65]--each of which appears, to some degree, in the Lectures.

Especially is there a close resemblance between Priestley and Ward on the doctrine of topics. Although Ward mentions about twice as many topics as does Priestley, their classifications are very similar. As universal topics, both

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[62]Priestley, Lectures, p. 69.

[63]Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 193.

[64]See Ward, System, Lectures VI-IX; and Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, pp. 127-128.

[65]Ward, System, I, 40, 53-54, 63-68, 131.

suggest definition, adjuncts, antecedents, consequents, contraries, and analogy or similitude;[66] and Priestley adds testimony or authority, which Ward calls an external topic.[67] This leaves only two of Priestley's universal topics unaccounted for--example and means; and even these terms are mentioned by Ward, though not directly as topics.[68] In treating particular topics, Ward has separate lectures on those suitable for demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial orations; and from these sections, Priestley, largely omitting the three divisions, appears to have taken his particular topics.[69]

Furthermore, Priestley and Ward use a similar example to illustrate how topics may be used in proving propositions; that is, in making the subject and predicate of a proposition coincide. Ward's illustrative proposition is, "Whether virtue is to be loved?" and, he says, "the agreement between virtue and love might be found by comparing them separately with happiness, as a common measure to both."[70]

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[66]Priestley, Lectures, p. 10; Ward, System, I, 52.

[67]Ward, System, I, 61. Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 142, also mentions arguments "drawn from authority."

[68]Ward, System, I, 95, 416-417.

[69]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, pp. 19-20 with Ward, System, Lectures VII, VIII, IX, and in particular with I, 63, 126-128, 150, 192, 416-417.

[70]Ward, System, I, 47.

Priestley uses as his proposition, "Every good man is a wise man," and shows the correspondence of subject and predicate through the middle term of "the making use of the means of happiness."[71]

Moreover, Priestley may have drawn many ideas on amplification from Ward; for, while it is true that they introduce this subject at different points in their respective systems, there are many similiarities in treatment. Compare, for example, these two statements. Ward: "The design of amplification is not barely to prove or evince the truth of things, but also to adorn and illustrate them";[72] and Priestley: "The former [concise discourse] is sufficient, where it answers a writer's purpose barely to inform his reader of the reality of an event; the latter [amplification] is necessary, if he be desirous that the reader be interested in it, and affected with it."[73] Moreover, Ward suggests the use of "particular to general" and "general to particular" among the methods of amplification,[74] and Priestley, modifying these only slightly, speaks of "supplying intermediate arguments" and "induction of particulars."[75]

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[71]Priestley, Lectures, p. 7.

[72]Ward, System, I, 40.

[73]Priestley, Lectures, p. 28.

[74]Ward, System, I, 293, 295.

[75]Priestley, Lectures, p. 26.

Another portion of Priestley's treatment of amplification, a long paragraph comparing writers and speakers, was undoubtedly prompted by a passage in Ward's discussion of diversities of style. Both writers suggest that those of quick judgment generally make good speakers, while those of deeper judgment are better suited for writers.[76]

In short, the similarities between Priestley's treatment of invention and the inventional doctrines found in Ward's System, and to a somewhat lesser extent in Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory, lend considerable credence to the hypothesis that Priestley drew many of his classical ideas from these contemporary sources.

4. Doctrine of Disposition. Priestley's divisions of the synthetic discourse--introduction, statement, proof, miscellaneous remarks, and conclusion--which closely resemble the speech divisions suggested by various ancient theorists, also could well have been taken from either Ward or Lawson. Ward compares the four divisions of Aristotle, a five-part division which he attributes to Quintilian, and the six divisions of Cicero, finally recommending the Ciceronian pattern of exordium, statement, narration, confirmation, confutation, and peroration.[77] Lawson's

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[76]Cf. Priestley Lectures, pp. 30-31 with Ward, System, II, 116-117.

[77]Ward, System, I, 176-178.

pattern of arrangement, like Priestley's, consists of five parts: exordium or introduction, narration, proof, refutation, and conclusion.[78]

5. Treatment of Style. There are a number of parallels between Priestley's treatment of style and ideas presented by Ward. A particularly strong connection appears in the section of the Lectures dealing with those "forms of address" which tend to gain the assent of the judgment, where Priestley suggests that a speaker be earnest, the master of his subject, candid, and that he present a redundancy of proofs.[79] These "forms" may well be adaptations of Ward's treatment of ethical appeal in which he lists four qualities suited to the character of the orator: wisdom, integrity, benevolence, and modesty.[80] Moreover, the figures of speech which Priestley includes under each of these four headings were almost certainly taken from Lectures XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of Ward's System. Priestley's "answering objections" corresponds with Ward's "prolepsis" and "hypobole"; Priestley's "deliberating with judge, hearers, and opponents," with Ward's "anacoinosis"; Priestley's "admission and show of candour," with Ward's

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[78]Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, Lecture IX, and pp. 279-385.

[79]Priestley, Lectures, Lectures XV-XVI.

[80]Ward, System, I, 142.

"epitrope"; Priestley's "correction," with Ward's "epanorthosis"; Priestley's "omission," with Ward's "paralepsis"; Priestley's "doubt," with Ward's "aporia"; Priestley's "exclamation," with Ward's "ecphonesis"; Priestley's "concealment," with Ward's "aposiopesis"; and Priestley's "apostrophe," with Ward's "apostrophe." Priestley also borrows from Ward some fifteen examples of these figures, principally the previously mentioned references to Cicero.

Nor should it be overlooked that both Priestley and Ward treat these additional figures common in classical rhetoric: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, antonomasia, communication, litotes, catachresis, hyperbole, and allegory. For these, too, Priestley occasionally draws illustrations from the System.

6. Departures from Classical Doctrine. Another circumstance corroborating the proposition that many of Priestley's classical features were taken from Ward and Lawson rather than directly from the ancients, is that Priestley makes some of the same deviations from classical doctrine that these two writers do.

a) On Invention. As has been mentioned before, Priestley looked upon rhetorical invention as a matter of recalling what had been previously stored in the memory. Thus he departed, to some extent, from the ancient concept of invention by removing "discovery" from this "part" of

rhetoric. Moreover, he conceived of the topics more as "keys" to the files of memory, than as "places" to seek for arguments.

Of considerable interest by way of comparison with Priestley's inventional system, is the fact that Lawson terms the power of remembering impressions on the mind "Recollection,"[81] and calls memory "the Storehouse of the Soul, from whence the Understanding furnisheth itself with Notions."[82]

Moreover, Lawson, while believing topics to be an important "tool" in rhetoric, does not give them their ancient function as an artificial means for "discovering" proofs. Rather, he makes them "Observations on all common Heads, digested into convenient Order; which should be ever ready at Hand, that the Orator may have recourse to them; and draw from them, as from a general Store, Materials on all Occasions."[83] Thus, in effect, he reduces them to a set of memorized or prepared statements which the orator may recall from the memory for use on any occasion. These collections of commonplaces, he refers to as "Fountains, . . . continually full, from which [ancient orators] drew the

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[81]Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 218.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid., pp. 127-128.

streams of Eloquence, with Ease and Quickness."[84]

Lawson's doctrine of topics is obviously drawn from Bacon's Advancement of Learning, for he both cites Bacon and repeats his treatment of "commonplaces" or "preparations." By this term, Bacon meant a store of prepared materials which can be put into use as the occasion demands--precisely the meaning Lawson gives to "topics." Moreover, both Bacon and Lawson refer to the use which Cicero and Demosthenes made of this artificial method of invention.[85]

It is altogether possible, then, that Priestley's omission of the concept of "discovery" from invention was influenced by a somewhat similar view expressed by Lawson, who seems to believe that the material for a discourse springs from the study of the subject[86] and "recollection," and that the topics are useful only as a mental storehouse of prepared materials. While Priestley's concept of invention and the topics does not exactly correspond with that presented by Lawson, it is significant that they both modify this part of rhetoric to make it deal primarily with recalling material from the memory.

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[84] Ibid., p. 128.

[85] Bacon, Advancement of Learning, 13. 7; Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 128.

[86] Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, pp. 134, 137, 218.

b) On Disposition. Along with this more limited conception of rhetorical invention, Priestley also varies from the ancient view by presenting a somewhat modified doctrine of disposition. In the ancient tradition, the second part of rhetoric included not only the mere mechanical arrangement of materials according to the standard steps of exordium, narration, etc., but also the exercise of discernment and judgment with respect to the particular proofs suitable to a given audience.[87] Priestley, however, assigned these functions of "selection" and "judgment" to his inventional system, defining invention as "readily recollecting and judiciously selecting, what is proper for [the orator's] purpose, out of the materials with which the mind was previously furnished."[88] Thus, he leaves for "method," his second division of rhetoric, only the work of showing in what order to dispose of the materials recollected, so as to produce the greatest "force" and "effect."[89]

Just as Priestley's departure from the classical conception of invention may have grown out of certain passages in Lawson, so his departure in regard to disposition

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[87]Russell H. Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," Studies in Speech and Drama in Honor of Alexander M. Drummond (Ithaca, New York, 1944), pp. 285-294.

[88]Priestley, Lectures, p. 5.

[89]Ibid.

could conceivably have come from Ward; for the author of the System, like Priestley, gives the "selection" function to invention, and regards disposition principally as a matter of arrangement.[90] He wrote: "[W]hat is chiefly intended by [disposition] is, the placing [of] the several parts of a discourse in a just method and dependence upon each other."[91]

Another of Priestley's variations from a strictly classical doctrine of dispositio was apparently suggested by Lawson. As noted earlier, much of Priestley's treatment of arrangement deals with an application of the geometric method of proof to the organization of an argumentative discourse. He suggests that:

> Truth, whether geometrical, metaphysical, moral, or theological, is of the same nature, and the evidence of it is perceived in a similar manner by the same human minds. Now it is universally allowed that the form in which evidence is presented by Euclid, and other geometricians of reputation, is that in which it gains the readiest and most irresistible admission into the mind; and their method of conducting a demonstration, and disposing of every thing preceding it, and subsequent to it, hath been so generally approved, that it is established as invariable. Such a successful method of procedure with respect to mathematical truth, certainly deserves the attention and imitation of all who are desirous to promote the interests of any kind of truth.
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> In order, therefore, to give the most perfect rules of synthetic demonstration, I shall explain the method of geometricians, and endeavour to shew how far it may be adopted, or imitated with advantage, by writers in general, and particularly by divines and moralists.[92]

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[90]See Ehninger, "John Ward and His Rhetoric," p. 7.

[91]Ward, System, I, 175.

[92]Priestley, Lectures, p. 289.

With this introduction, Priestley devotes a lecture and a half to a discussion of the steps in a geometric demonstration. Beginning with axioms or self-evident truths, he proceeds through definitions, statement of the proposition with whatever lemmas may be necessary, proof of the proposition, scholia, and corollaries. In outlining this geometric procedure, Priestley observes at each step, just how the speaker or writer may follow a similar practice.[93]

Although the application of geometrical and mathematical methods to rhetoric was not infrequent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,[94] Priestley's references to the geometric method were most likely taken from Lawson, who also has much to say on the subject:

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[93]See Ibid., Lectures VII and VIII.

[94]Blaise Pascal, the French philosopher and mathematician, wrote a brief treatise called De l'Art de Persuader as a preface to a work on the Elements of Geometry. This fragment, which, according to Jean Mesnard in Pascal: His Life and Works (New York, 1952), p. 112, was composed for use at Port Royal in 1657 or 1658, recommended that a speaker utilize the geometric method of demonstration by defining all unfamiliar or ambiguous terms, and by stating succinctly the axioms or maxims forming the basis of his argument. Some of these ideas found their way into Bernard Lami's L'Art de Parler (1675), sometimes called the Port Royal Rhetoric, previously mentioned as being influential in seventeenth-century England. Moreover, George Campbell also drew on mathematical concepts in his rhetorical system by making "mathematical axioms" a type of intuitive evidence and "calculation of chances" a species of deductive evidence. Richard Whately, likewise, made "calculation of chances" a type of evidence.

> Upon the Whole, I think it may be laid down as a universal Rule in the Point, That in laying the Plan of what you are to say, and in selecting your Materials, you should arrange all at first in a Geometrical Method; by which Means you will see the just Value, the Force and Connexion of each Argument: Afterwards, if you think it expedient, in order to win the Attention of the Hearers, to add any Ornament, you may be at least certain, that the Foundation is right: You have chalked out a well-known and sure Path; and, if, for the Sake of pleasing Prospects, you should now and then lead your Hearer to some Distance from it, yet you may be certain of recovering it at Will, and of conducting him safely to his Journey's End.[95]

This, of course, is basically the same recommendation that Priestley makes when he suggests that the orator plan an argumentative discourse according to the pattern of geometric demonstration, and later suggests techniques of style as a means of ornamenting the discourse.

Priestley's deviations from the classical doctrine of dispositio, therefore, could well have been suggested to him by the works of Lawson and Ward. From Ward, might have come transferral of "selection" from disposition to invention; and from Lawson, seemingly, came his advocacy of the geometric method.

c) On Style. Another deviation from the classics which Priestley probably found in contemporary works was his discussion of style in terms of plain and figurative, rather than high, middle, and low. This concept, which holds that either the plain or figurative style is natural

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[95]Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 133.

under the proper circumstances, may have been based on a passage in Lawson which compares the plain and figurative styles, and declares the figurative to be natural if the occasion is suitable.[96]

IV. Conclusion. By Priestley's own admission, therefore, he was acquainted with Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory and Ward's System of Oratory, and when these two works are compared with Priestley's rhetorical system, it becomes obvious that he drew heavily from them. Even more important is the fact that it was apparently from these two works, rather than from the ancients themselves, that he borrowed many of those ideas and illustrations which give his Lectures the stamp of classicism.

From the material in this chapter, then, we can draw two conclusions: that Priestley's rhetorical system contains certain significant similarities to classical rhetoric; and that these elements were, for the most part, probably taken, not from the ancients themselves, but from the contemporary works of Lawson and Ward.

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[96]Cf. Priestley, Lectures, pp. 75-58 with Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, pp. 251-253.

CHAPTER VI

PRIESTLEY AND THE RHETORIC OF BELLES LETTRES

I. Introduction. Having observed the similarities between Priestley's system and certain doctrines common among the ancients, we turn now to a comparison of his rhetoric with another important trend in the works of late eighteenth-century English rhetoricians--the so-called rhetoric of belles lettres. This trend, it will be recalled, was described in Chapter IV as having three dominant characteristics: (1) theories of oral and written discourse are fused into a single, coherent body of doctrine, thus obscuring the distinction between these two traditionally independent modes; (2) many rules and principles are made to serve a double function, standing both as guides to production and as standards for criticism; and (3) the subjects of language and style receive a marked spatial and doctrinal emphasis.

II. Priestley and Belles Lettres. Since Joseph Priestley occupied the position of "Tutor of Belles Lettres" at Warrington Academy and since he composed two of his

three works on language while in that capacity, it is particularly appropriate in this study to determine the extent to which each of these three "hallmarks" of belles lettres is to be found in his views on language, oratory, and criticism.

A. The Fusion of Oral and Written Discourse. First, from the structure, scope, and content of Priestley's linguistic works, it appears that, in a large measure, he, like belletristic writers, tends to fuse the theories of written and oral discourse.

1. Viewpoint of the Universal Grammar. In his Theory of Language and Universal Grammar, Priestley's approach to language clearly exhibits this fusion. As indicated earlier, his specifically announced purpose is to present the "theory or rationale" of language, "whether spoken or written."[1] In accordance with this aim, throughout the work he makes constant and common reference to the elements basic to both writing and speaking, as well as developing certain doctrines that pertain to each of these modes individually.

Thus, he opens with a lecture on articulation, moves through a discussion of the origin of speech and writing, treats in detail the parts of speech, syntax, the history of language as it relates to both writing and speaking,

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[1] Works of Priestley, XXIII, 121, 124.

discusses the composition and pronunciation of poetry, and finally concludes with a general comparison of various languages.

Moreover, his description of the characteristics of an ideal language comprehends both oral and written discourse: "In the first place, it is necessary [that] there be a sufficient copia of words; secondly, that there be no ambiguities of words or constructions; and, lastly, that the pronunciation of it be not grating, but pleasing to the ear."[2]

2. The Scope of the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. In his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, also, Priestley exhibits a belletristic point of view by making the scope of the work broad enough to cover both written and oral discourse. Indeed, from the initial lecture, it is obvious that he draws no clear distinction between theories of speaking and writing, or, for that matter, between the sciences of rhetoric and poetic. The very expressions employed in introducing the Lectures indicate that he intends to present principles that will be of service both to the writer and the speaker; for in his initial survey of the subject he habitually, and with clear intention, uses such phraseology as "speeches or compositions," "in order to speak or write well upon any subject," "make a political

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[2]Ibid., p. 227.

harangue, or write a dissertation upon the constitution of a state," and "whatever subject, therefore, any person intends to write or speak upon."[3]

But that Priestley in this work considers the various forms of discourse as founded upon a common set of principles is evident not only from his phraseology, but, even more significantly, from his treatment of each of the major divisions of the subject. In each of the three sections of the Lectures--recollection or invention, method, and style--Priestley constantly applies the doctrines of his system to both oral and written discourse.

Under the head of invention, the topic of "definition," for example, is said to suggest arguments to lawyers, to disputants "in a great number of metaphysical, moral, and religious controversies," and also to "those who write treatises upon any entire art or science."[4] Likewise, "antecedents" are recommended for use not only by divines and eulogists, but also by historians and political writers; while "consequents" are prescribed for moralists, divines, mathematicians, and lawyers.[5] Also under the head of recollection, Priestley treats the subject of amplification

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[3]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 2-5.

[4]Ibid., pp. 11-12.

[5]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

in such a way as to make it clear that he is interested in both writing and speaking, and their common underlying principles.[6]

In the same way, Priestley's recommendations on method are intended to be of aid in the preparation of all types of discourses. The composers of narratives, whether they be histories or romances, orations or eulogies, will, we are told, find the chronological, spatial, and topical orders applicable; while philosophers, scientists, preachers, moralists, and politicians, who compose argumentative discourses, will find the geometric method the most satisfactory. In the closing paragraphs on method, where he makes brief mention of several types of compositions, Priestley's breadth of scope becomes especially apparent. Sermons, he suggests, may be either topical or textual; essays may employ any one of a variety of methods, but should pay particular attention to transitions; and odes may be allowed much latitude in arrangement, so long as they maintain unity.[7]

Finally, the integration of the theories of oral and written discourse is apparent in Priestley's treatment of style. Frequently he applies the same stylistic principle

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[6] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[7] Ibid., pp. 64-68.

to both authors and orators, as in the following instance:

> Since no form of expression can appear natural, unless it correspond to the feelings of the person who uses it, let no writer adopt the present tense in describing a past transaction, unless the scene be so interesting, that the reader can hardly help realizing it, and fancying that he actually sees and hears every thing that is represented; otherwise the affectation becomes sensible, and cannot fail to give disgust.
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> It is a very extravagant stretch of this figure, when a public speaker represents a scene that is past or future as present in the very place of the audience; for it requires an illusion capable not only of affecting the imagination, but of imposing upon the bodily senses too, to cover the absurdity of such language. Let this observation be applied to some preachers when they describe the day of judgment.[8]

Another principle of style given the same double application is this:

> It is a fundamental rule in all kinds of composition [i.e., whether written or spoken] that they ought to be more or less elaborate, according as they are longer or shorter; or, rather, according to the opportunity they give the mind to attend to all the beauties of them.
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> In these cases, however, regard must be had, if possible, to the persons for whose use any kind of composition is made, and even to the temper of mind in which it is most likely to be perused.[9]

By way of illustration, Priestley applies this principle to epigrams, odes, histories, heroic poems, tragedies, and harangues.

Similarly, when he lectures on the writing of verse and prose, Priestley takes occasion to include instruction on oral interpretation. The section entitled "Harmony in

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[8] Ibid., p. 83.

[9] Ibid., p. 140.

Verse," for example, while dealing mainly with versification, also contains comments on whether the pronunciation should favor the metre or the sense.[10] Again, the lecture on "Harmony in Prose" contains a discussion of pauses "in reading prose," along with the treatment of rhythm and word usage.[11]

These instances suggest, therefore, that in the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, as well as in the Universal Grammar, Priestley envisions written and oral discourse as essentially unitary in nature, and as founded upon the same basic principles of language and style. Clearly, in his mind there is no sharp distinction between these two modes, or between the laws and precepts that govern their usage.

3. The Illustrative Material in the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. Further evidence of Priestley's kinship to the rhetoric of belles lettres in general, and to its fusion of written and oral discourse, in particular, lies in the fact that he habitually takes the great majority of his illustrations from writers rather than from speakers--even in the section of his work that bears the running head of "Oratory." Of the nearly one hundred and fifty citations which he makes to the works of others, only twenty-nine are

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[10] Ibid., pp. 300-301.

[11] Ibid., p. 310.

to what might be called speeches. Moreover, references are made to some ninety authors, but to only four orators. This in itself suggests that in Priestley's own thinking he tended to fuse the theories of oral and written discourse, to the extent that it became immaterial whether an illustration was taken from the one or the other.

Nor should it be overlooked that the specific authors cited by Priestley are, by and large, the same as those cited by such belletristic writers as Blair and Jamieson. Shakespeare appears to have been Priestley's favorite source of illustrative material, being quoted or alluded to forty-eight times. Pope, cited thirty times, ranks second; then follow the Bible, referred to twenty-five times: Cicero, also twenty-five; Virgil, twenty-three; Milton, fifteen; and Homer, ten.[12]

4. Literature and the Fine Arts. Not only does Priestley believe that all species of discourse are related by virtue of their common foundation in underlying principles of style and language, but, again like members of this school, he also believes that literature itself is merely one facet of the larger field of the fine arts, or humanities, and therefore, is based upon laws and principles that apply

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[12]As indicated elsewhere, Priestley took the majority of these references from Kames, Ward, and Lawson, rather than from their original source.

to the fine arts in general. Such a view is, for example, implicit in his treatment of novelty. After recommending this quality as useful in all sorts of discourses, in the same breath he goes on to discuss it as the reason for the vogue of "the Chinese taste, and the revival of the Gothic, in architecture, the pantomime entertainments, with all their varieties, or the theatre, and the new forms [of] musical entertainments," as well as the choice of furniture, the disposition of gardens, and the fashion of clothes.[13] In other passages in the Lectures, Priestley uses painting and sculpture to demonstrate the principles of taste,[14] painting and music to illustrate the appreciation we have for the accomplishments of human genius,[15] drama and sculpture to depict the reasons why an imitation should bear the marks of an imitation,[16] an unresolved musical passage to indicate the undesirability of incompleteness,[17] and the sounds of music to exemplify the effects of the sounds of words.[18]

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[13] Ibid., p. 149.

[14] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[15] Ibid., pp. 263-264.

[16] Ibid., pp. 264-267.

[17] Ibid., p. 272.

[18] Ibid., p. 289.

5. Conclusion. Upon the basis of this evidence, therefore, it would appear that Priestley, in common with writers of the belletristic school, tends to fuse the theories of written and oral discourse into a single, integrated body of doctrine. Moreover, like writers of the belletristic school, he regards literature as only one facet of the general field of the humanities.

B. The Use of Rules and Principles to Serve Both Author and Critic. It is obvious from our previous discussion that Priestley intends many of the specific rules and principles set forth in the grammars and Lectures to serve as guides for the composer; but, of particular importance here is the fact that, like belletristic writers, he also intends these same rules and principles to serve as standards for the critic.

1. The Lectures on Oratory and Criticism Obviously Intended to Be a Work on Criticism as Well as Rhetoric. Beyond much doubt, Priestley intends his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism to be a work that will serve the critic as well as the composer. Perhaps the most obvious indication of such a design is the appearance of the term "criticism" both in the title of the Lectures and as the running head for the entire section of the work that is given over to style. Moreover, this section itself is replete with such tell-tale phrases as these: "the knowledge of which is essential to

criticism upon works of genius and imagination";[19] ". . . may help to throw light upon several things which occur upon the subject of criticism, and works of taste and genius";[20] "another observation . . . of considerable use in criticism,"[21] and "the business of criticism, or the standard of judging in works of genius."[22]

2. The Double Function of Rules and Precepts. Of even greater significance, however, in indicating Priestley's intention of serving the critic as well as the composer is the presence in the Lectures of many specific rules and principles that are obviously designed to perform the double function of guiding the writer or speaker and also, at the same time of guiding the critic, by providing him with various standards and criteria of judgment.

The first such "two-edged" doctrine is Priestley's system of topics. Much has already been said about how Priestley believed topics might aid both speakers and writers, but it remains to be noted that, by virtue of this principle of "double-function," he also regards topics as useful to

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[19] Ibid., p. 73. Italics in this and the three following quotations, mine.

[20] Ibid., p. 89.

[21] Ibid., p. 98.

[22] Ibid., p. 137.

the critic. After reading a composition, the critic may, he points out, consult a list of the topics to determine whether anything of importance has been overlooked by the author; or, if the discourse is necessarily limited to only a few arguments, the critic may, by such consultation, decide whether the composer has selected those which are strongest and best designed to achieve his purpose.[23]

Priestley likewise regards the principles of taste as having this two-fold application. In common with such belletristic writers as Blair and Jamieson, he gives considerable emphasis to the matter of developing taste, for he believes it to be of value to those engaged in pursuits involving the use of language. To the composer, taste serves as a guide to "genius," and to the critic, on the other hand, it provides the delicate discernment that is necessary if one is to pass accurate judgment on works of art or literature.[24]

Another of Priestley's "two-edged" doctrines deals with the passions; for he recognizes that composers must utilize emotional appeal in their writing or speaking, while critics must analyze such appeals where they have been used. Therefore, he reasons, both need a clear understanding of the principles underlying human emotion.

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[23] Ibid., p. 23.

[24] See Ibid., pp. 73, 140, 246.

Priestley's interest in the passions from a critical point of view, is obvious from his introduction to this subject, where he states that he will attempt to explain those "critical situations of mind respecting the passions and emotions in general, the knowledge of which is essential to criticism upon works of genius and imagination."[25] In this connection, his observation that passions are aroused in direct proportion to the vividness of the language employed, is presented as one of the standards by which a critic determines the effectiveness of the emotional appeal in a given work, as well as one of the guides by which a composer selects his words. Moreover, the directions given to authors concerning the use of names and circumstances for making a discourse vivid, serve also as criteria by which the critic may distinguish true history from fable and romance.[26] Other principles which Priestley suggests as being useful to both authors and critics are these: strong emotions and passions tend to generate belief;[27] and passions are excited with more or less ease according to the state of mind that precedes them.[28] Each of these principles is illustrated by critical

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[25] Ibid., p. 73.

[26] Ibid., p. 85.

[27] Ibid., p. 89.

[28] Ibid., p. 60.

remarks upon such authors as Shakespeare, Homer, Virgil, Milton, Pope, Livy, Dryden, and Moliere, as well as by references to the Scriptures.[29]

Throughout the remainder of his discussion of style, which deals primarily with various figures of speech designed to stir the pleasures of the imagination, Priestley continues to present principles in such a way as to emphasize their double function. He stresses, for example, that composers should avoid and critics should "expose" the use of any "forms of expression" that do not suit either the purpose of a work or the audience for which it is intended.[30]

The treatment of specific figures, moreover, is clearly intended to serve the critic as well as the author. The general approach to these figures, as we shall see in Chapter VIII, is made from a psychological point of view--that is, by explaining the effect of each figure in terms of the nature of man's mind. Novelty, sublimity, and analogy, for example, are said to please because they require "a moderate exertion of the faculties." This method of supplying a psychological explanation for figures of speech, is, of course, equally useful to composers and critics; for in this way composers are instructed in the use of figures, while,

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[29]See Ibid., Lectures XII, XIII, XIV.

[30]Ibid., pp. 140, 227.

at the same time, critics are supplied the knowledge necessary for analyzing them and estimating their effect on the mind.

3. Conclusion. From the evidence here presented, it appears that Priestley clearly intends the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism to be, among other things, an essay on criticism, and that he clearly had critics as well as composers in mind as he wrote. Also of considerable significance in relating his system to the belletristic tradition is the fact that, as here demonstrated, Priestley often regards the same rules and precepts as being of service to both authors and critics.

C. The Spatial and Doctrinal Emphasis on Style. As we have previously seen, Priestley gives to style a greater amount of space than he devotes to any other subject dealt with in his Lectures--some seventy-five per cent of the work being concerned with this subject. This marked spatial emphasis on style is actually the result of two factors: the introduction of more numerous sub-divisions and greater elaboration; and a more copious illustration than is given to precepts on other matters.

This greater detail, elaboration, and illustration in the treatment of style, has been noted by both Sandford and Edney. Sandford writes: "His emphasis may be judged by the fact that he gives only ten lectures to [recollection

and method], and twenty-five to style." "The author," continues Sandford, "is obviously more at home in his discussion of style than in treating of invention and disposition, and supplies considerably more detail."[31] Edney goes even further, concluding that the Lectures contain a "treatment of all aspects of rhetoric, aside from limited discussions of topics, techniques of amplification, and methods of arrangement, under a broad concept of style."[32]

The question of just where Priestley does place the doctrinal emphasis in his system is open to interpretation. As was suggested in the preceding chapter, he clearly states that recollection and method "are more peculiarly the proper objects of an orator, and essential to his views," while style is only "an advantage rather than a necessary part of his art."[33] At the same time, however, as this chapter on Priestley's belletristic tendencies demonstrates, he by no means confines his Lectures to the subject of oratory alone. They are designed, rather, to supply the basic principles for all types of discourse, written as well as spoken.

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[31]Sandford, English Theories of Public Address, pp. 115-116.

[32]Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in Nineteenth-Century America," p. 85.

[33]Priestley, Lectures, p. 68.

The fairest interpretation would seem to be that, so far as oratory itself is concerned, Priestley considers recollection and method to be the essential tasks, while style is merely an important "advantage." On the other hand, however, when treating the many other types of discourse included in his system, he tends to regard style as not only advantageous, but as the matter of greatest concern. He declares, for example, that those who write in the narrative style will find little help from recollection, but "can expect [assistance] from the art of oratory in digesting and adorning their compositions; and these articles will be considered in the second and third parts of these Lectures."[34] In short, when viewing Priestley's system in its entirety, it appears that style should be regarded as the point of doctrinal as well as spatial emphasis; for he not only devotes some seventy-five per cent of the Lectures, as well as much of the grammars, to this subject, but he also appears to make it the point of major interest and concern for the composers of most types of discourses.

D. The Structure of the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. Not only do Priestley's Lectures resemble a typical belletristic work in the three basic characteristics just discussed, but one significant portion of them--that

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[34] Ibid., p. 6.

dealing with style, and occupying over seventy-five per cent of the book--is strikingly similar to the belletristic rhetorics in all-over organization and structure. This organizational similarity may be seen by comparing this section of the Lectures with Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, which, as we have already indicated, is generally accepted as the prototype of works in this tradition.[35]

Thus, Priestley, like Blair, opens his treatment of style with a brief analysis of taste and criticism. Then--by-passing the matters of language and syntax included in the second section of Blair's work, all of which he had already covered in his two grammars, and which he did not, therefore, need to repeat--Priestley enters upon a minute discussion of the nature of figurative language, harmony, perspicuity, and such specific figures as novelty, sublimity, comparison, simile, metaphor, allegory, humorous contrast,

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[35]Ehninger and Golden, "Intrinsic Sources," p. 13. Blair's work may be considered as containing four basic divisions: (1) a discussion of taste and criticism; (2) an explanation of the development and structure of language; (3) lectures on the general subject of style, including discussions of perspicuity, sentence structure, harmony, and the nature of figurative language, and (4) specific applications of the principles thus developed to various types of discourses arranged in the order of their difficulty: public speaking, historical writing, philosophical writing, dialogues, epistolary writing, fictitious history, poetry of various sorts, tragedy and comedy.

antithesis, exclamation, metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, and personification--almost exactly the same list found in the corresponding section of Blair's treatise.

The last portion of Blair's work undertakes to apply the principles of style and language to specific types of discourse, and at first it may appear that Priestley here departs completely from the belletristic pattern; but the departure is not so radical as it at first seems to be. A more careful examination will reveal that Priestley does, in fact, take care to apply the various principles developed in his discussions of theory to practically all of the types of discourse mentioned by Blair; but he does so piece-meal in connection with each principle as it is presented, rather than as a unit in a final section of his work. For example, in Lecture XVIII, on the "Exertion of Our Faculties," he applies the principles of style to epigrams, odes, histories, heroic poems, tragedies, harangues, philosophical writings, romances, familiar essays, and poetry. Moreover, this same technique is employed outside the section on style; for in discussing method, Priestley has suggestions for authors of history, biography, romance, fiction, didactic treatises, scientific works, moral discourses, argumentative discourses, sermons, essays, odes, and other poems.

In short, Section III of Priestley's Lectures, dealing with style and language, while admittedly differing in some

respects, does conform in a discernible way to the belletristic pattern in the outlines of its structure and development and also in the practice of applying theoretical principles to a variety of compositional forms.

E. Opinions of Priestley's Contemporaries. Not only does our analysis indicate that Priestley's views on language, oratory, and criticism bear the marks of the belletristic trend, but the evaluations of his own contemporaries appear to corroborate this analysis.

An unknown reviewer in The Critical Review for July, 1777, seems to regard the Lectures as a work chiefly significant for its discussions of the subjects of language, style, and criticism. He quotes Priestley's comparison of writers and speakers, agrees with his doctrine of vivid style, disagrees with his reason as to why philosophers make poor poets, defends Shakespeare from at least one of his censures, and mentions his treatment of personification. On the other hand, this reviewer makes practically no mention of Priestley's attempt to include in the Lectures the matters of composition and oratory. He concludes by saying, "As we have now extended this article as far as the limits of our Review will allow, we shall only add, that these Lectures contain many other valuable remarks; and may be of great service to those, who wish to form their style, and their

taste for polite literature."[36]

A month later, William Enfield reviewed the Lectures for The Monthly Review. He, similarly, interpreted the work as one concerned primarily with criticism; and, after a penetrating analysis, concludes that Priestley "here offers to the Public a new theory of criticism, grounded on Dr. Hartley's general theory of human nature."[37]

Another contemporary comment was made by John Corry, who published a biography of Priestley in 1804. He wrote that in the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, Priestley applied Hartlian associationism to objects of taste "in a clear and satisfactory manner." At the same time, however, Corry suggests that they are not of such general and practical utility as Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.[38]

Priestley's contemporaries who have left comments on his Lectures, therefore, clearly seem to have regarded them more as a work on taste and criticism than as a treatise on composition, and thus to have placed them in the same general category as Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.

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[36]"A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. By Joseph Priestley, LL.D.," p. 17.

[37][Enfield], "A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, by Joseph Priestley," p. 90.

[38]Corry, Life of Joseph Priestley, p. 54.

F. Conclusion. Inasmuch, then, as Priestley's writings in the language field exhibit a discernible degree of conformity to the three distinguishing marks of the belletristic trend, are structurally similar to belletristic works, and were regarded by his contemporaries as being primarily an essay on criticism, we are justified in concluding that Priestley reflects to a considerable extent, the belletristic trend which was developing in his day.

G. Priestley's Use of Works on Criticism and Taste. Where Priestley got his belletristic ideas cannot at present be fully determined in the way that we are able to trace the origins of other aspects of his rhetorical and critical thought. It is possible, however, to point out the sources from which he derived much of his specific material on style--that portion of his system bearing the greatest resemblance to a work in belles lettres. These are two in number, Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism and Alexander Gerard's Essay on Taste. It is particularly important to explore the relationships of these works to Priestley's doctrines because they have been overlooked by previous students.

1. Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism. The work exerting the greatest influence on the stylistic aspects of Priestley's rhetorical theory is Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism, one of the most important eighteenth-century

treatises on literary criticism. Priestley acknowledges this indebtedness to Kames in the Preface to his Lectures, saying:

> The most considerable work on the subject of criticism that was extant at the time of my composing these Lectures, was that of Lord Kaims [sic], to whom I am indebted for a very great number of my examples, especially those from the dramatic writers, and sometimes for the observations too; but with respect to this subject, on which so many able men have written, it is hardly possible to say to whom we are ultimately obliged for any very valuable remark.[39]

The Kamean shadow first falls across the Lectures in Lecture XII where Priestley divides his discussion of a pleasing style into passions, judgment, and imagination, and takes up the first of these in detail. The central idea in Kames' treatment of the passions is the doctrine of what he calls "ideal presence." This theory states that the basic difference between an experience and a memory lies in the degree of their vividness; and, therefore, that if a speaker or writer makes his descriptions vivid enough, he can virtually reproduce through language both the experiences themselves and the passions that originally occurred with them. This doctrine Priestley adopts completely. Like Kames, he makes vividness the principal requisite for arousing the passions; and even suggests the same techniques for achieving a vigorous style--i.e., the use of the present

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[39]Priestley, Lectures, p. iii.

tense and the inclusion of particular details.[40] In addition to this similarity in doctrine, Priestley appears to have taken some twenty-five illustrations directly from Kames' section on the passions.[41]

The shadow of the Elements of Criticism also extends over that section of the Lectures devoted to the pleasures of the imagination, where Priestley presents his principal analysis of the figures of speech. In defining "pleasures of the imagination," Priestley makes one of his two direct references to Kames, saying, "The first circumstance I shall take notice of with regard to those exquisite feelings is, that the only inlets to them are, as Lord Kaims [sic] observes, the eye and the ear, and that the other senses have nothing to do with them."[42] From this point forward, though their patterns of organization differ, Kames' Elements and Priestley's Lectures present basically the same figures; and--except for Priestley's emphasis on the concept of

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[40]For a discussion of the psychological similarities between Priestley and Kames on this point, see Chapter VIII of this study.

[41]See Kames, Elements of Criticism, Chapter 2, Parts 1 and 2; Priestley, Lectures, Lectures XII, XIII, and XIV.

[42]Priestley, Lectures, p. 125; from Kames, Elements of Criticism, I, 1. The other direct reference to Kames is found in the Lectures, p. 95, taken from Kames, Elements of Criticism, I, 84.

"mental exercise," which he considers very important--there is a striking similarity in their descriptions and illustrations of each figure. Both, for example, devote a chapter to novelty, in which they speak of wonder as the emotion aroused by the novel, and surprise as the reaction to the unexpected. Their doctrines of the sublime, as the "expansion" of the mind to comprehend some great object, are also strikingly similar. Moreover, both of these authors give lengthy discussions of comparison and contrast, in connection with which they both use the expression "uniformity and variety," and for which Priestley takes at least fifteen of Kames' illustrations. One significant difference, however, occurs in connection with ridicule, a form of humorous contrast, which Kames regards as a test of truth, while Priestley insists that it is not.[43]

Kames mentions "a figure which, among Related Objects, extends the Properties of one to another," saying that "this figure is not dignified with a proper name, because it has been overlooked by writers."[44] Priestley correctly labels the figure in question as "metonymy," explains its effects on the same psychological basis that Kames does, and borrows nine of Kames' illustrations. Virtually the same

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[43]See Kames, Elements of Criticism, I, 378; Priestley, Lectures, pp. 213-215.

[44]Kames, Elements of Criticism, II, 269.

thing takes place in regard to hyperbole.

Personification, however, is the figure concerning which Priestley leans most heavily upon Kames. Kames speaks of two types of personification--"passionate and descriptive"; Priestley adopts this same division, although modifying the names to "real and rhetorical."[45] Not only do their subdivisions of this figure coincide, but they give similar psychological explanations of it, and Priestley takes at least fourteen illustrations directly from Kames' chapter on the subject.

Even after Priestley turns from the "pleasing" to the "perspicuous" style, he continues to draw heavily upon Kames. Both authors suggest that it is more important to be clear than elegant, and most of Priestley's directions on how to achieve perspicuity also appear in Kames.[46] Some of the matters mentioned by both are: placement of antecedents and modifiers, location of incidental circumstances early in a sentence, the effect of various placements of names, parallel statement, and the omission or repetition of articles and copulatives. Over half of Priestley's examples in the section on perspicuity are obviously borrowed from Kames.

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[45]See Kames, Elements of Criticism, Chapter 20, Section 1; Priestley, Lectures, Lecture XXIX.

[46]Cf. Kames, Elements of Criticism, Chapter 18, Section 2, with Priestley, Lectures, Lecture XXXII.

Following perspicuity, Kames introduces "Beauty of Language from a resemblance between Sound and Signification," and then "Versification"; Priestley's next two lectures are titled "Of the Resemblance between Sound and Sense," and "Of Harmony in Verse." In both, Priestley continues his dependence upon Kames. Regarding "sound and sense," each author speaks of the desirability of making the ease or difficulty of pronunciation correspond with the ease or difficulty of the action described, the utilization of short syllables to represent speed and long syllables to represent slowness, and the manner in which pronunciation can enhance the tendency of the sound to echo the sense. In the section on versification, both mention various types of metre; and both suggest that a poet should have one principal pause in the midst of each line, and another at the end, with the pauses corresponding, as much as possible, with the sense. Both writers note the difficulty of using polysyllabic words in verse, and the importance of making stressed syllables fall on important words. In both of these sections, Priestley again shows a strong affinity for Kames' illustrations.

Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism, then, appears to have had a great influence on Priestley's discussion of style. There are few lectures of the twenty-five dealing with this subject that are not influenced to a considerable degree by Kames' work, and at least a hundred of Priestley's

illustrations and allusions may be traced directly to the Elements.[47] While it would certainly be a misappraisal to say that this portion of the Lectures is merely a restatement of the Elements, the similarity is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that Priestley's use of Kames was extensive and undoubtedly played a considerable part in shaping his views on style.

2. Gerard's Essay on Taste. At only one point in the Lectures does Priestley mention Alexander Gerard's Essay on Taste (1759),[48] but his debt to this work is much greater than at first appears. A number of indications, besides this direct reference, make it evident that Priestley was not only familiar with Gerard's ideas, but that he drew upon them considerably. Undoubtedly, he was attracted to this Essay because of its extensive use of association psychology, and it is very possible that Gerard, along with Kames, did much to make Priestley aware of the possible connections

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[47]Of Priestley's forty-eight references to Shakespeare, twenty-six are apparently taken from Kames; as are nine of the twenty-three references to Virgil, six of the fifteen references to Milton, eight of the ten references to Homer, eleven of the thirty references to Pope, and four of the seven references to Addison.

[48]Priestley writes: "And Dr. Gerard, in his treatise upon the same subject [taste], has illustrated the same observation by analyzing the complex sensation of pleasure we perceive from a view of a fine human face." Priestley, Lectures, p. 130.

between rhetoric and associationism. Gerard's Essay also appears to have exerted a marked influence on various specific doctrines in the third section of the Lectures, "On Style."

For example, a good deal of similarity exists between the doctrines of taste presented by Gerard and Priestley. Both trace its origin primarily to association and custom;[49] both regard judgment and taste as at least partially "acquired";[50] and both believe taste to be as useful to the critic as to the composer.[51] Moreover, as Priestley discusses taste, he mentions "the properties of uniformity, variety, and proportion, or a fitness to some useful end;[52] and these are the very elements that Gerard lists as constituents of "the sense or taste of beauty."[53]

A favorite doctrine with Gerard, as with Priestley, is the pleasing effect of a "moderate exertion of the faculties." Priestley devotes an entire lecture to this subject, and includes novelty, sublimity, and analogy

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[49]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 75, 130-135; Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste (Philadelphia, 1804), pp. 126-127.

[50]Priestley, Lectures, p. 74; Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 105-120.

[51]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 73, 140, 246; Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 204, 211.

[52]Priestley, Lectures, p. 133.

[53]Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 41, 49.

(uniformity and variety) under this head.[54] Gerard, likewise, considers the exercise of the faculties to be an important factor in the pleasure derived from novelty,[55] sublimity,[56] and uniformity and variety.[57]

In connection with these same figures of speech, there are other resemblances. The following paragraph in the Lectures, for example, is based almost entirely upon the Essay:

> Nor is the desire of novelty less conspicuous in other subjects of taste. What other recommendation have the Chinese taste, and the revival of the Gothic in architecture, the pantomime entertainments, with all their varieties, on the theatre, and the new forms in which musical entertainments are daily exhibited? Doth not a regard to novelty influence our choice of the furniture of our houses, interfere in the disposition of a garden, and suggest alterations in the fashion of our clothes? Why else doth a lady of taste in dress, discover more conscious satisfaction the first time she makes her appearance at an assembly, among the first in a fashionable dress, than she would have done if she had not been seen in the same dress till a month afterwards, when the convenience, and other properties of the habit, remain the same?[58]

Gerard, in his discussion of novelty, similarly mentions its influence in furniture, architecture, the Chinese and

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[54]See Priestley, Lectures, Lectures XVIII-XXVI.

[55]Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 11-18.

[56]Ibid., p. 22.

[57]Ibid., pp. 41-46.

[58]Priestley, Lectures, p. 149.

Gothic tastes, and "a fine lady . . . among the first in a fashion."[59]

Moreover, in their treatments of the sublime, both writers speak in much the same way of the "enlargement of the mind" which accompanies the conception of a sublime object;[60] both mention the "simplicity" which characterizes it;[61] and both attribute sublimity, at least in part, to association.[62] Further evidence that Priestley was familiar with Gerard's treatment of sublimity is seen in his use of the same objects for illustrations. Priestley, for example, says: "Objects of the first rank in point of magnitude, and which chiefly constitute the sublime of description, are large rivers, high mountains, and extensive plains; the ocean, the clouds, the heavens, and infinite space; also storms, thunder, lightening, volcanos, and earthquakes, in nature; and palaces, temples and pyramids, cities, &c. in the works of men."[63] Gerard, in the same connection, speaks of "the Alps, the Nile, the ocean, the wide expanse of

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[59]Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 16-19.

[60]Priestley, Lectures, p. 151; Gerard, Essay on Taste, p. 22.

[61]Priestley, Lectures, p. 153; Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 23-24.

[62]Priestley, Lectures, p. 160; Gerard, Essay on Taste, p. 29.

[63]Priestley, Lectures, p. 154.

heaven, or the immensity of space uniformly extended, without limit or termination,"[64] "the raging of the sea in a storm, and the loud roaring thunder,"[65] and "lofty palaces and pyramids."[66]

Another instance of Priestley's use of Gerard's Essay may be seen where he begins his discussion of burlesque with a quotation from Butler, apparently taken from Gerard's treatment of the same subject.[67]

Further evidence of Gerard's influence on Priestley is found in their doctrines of imitation. Both writers give considerable attention to the pleasure received from an artful imitation of some object, either in sculpture, painting, music, or some other fine art. Both suggest that the imitation gives more pleasure than the original object because of the appreciation the observer or listener has for the human genius that designed and executed it.[68] Both also recommend that the imitation bear the marks of an

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[64]Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 21-22.

[65]Ibid., p. 27.

[66]Ibid., p. 32.

[67]Priestley, Lectures, p. 211; Gerard, Essay on Taste, p. 85.

[68]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 261-264; Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 60-65.

imitation lest the exactness of resemblance be carried too far.[69]

Finally, it is possible that Priestley even took certain organizational features of his Lectures from Gerard's Essay. Part I of Gerard's work contains sections on novelty, sublimity, beauty (uniformity and variety, etc.), imitation, harmony, ridicule, and virtue, in that order; and the last two parts deal with the formation and importance of taste. Priestley uses a similar order in his own treatment of style. Under "imagination" he considers novelty, sublimity, uniformity and variety; and later, after some intervening subjects, he treats imitation and harmony. Ridicule he includes as a type of contrast or variety, and virtue or moral sense, he expressly excludes because it deals, he says, with the subject rather than with the skill of the composer.[70]

Gerard's Essay on Taste, therefore, stands as a source of some importance. From it Priestley drew both concepts and examples, and it is also likely that it helped him to see connections between associationism and rhetorical theory.

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[69]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 264-265; Gerard, Essay on Taste, pp. 67-68.

[70]Priestley, Lectures, p. 279.

III. Conclusion. Upon the basis of the evidence presented in this chapter, we may conclude that Priestley deserved his title of "Tutor of Belles Lettres," for the lectures which he delivered at Warrington are, to a discernible degree, belletristic in their approach and treatment. Moreover, his contemporaries considered his Lectures as primarily a work on taste and criticism. Most important, however, in establishing this relationship, is the fact that Priestley, in his own views on language, oratory, and criticism, regards written and oral discourse as founded upon a common set of principles; considers many rules and precepts as serving equally well both the author and the critic; and gives spatial and doctrinal emphasis to style--the three distinguishing marks of the belletristic school.

The specific sources of Priestley's belletristic views are not at present apparent, but this chapter has established that two of the major sources of his treatment of style are Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism, and Alexander Gerard's Essay on Taste.

CHAPTER VII

PRIESTLEY AND ELOCUTION

I. Introduction. As we have already suggested, one of the most significant developments in eighteenth-century English rhetoric was the evolution of a movement which gave new importance and further development to the canon of delivery. Under the banner of "elocution," as its promoters styled it, an attempt was made both to advance the English language and to improve current standards of delivery by providing theory and practice in such matters as articulation, pronunciation, accent, emphasis, inflection, pause, gesture, and the expression of the passions. Despite certain variations in method, teachers and writers in this movement generally sought a delivery characterized by justness, sincerity, naturalness, grace, and vigor.

II. Priestley and the Characteristic Doctrines of Elocution. Since in none of Priestley's works on language is there a separate section devoted to a systematic discussion of delivery, it is somewhat more difficult to compare Priestley with the elocutionary movement than with

the two trends we have thus far discussed. Various scattered passages in his Lectures and other writings, however, reveal many of his ideas on delivery,[1] and when these are brought together and used as a foundation, we can, in a general way, determine his relationship to the doctrines of elocutionism.

A. Use of the Term "Elocution." The first indication that there may be some similarity between Priestley's treatment of delivery and that common among the elocutionists, is the fact that he uses their term as his designation for "delivery." In the opening portion of the Lectures, he makes "elocution" the fourth canon of his system, and defines it as that part of the art of oratory which "teaches what tone of voice, or what gestures of the body, will best become, and add grace to the delivery of [a discourse]."[2] Moreover, it should be recalled that the term "elocution" was his title for the weekly lectures on voice and action that he gave while at Warrington, and in which he took "great pains . . . to form the pupils to a habit of just and graceful delivery."[3]

Now lest the significance of this be missed, let it be pointed out that most of Priestley's contemporaries used the Latin term elocutio, and, consequently, its cognate

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[1]See Chapter III, above, for a statement of these.

[2]Priestley, Lectures, p. 5.

[3]Ibid., p. iv.

"elocution," much as the ancient Romans had, to signify that portion of rhetoric dealing with the use of language--that is, as synonymous with "style." John Ward, for example, says, "Elocution is twofold, general and particular. The former treats of the several properties and ornaments of language in common; the latter considers them as they are made use of to form different sorts of stile."[4] "Pronunciation" is Ward's designation for delivery. John Lawson, similarly, uses the terms "style" and "pronunciation" as headings for the third and fourth "parts" of his system; and George Campbell, whose work was published just one year before Priestley's, entitles his section on the use of language "elocution," and speaks of delivery as "pronunciation."

It is in itself significant, therefore, that Priestley uses the term "elocution" with the same meaning given to it by the elocutionists, rather than using "pronunciation" as the heading for his section on delivery, as did most contemporary rhetoricians. In fact, among those who have constructed systems of rhetoric encompassing all five of the traditional functions of the orator, he is the first and almost only major writer to use this term as a name for the canon of delivery.[5]

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[4]Ward, System, I, 307.

[5]Francis Bacon, in his Advancement of Learning (1605), had used the term "elocution," but in a much broader

B. Interest in the Advancement of the English Language. As was previously suggested, most of the elocutionists were interested in advancing and standardizing the English language. In this regard, Priestley may certainly be considered not only as in complete sympathy with them, but as a co-worker.

Since the Dissenting academies led in the movement to remove Latin from general classroom use, and to replace it with English,[6] Priestley's experience as a student at Daventry may well have indoctrinated him with a preference for his native tongue. He is, however, not content merely to adopt English as the common language of the classroom; for, in addition to this, he believes that Latin and Greek should be entirely removed from the curriculum, except for those students who would find them directly useful in their

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sense than the meaning given to it by Priestley and the elocutionists. Anselm Bayly, in An Introduction to Languages, Literary and Philosophical (1758), published several "dissertations," one of which was entitled "On elocution or the art of just speaking"; but he does not actually label a canon of rhetoric with this term. Two writers, following Priestley, who use "elocution" as a title for the portion of their systems dealing with delivery are John Walker, one of the leaders in the elocutionary movement, who treats some elements of invention, disposition, and style, as well as delivery, in his Rhetorical Grammar (1785), and Richard Whately, who adopts the term "elocution" as the title for his treatment of delivery, while at the same time calling the efforts of the elocutionists "entirely unsuccessful."

[6]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, p. 27.

anticipated professions.[7] In place of these ancient languages, he recommends a study of English, "a competent knowledge of our own language being both useful and ornamental in every profession, and a critical knowledge of it absolutely necessary to all persons of a liberal education."[8]

Priestley clearly shows his desire to improve and advance the English language in his Rudiments of English Grammar. In this volume, his first work in the language field, he makes an attempt to simplify English grammar by removing certain "technical terms" and "divisions" taken from Latin and Greek which do not suit English.[9] "I cannot help flattering myself," he writes, "that future grammarians will owe me some obligation for introducing this uniform simplicity, so well suited to the genius of our language, into the English grammar."[10] He hopes, also, to point out certain French "forms of speech" which had made their way into English, and by so doing to aid in purifying the English tongue. Concerning this effort, he says:

> If I have done any essential service to my native tongue, I think it will arise from my detecting, in time, a very great number of gallicisms, which have insinuated

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[7]Priestley, Miscellaneous Observations Relating to Education, pp. 41-44.

[8]Works of Priestley, XXIII, 10.

[9]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[10]Ibid., p. 5.

> themselves into the style of many of our most justly admired writers; and which, in my opinion, tend greatly to injure the true idiom of the English language, being contrary to its most established analogies.[11]

At the same time, Priestley shows himself to be familiar with the proposals for an academy to legislate on matters regarding the English tongue; and, although in sympathy with the purpose of such a move, he is strongly opposed to the means.

> As to a public Academy, invested with authority to ascertain the use of words, which is a project that some persons are very sanguine in their expectations from, I think it not only unsuitable to the genius of a free nation, but in itself ill calculated to reform and fix a language. We need make no doubt but that the best forms of speech will, in time, establish themselves by their own superior excellence: and, in all controversies, it is better to await the decisions of time, which are slow and sure, than to take those of synods, which are often hasty and injudicious.[12]

More specifically, it is Priestley's opinion that the way to improve and standardize the language is for various writers "to exhibit its actual structure, and the varieties with which it is used." "When these are once pointed out, and generally attended to," he argues, "the best forms of speech, and those which are most agreeable to the analogy, will soon recommend themselves and come into general use; and when, by this means, the language shall be written with

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

sufficient uniformity, we may hope to see a complete grammar of it."[13]

Priestley shows considerable interest, then, in advancing the English language--an interest of particular importance here because it was one he shared with the elocutionists.

C. Interest in Improvement of Delivery. In common with writers in the elocutionary movement, Priestley also appears to have had considerable interest in the improvement of delivery among the public speakers of his day. In his A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters, he devotes an entire section to "Advice to Ministers," much of which concerns their "manner of preaching, or the delivery of [their] sermons."[14] Here he censures "two extremes," both of which he declares to be "too prevalent." Some preachers, he says, have excellent compositions, but deliver them "with shameful carelessness and unconcern, with no force or energy." Others, who "seem to study nothing but the art of haranguing the populace," fail to speak with the "earnestness and dignity" befitting the subject they are presenting, and because they attempt to be striking in every discourse, they fall into artificiality.[15]

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[13] Ibid., p. 8.

[14] Ibid., XXII, 287.

[15] Ibid., pp. 287-288.

The Lectures on Oratory and Criticism likewise contain indictments against pulpit delivery. The author relates, for example, the story concerning a bishop who asked an actor why plays were heard with more attention than sermons. The player answered, "'The reason is, that we speak fiction as if it were a reality, while preachers speak of things real as if they were fiction.'"[16]

Priestley's interest in the improvement of delivery, however, is chiefly demonstrated by his efforts at Warrington to improve the delivery of his students. Soon after his arrival there, he originated a regular Saturday meeting, when "the tutors, all the students, and often strangers, were assembled to hear English and Latin compositions, and sometimes to hear the delivery of speeches, and the exhibition of scenes in plays."[17] In the Preface to the Lectures, Priestley gives the following description of these weekly sessions:

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[16]Priestley, Lectures, p. 267. Thomas Sheridan, a leading elocutionist, tells a very similar story of a Bishop of London who asked Betterton why audiences were moved to tears by scenes on the stage while they were unmoved by discourses from the pulpit. The actor replied, "'My Lord, it is because we are in earnest.'" Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, p. 127. James Burgh presents a similar conclusion but does not relate the story. Burgh, Art of Speaking, p. 33.

[17]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 54.

> [I]t was my custom (as I believe it is still that of my successors in that department of the academy, and it is certainly a most useful one) to have lectures appropriated solely to the business of elocution, which all the students who were designed for public speakers constantly attended, at least once a week. At these lectures great pains were taken to form the pupils to a habit of just and graceful delivery; and the instructions were given as occasion required; so that the reducing of them to writing was by no means necessary.[18]

Additional information concerning these meetings is found in a comment by a Warrington student, who recalled:

> Though no proficient in oratory himself, Dr. Priestley contrived to render himself very useful in the promotion of it among the students. He obtained the introduction of public weekly exercises, for the delivery of Latin and English compositions, and the recitation of passages, both in poetry and prose, calculated to improve the students in elocution, as well as to correct and refine their taste. His observations on their defects in speaking, and his directions how to remedy them, were very judicious; and he had the advantage of being able to refer them to excellent practical models in Dr. Aikin and Mr. Seddon.[19]

The same author, in another place, relates that the first-year students brought to these sessions previously rehearsed essays in English or Latin; those in the second and third years presented skeletons of sermons, "more or less clothed"; and the fourth- and fifth-year students gave sermons at length, and sometimes critical dissertations. "These were read by the students, and carefully criticised by the tutor; the defects of composition and method pointed out; and often

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[18]Priestley, Lectures, p. iv.

[19]Turner, "Historical Account of Warrington Academy," p. 230.

references made to preachers of reputation, French or English, who had treated the same text or subject."[20]

As Priestley mentions, the other tutors were also present, and, according to Turner, Dr. Aikin, Divinity Tutor at the Academy, took an active part. Sometimes, says Turner, Dr. Aikin would take one of the subjects which interested him and extemporaneously present a "method" of his own, "in a happy strain of dignified eloquence." On other occasions, Aikin would read passages from the English poets "with singular propriety of tone and emphasis," and then, having the students repeat the same passage, would comment on their manner of reading.[21] Aikin's training for such work came from one of his former teachers, who had, at one time, been on the stage, and who exercised his students in "theatrical declamation."[22]

As Priestley suggests in the Preface to the Lectures, these weekly exercises were continued by succeeding tutors--one of whom was William Enfield, a major figure in the elocutionary movement. Indeed, it is significant that the course for which Enfield composed his important work The Speaker (1774), was the very course of exercises in speaking

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[20]Turner, Lives of Eminent Unitarians, p. 385.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Turner, "Historical Account of Warrington Academy," p. 162.

which Priestley had begun. Moreover, descriptions of the work done under Priestley's direction and that done under Enfield show that the exercises were carried on in a similar fashion by both men.[23]

The relationship between Priestley and Enfield is an interesting one, particularly as it concerns the history of the elocution movement. The two Dissenting ministers became acquainted when Enfield, then at Liverpool, visited Warrington Academy during the time Priestley was teaching there.[24] In 1770, three years after Priestley's removal to Leeds, Enfield came to Warrington as Rector Academicus, and as tutor of various courses in the Academy, one of which was the weekly speaking exercises.

In that same year, Enfield wrote an anonymous reply to Priestley's recent Address to Protestant Dissenters, and among the subjects discussed was speech training for preachers. Priestley, as we have already seen, had devoted a section of this publication to what he termed "Advice to Ministers," and under this heading had made various suggestions about their speaking and speech training. Enfield, in reply, offered a "plan of business" for students studying for the ministry, including lectures on universal grammar, English

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[23]Compare the descriptions already given with Turner, "Historical Account of Warrington Academy," p. 429.

[24]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 61.

grammar, and composition, with special reference to the composition of sermons and prayers. He also recommended that essays, orations, prayers, and sermons be memorized and delivered before the tutors and other students. Moreover, he suggested that students attend lectures on the art of public speaking, and that they read or deliver memoritor passages from the best English writers. These exercises in delivery, he thought, might well occupy one day each week.[25]

Enfield's proposal sounds much like an expanded version of the very activities Priestley had initiated while he was at Warrington; but Priestley, in the heat of controversy, saw a dangerous trend in Enfield's "plan of business." Fearing that it might result in the neglect of other necessary fields of study, he answered with a defence of the stress he had laid upon the study of the Scriptures, the church fathers, and metaphysics. Moreover, he accused Enfield of devising a plan more suitable for developing "fine gentlemen" than "learned divines." Priestley, however, was quick to point out that he believed it desirable for a minister to be both a "fine gentleman" and a "scholar," and indicated his approval of studies relating to belles lettres and public speaking so long as they were kept in proper balance with other matters.[26]

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[25]Quoted in Ibid., XXII, 419-420.

[26]Ibid., p. 426.

This brief controversy, which for a time apparently strained relations, did not cause a permanent breach in the friendship of these fellow ministers and teachers. On November 4, 1770, Priestley wrote to Theophilus Lindsey, "I have lately had several letters from Mr. Enfield, so penitent and ingenious, that I cannot but esteem and love him, and so would you, if you knew him thoroughly, notwithstanding his late offence and failure in point of friendship to me. I wish my controversy with him had never happened, but I hope some good will rise out of it."[27] Later, in a letter to S. Merivale, he said, "Mr. Enfield and I are now upon very good terms. I really esteem him much. He was lately at Leeds, upon a scheme for a fund for the academy at Warrington."[28]

In all probability, Priestley and Enfield did not actually differ greatly in their views concerning rhetorical training for ministers. It is true that they may have varied to some extent concerning the optimum amount of such training, and, perhaps to some degree concerning instructional methods; but both believed strongly in training a preacher to speak well, and neither would have advised a minister to neglect a study of the Scriptures and other valuable works.

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[27]Priestley to Lindsey, Leeds, November 4, 1770, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 123.

[28]Priestley to Merivale, Leeds, August 23, 1771, quoted in Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 143.

In addition to the weekly speaking exercises which Priestley introduced at Warrington and Enfield continued, Priestley also originated public academical exercises at the end of each session of the Academy. These speeches consisted of "'translations from Greek, Latin, and French authors, and Orations or Dissertations, which were delivered in English and Latin and French wherein a particular attention was paid to the manner of reading and speaking.'"[29]

From various passages in Priestley's writings, then, and from his activities as tutor at Warrington, it is obvious that he, like the elocutionists, was much interested in the improvement of standards of delivery, especially among ministers. Moreover, his connection with Enfield, a confirmed elocutionist, gives further evidence of his alliance with the elocutionary movement.

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[29]McLachlan, Warrington Academy, p. 63, quoting the Warrington Academy Report of 1772. Some of the oration titles were: "An Inquiry into the effect which the opinions of the principal sects of the ancient philosophers might be supposed to have in promoting or preventing the reception and progress of the Christian religion in the world"; "An attempt to illustrate, in several important instances, the salutary effect of the Christian religion in improving the laws, customs, manners, and religion of the several nations where it hath been received"; "Salus populi suprema lex. Or an essay to show how far the several forms of government which may have been introduced in the world are calculated to promote the happiness of mankind, which is the great end of government"; and "An Enquiry into the effect of civilization on the real improvement and happiness of mankind; in which the principles of Mr. Rousseau upon the subject are considered."

D. Doctrinal Characteristics of the Elocutionists. In Chapter IV it was pointed out that the elocutionists took most of the basic ingredients of their doctrine of delivery from the ancients, doing little more than enlarge upon these elements in producing their own particular brand of rhetorical theory. As a result, their specialized emphasis on the canon of delivery arises not so much from novelty of content, as from the fact that they, unlike the ancients, believed that the elements of voice and gesture could be analyzed, described, reduced to a science, and effectively taught in detail. On this essential point also, Priestley seems to be in agreement with them, for he writes, "The art of public speaking [delivery], therefore, must be studied, and the instruction of a master must be accompanied with frequent exercise."[30] In fact, for a time, as we know, he even contemplated the publication of a systematic treatise on delivery, saying that he would have composed something on elocution for his class at Warrington, "if [he] had continued longer in that employment."[31]

What Priestley does write about delivery in various places, bears some marked similarities to the doctrines of the elocutionists. In the first place, he uses most of the

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[30]Works of Priestley, XXII, 288.

[31]Priestley, Lectures, p. iv.

same terms they do in describing a desirable delivery, calling it "just," "graceful," "natural," and "earnest."[32] Second, the specific aspects of delivery that Priestley mentions are the very ones that the elocutionists, borrowing from the ancients, molded into their system. Articulation, mentioned by nearly every elocutionist,[33] he thinks important enough to be the subject of the entire first chapter of his Universal Grammar. Accent, he regards as stress placed upon the proper syllable of a word, and emphasis as stress upon the proper word of a sentence"[34]--a view that corresponds with statements in Sheridan,[35] Mason,[36] Burgh,[37] Walker,[38] Cockin,[39] and Enfield.[40] Moreover, Priestley devotes several

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[32]Ibid., pp. iv. 115.

[33]See Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, p. 10; Burgh, Art of Speaking, p. 29; Enfield, The Speaker (Philadelphia, 1799), p. 18; John Rice, An Introduction to the Art of Reading with Energy and Propriety (London, 1765), pp. 31-35.

[34]Works of Priestley, XXIII, 39.

[35]Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, pp. 57, 81.

[36]Mason, Essay on Elocution, p. 21.

[37]Burgh, Art of Speaking, pp. 9-12, 29.

[38]Walker, Elements of Elocution, pp. 181, 188.

[39]William Cockin, The Art of Delivering Written Language (London, 1775), pp. 22-23.

[40]Enfield, The Speaker, pp. 20-22.

passages of the Lectures to the subject of pause, a favorite topic among the elocutionists;[41] and, while he does not go nearly so far as some of these writers did in marking pauses, he does employ the technique of using one vertical line to indicate a short pause, and two vertical lines to indicate a longer one.[42]

Similarly, on several occasions, Priestley, like the elocutionists, uses the term "tone," by which he means a combination of timbre and inflection; and he suggests that by variety in the "tone" one can "vary and modify" meaning. As an example, he says that through tonal variations the word "Sir" can be made to express "tenderness, respect, anger, contempt, reproach, and almost every other passion, and degree of passion, that the human mind is capable of."[43] This passage is similar to Sheridan's discussion of tone,[44] and to statements found in the works of other elocutionists.[45]

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[41]See Priestley, Lectures, Lectures XXXIV and XXXV; Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, pp. 10, 19, 75-82; Walker, Elements of Elocution, pp. 18, 20-69; Enfield, The Speaker, pp. 22-23; Cockin, Art of Delivering Written Language, pp. 98-109; Austin, Chironomia, p. 36.

[42]See Priestley, Lectures, Lectures XXXIV and XXXV.

[43]Works of Priestley, XXIII, 132.

[44]Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, pp. 108-111; see also pp. 58-59.

[45]Cf. Enfield, The Speaker, p. 21; Walker, Elements of Elocution, pp. 74-76; Burgh, Art of Speaking, pp. 9-10.

Furthermore, Priestley specifically recognizes that "gestures and postures of the body, and particularly motions of the hands, and of the features of the countenance," may be expressive of various ideas and sentiments.[46] Gesture, countenance, and posture, and their relation to the expression of various meanings, are similarly discussed by Sheridan, Enfield, Austin, and others who wrote on this phase of delivery.[47] Like some of the elocutionists, too, Priestley recommends extemporaneous delivery.[48]

Finally, one of the topics discussed at length in nearly all elocutionary works, is the expression of the passions. Indeed, it is on this point that the elocutionists chiefly vary. All agree that every emotion has its characteristic expression in voice and body. Some, however, believe that if the speaker understands the meaning and feels the sentiment, he will automatically express himself in the proper manner;[49] others hold that the best way to be

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[46] Works of Priestley, XXIII, 128-129.

[47] Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, p. 19; Enfield, The Speaker, p. 23; Austin, Chironomia, p. 1.

[48] Priestley, Lectures, pp. v, 111-15, 263; cf. Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, p. 12; Enfield, The Speaker pp. 24-25; Burgh, Art of Speaking, p. 32; John Rippingham, The Art of Extempore Public Speaking (London, 1813), passim.

[49] See Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, pp. 70-74, 120-121; Mason, Essay on Elocution, pp. 16, 25-26; Enfield, The Speaker, pp. 21, 24.

certain of expressing the emotions properly is to make a detailed study of each emotion and its manifestations, with a "cultivation" of the ability to exhibit these manifestations.[50] Priestley, in accord with both schools, stresses the coincidence of every emotion with some characteristic mode of expression--primarily because he sees behind such a doctrine an application of association psychology.[51] More important, however, for this same reason, he agrees with those who believe that passions are better expressed by "thinking the thought" and "feeling the feeling" than by the use of rules and practice. He writes:

> If a person never attempt these forms of speech but when his temper really corresponds to and dictates them, he will seldom fail in point of propriety; because the state of mind being strongly associated with those correspondent motions, they are excited mechanically and justly. No attention can supply the place of this. The external expressions of passion, with all their variations, corresponding to the different degrees of their emotions, are too complex for any person in the circumstances of a public speaker to be able to attend to them. Or, were it possible, the difference between a genuine automatic and a voluntary motion, is sufficiently apparent. All motions that are automatic have a quickness and vigour which are lost when they become voluntary; witness sighing, laughing, the gestures peculiar to anger, &., and the same when imitated. The difference is too apparent to escape any person's observation.
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> If these observations be sufficiently attended to, they will deter any prudent and considerate person from

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[50]See Walker, Elements of Elocution, pp. 310-311; Burgh, Art of Speaking, pp. 12-14; Austin, Chironomia, pp. 137-138.

[51]See Chapter VIII of this thesis.

> attempting phrases and modes of address, expressive of earnestness, when they do not really feel those emotions, which will, of themselves, suggest the proper attitudes and gestures corresponding to them.[52]

Doctrinally, then, Priestley shows a number of similarities with the elocutionists. While he did not write enough on the subject to produce a complete system of elocution, the passages dealing with delivery which he did leave are treatments of the same doctrines as those stressed by elocutionary writers. Moreover, nothing in Priestley's thinking is opposed to the doctrines expressed by writers in this movement; on the contrary, he seems to be in almost complete doctrinal agreement with the views expressed by such men as Sheridan, Mason, and Enfield.

III. Priestley's Elocutionary Sources. Having seen the similarities between Priestley's doctrines and those of the elocutionists, let us now examine the sources of Priestley's views on delivery. Is there a direct connection between Priestley and the elocutionary movement, or did he arrive at somewhat similar conclusions independently?

Some of the ideas on delivery that Priestley presents, may have been introduced to him during his school days at Daventry Academy. This school had speaking exercises in which all students were required to participate.[53] Moreover,

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[52]Priestley, Lectures, p. 115.

[53]Irene Parker, Dissenting Academies in England (Cambridge, England, 1914), pp. 90-91; McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, pp. 154-161.

Caleb Ashworth, head tutor during Priestley's time, recommended that his students read Lord Chesterfield's Letters "in order to improve their epistolary style and introduce them to the arts and graces of polite society."[54] These letters of Lord Chesterfield's contain, of course, one of the most frequently cited criticisms of current delivery standards. Ashworth also used Doddridge's Lectures on Preaching,[55] which contain some ideas appearing later in Priestley's writings. Concerning the delivery of sermons, Doddridge writes, "This is evidently a matter of great importance, and almost every body pretends to be a judge of it."[56] He recommends that the delivery be "grave and serious, distinct, affectionate, composed, and various."[57] He further suggests that the preacher appear natural and unaffected, urges that he use as few notes as possible, and recommends that he "look about much upon [his] auditory."[58] Brief mention is also made of emphasis, cadence, action, pause, and animation.[59] In view of these influences at Daventry

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[54]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, p. 155.

[55]Ibid., p. 157.

[56]Philip Doddridge, Lectures on Preaching (London, 1824), p. 60.

[57]Ibid., pp. 60-61.

[58]Ibid., p. 63.

[59]Ibid., pp. 60-65.

during the time of his study there, it is possible that Priestley's interest in delivery started at this early period in his life, and that some of his fundamental ideas on the subject may have been founded on Doddridge's Lectures on Preaching--a work which, like Priestley's own writings, expresses, to some extent, the views of the elocutionists.

In addition to this, however, Priestley was directly acquainted with the writings of the leaders in the elocutionary movement, and thus had an opportunity to draw ideas from them at first hand. Twice in his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism he calls attention to passages in Sheridan's Lectures on Elocution which he believes to exemplify an improper use of words.[60] While these statements admittedly do not deal directly with major doctrines of the elocutionists, they are proof that Priestley was familiar, to some extent at least, with Sheridan's Lectures, and that he could, therefore, very well have been influenced by them.

Moreover, at least five times during the course of the Lectures, Priestley draws upon the works of John Mason. He adopts "the ingenious Mr. Mason's" method for scanning poetry, which recommended "tum" for a long syllable and "ti"

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[60] Priestley, Lectures, p. 288, from Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, p. 239; Priestley, Lectures, p. 312, from Sheridan, Lectures on Elocution, p. 153.

for a short one.[61] In another place, he criticizes Mason for the grammatically "offensive" statement, "Many things that deserve to be observed on this subject."[62] And lastly, he apparently borrows three illustrations from Mason.[63]

There is likewise some evidence to indicate that Priestley may have been familiar with Enfield's The Speaker. Although this treatise was not published until 1774, seven years after Priestley left Warrington, this was still three years before Priestley made his lectures public; and Priestley says that he made some alterations between the delivery of the lectures and their publication.[64] Indeed, in view of the previously described controversy between the two men over the speech training of preachers, it is quite probable that Priestley would read Enfield's later publication on the subject. Further external evidence that Priestley may have been motivated to read The Speaker is found in the

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[61]Priestley, Lectures, p. 299, from John Mason, Essay on Prosaic Number (2nd ed; London, 1761), p. 15.

[62]Priestley, Lectures, p. 312, apparently from Mason, Essay on Prosaic Number, p. 13, where the author says, "Another thing that deserves to be observed on this Subject. . . ."

[63]Priestley, Lectures, p. 310, from Mason, Essay on Prosaic Number, p. 62; Priestley, Lectures, p. 299, from Mason, Essay on Prosaic Number, p. 60; and Priestley, Lectures, p. 310, from Mason, Essay on Prosaic Number, p. 26.

[64]Priestley, Lectures, p. vi.

fact that Enfield was the writer who reviewed the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism for the Monthly Review.[65]

From an internal point of view, a large number of Priestley's examples could well have been taken from Enfield's work, although the connection here is not so clear as in the cases of Kames, Lawson, and Ward. Yet, no less than twenty-one of the quotations or references which Priestley makes to other authors in the Lectures also appear in The Speaker.[66]

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[65]Nangle, Monthly Review Authors and Contributors, p. 179.

[66]The following table lists quotations appearing in both Enfield's Speaker and Priestley's Lectures:

Author	Work	Speaker	Lectures
Pope	Essay on Man	p. 144	p. 153
"	" " "	p. 146	p. 204
"	" " "	p. 144	p. 204
"	" " "	p. 146	p. 301
"	" " "	p. 146	p. 308
"	" " "	p. 148	p. 301
"	Essay on Criticism	p. 152	p. 291
"	" " "	p. 152	p. 292
"	" " "	p. 152	p. 292
"	Ode on St. Cecilia's Day	p. 144	p. 295
"	" " " " "	p. 446	p. 102
"	" " " " "	p. 445	p. 276
"	" " " " "	p. 446	p. 295-296
Shakespeare	"Othello's Apology"	p. 78	p. 99
"	"Hamlet's Sililoquy on Death"	p. 442	p. 294
Akenside	Pleasures of the Imagination	p. 348	p. 154, 155
Dryden	Alexander's Feast	p. 448	p. 296-297
	Hercules Choice	p. 40	p. 257
	Alexander to Parmenio	p. 23	p. 155
	Oration of Junius Brutus	p. 190-91	p. 117-118
	"cloud clapt [sic] towers"	p. 32	p. 155

And even if Priestley did not take these directly from The Speaker, it is, of course, entirely possible that Enfield's work still might have suggested their use to him. Priestley gives no credit to Enfield, but, as we have already seen, he often fails to give credit when he borrows from others. The similarities between the two works from a doctrinal standpoint have already been noted, and these, too, make it appear that Priestley was, to some degree, familiar with Enfield's work.

On the basis of this external and internal evidence, then, it would seem that there is a distinct possibility that Priestley was familiar with Enfield's Speaker, and may even have used it, to some extent, as a source for both ideas and illustrations.

Two other writers, not classed among the elocutionists, but who express a number of ideas similar to theirs, also appear to have had some influence on Priestley's doctrine of delivery. The first of these is Lord Kames--previously mentioned so frequently in connection with Priestley and the belletristic trend. Kames devotes a few brief passages in his Elements of Criticism to the subject of speech delivery. In these he mentions the relationship between the passions and their expressions through voice and body, and also the virtual impossibility of reproducing believable signs of passions without actually feeling them. Thus Kames becomes another of Priestley's possible sources--in addition to Sheridan, Mason, and Enfield--all of whom also treat the

passions in this manner.[67] Priestley definitely draws upon Kames in regard to the interpretation of poetry, for both mention "pausing according to the sense,"[68] the pleasing quality of a mixture of long and short syllables, as in the words "rapidity, independent, and impetuosity,"[69] the echo which pronunciation can give to the sense,[70] and the assistance that pronunciation may give to written language.[71]

The other "non-elocutionary" source for Priestley's ideas on delivery is John Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory. With apparent awareness of the developing elocutionary movement, Lawson strenuously objects to what he terms "mechanical methods" similar to musical notations, for learning pronunciation; and, like the writers of the "natural wing" of the elocutionists, recommends that since each emotion has its own outward expression,[72] a speaker should be

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[67]Cf. Kames, Elements of Criticism, I, 426-436, 450.

[68]Ibid., II, 103-104; Priestley, Lectures, pp. 300-301.

[69]Kames, Elements of Criticism, II, 10; Priestley, Lectures, p. 309.

[70]Kames, Elements of Criticism, II, 94-96; Priestley, Lectures, p. 293.

[71]Kames, Elements of Criticism, II, 94-96; Priestley, Lectures, pp. 296-297.

[72]Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, pp. 425-427.

"possessed with the Passion [he] would excite."[73] At the same time, however, he cautions that one should only "seem to feel the Passion he would excite," while not being under its "actual influence"; otherwise, he will lose command of himself and "stray from all the Rules of Eloquence."[74]

While it is, of course, possible that Priestley's strong recommendation for the extemporaneous method may have stemmed, in part, from a realization of his own inadequacy, for he read his sermons and even his prayers from manuscript,[75] it may also have been partially due to his acquaintance with the writings of Lawson. For, even though he recognizes certain advantages in writing the discourse for delivery from manuscript, Lawson seems to have favored extemporaneous delivery. He says:

> From hence we may account for the remarkable difference between the Effects, produced by extemporary, and by premeditated Discourses. A Discourse prepared before hand, although regular in its Method, just in the Sentiments, pure in the style, shall yet prove and please less, than one spoken off-hand, which is defective in all these; because this latter, inspired by the Occasion, proceedeth directly from the Heart, from a Mind agitated by the same Passions which the Speaker would raise in his Audience.[76]

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[73] Ibid., p. 170.

[74] Ibid., p. 256.

[75] Cooper, "Observations on the Writings of Joseph Priestley," II, 480.

[76] Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, p. 172; see also pp. 414-417.

IV. Conclusion. Since Priestley did not write a separate treatise on delivery, and even omits a systematic discussion of this canon from his other works on language, he can hardly qualify as an elocutionist. A comparison of his views with those of the elocutionists, however, reveals that if he had completed his design of preparing a written work for use in his Warrington course in elocution, it would probably have fallen well within the limits of the elocutionary tradition; for he adopts its peculiar use of the term "elocution," and shares with the elocutionists an interest in the advancement of the English language and a desire to improve current standards of delivery. Moreover, where Priestley does present his views on delivery in scattered passages throughout his writings, they are in substantial accord with the doctrines found in various works in the elocutionary movement, particualrly those by Sheridan, Mason, and Enfield. In addition, a study of Priestley's sources indicates that he was definitely familiar with the writings of Sheridan and Mason, and also probably knew the work of Enfield. Doddridges's Lectures on Preaching, Kames' Elements of Criticism, and Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory, while they are not actually elocutionary works, also present some views common among elocutionists, and each of these appears to have had a measure of influence on Priestley's doctrine of delivery.

Consequently, we may conclude that Priestley was not only sympathetic with the basic purposes of the elocutionists, but that his views on delivery bear a good deal of kinship to theirs. Like the other trends we have considered, therefore, the elocutionary movement left a definite mark upon Priestley's rhetorical theory.

CHAPTER VIII

PRIESTLEY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RHETORIC

I. Introduction. As we have already indicated, one of the most significant developments in eighteenth-century English rhetoric and criticism was the application of current psychological and epistemological doctrines to rhetorical theory, as seen in the works of Campbell, Blair, Ogilvie, Sheridan, Kames, and others.[1] Inasmuch as Joseph Priestley is generally regarded today as a philosopher of consequence in his century, an examination of the relationship between rhetoric and psychology in his case becomes especially interesting and important.

Practically all of Priestley's writings in philosophy, psychology, and metaphysics were prompted by a single desire--to spread the "gospel" of associationism. In fact, Priestley may be regarded a veritable apostle of association psychology, with its doctrines of the innately blank mind, sensory experience as the only source of ideas, and the association

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[1] See Chapter IV of this thesis.

of these ideas according to the laws of time, space, and relationship. In his Memoirs he writes:

> It was a reference to "Dr. Hartley's Observations on Man," in the course of our Lectures [at Daventry Academy],[2] that first brought me acquainted with that performance, which immediately engaged my closest attention, and produced the greatest, and in my opinion the most favourable effect on my general turn of thinking through life. It established me in the belief of the doctrine of Necessity, which I first learned from Collins [Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1715)]; it greatly improved that disposition to piety which I brought to the academy, and freed it from the rigour with which it had been tinctured. Indeed, I do not know whether the consideration of Dr. Hartley's theory contributes more to enlighten the mind, or improve the heart; it affects both in so supereminent a degree.[3]

Although there are appearances of associationism in Priestley's earlier writings, his most active support of this theory occurred in the decade of the 1770's. His first important attempt to bring greater attention to Hartley's theories was the two-volume Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion (1772-1774), in the Preface of which he writes:

> In the latter part of these Institutes, which relates to the duty and final expectations of mankind, it will be seen that I have made great use of Dr. Hartley's

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[2]It is interesting to notice that Philip Doddridge's A Course of Lectures on the Principal Subjects in Pneumatology, Ethics, and Divinity: with References to the Most Considerable Authors on Each Subject, which was used during Priestley's stay at Daventry Academy, makes some twenty references to Hartley's Observations on Man.

[3]Works of Priestley, I, Part I, 24.

> "Observations on Man." To this writer I think myself happy in having any fair opportunity of making my acknowledgments; and I shall think that a very valuable end will be gained, if, by this or any other means, a greater degree of attention could be drawn upon that most excellent performance, so as to make it more generally read, and studied, by those who are qualified to do it.[4]

Almost concurrently with the appearance of the Institutes, Priestley made the doctrine of association the basis for his reply to the Scottish "common sense philosophy" in An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion, first issued in 1774, and again in 1776. In all probability, however, Priestley's most significant contribution to the progress of associationism is his edition, in 1775, of a simplified and abridged version of Hartley's Observations on Man, titled Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, for which he composed an introductory essay outlining the doctrine of association. This work, issued again in 1790, seeks to bring more attention to Hartley's ideas, and to promote a better understanding of them. In the metaphysical realm, Priestley attempted to erect a doctrine of materialism upon the foundation of association psychology, and this he presents in his Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, published in

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[4]Ibid., II, xxi.

1777 and 1782. In 1778, he wrote a work applying associationism to various educational subjects, especially those relating to the conduct of the mind. This book, titled Miscellaneous Observations Relating to Education, not only contains various pedagogical essays, but also includes the outlines of his Warrington courses on general history and the civil history of England.

It was in the midst of these philosophical writings, and primarily for the purpose of illustrating association psychology, that Priestley published his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. Two statements from his own pen bear out the connection he intended between the Lectures and this theory of the mind. The first comes from the Preface of the Lectures themselves:

> I have been frequently urged to make the Lectures public; and having postponed it so long, I have been induced to do it at this time, partly with a view to the illustration of the doctrine of the association of ideas, to which there is a constant reference through the whole work, (in order to explain facts relating to the influence of oratory, and the striking effect of excellencies in composition, upon the genuine principles of human nature,) in consequence of having of late endeavoured to draw some degree of attention to those principles, as advanced by Dr. Hartley.[5]

A similar statement is found in the Preface of his reply to Reid, Beattie, and Oswald:

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[5]Priestley, Lectures, p. ii.

> Also, to shew the great importance and extensive use of this excellent theory of the mind, I thought it might be of service to give some specimens of the application of Dr. Hartley's doctrine to such subjects of inquiry as it had a near relation to, and to which I had had occasion to give particular attention. And as I had, on other accounts, been frequently requested to publish the Lectures on Philosophical Criticism,[6] which I composed when I was tutor in the Belles Lettres at the academy at Warrington, this was another inducement to the publication. For it appears to me, that the subject of criticism admits of the happiest illustration from Dr. Hartley's principles; and accordingly, in the composition of those lectures, I kept them continually in view.[7]

As one reads Hartley's Observations, it is not difficult to understand why Priestley thought that a course in oratory and criticism would make an excellent showcase in which to display that philosopher's association psychology.

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[6]Obviously referring to the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism; see Works of Priestley, III, 6.

[7]Ibid. Priestley's use of associationism in his rhetorical theory was also noted by the contemporary reviews of his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. William Enfield, in his previously mentioned article on Priestley's Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, which appeared in the Monthly Review for August, 1777, on pp. 89-90, commented: "Dr. Priestley, apprehending that the subject would receive new light by referring the several principles of which Lord Kaims [sic] treats, to one common source, the association of ideas, and by explaining the chief facts relating to the influences of oratory and poetry from this principle, he offers to the Public a new theory of criticism, grounded on Dr. Hartley's general theory of human nature." John Corry, another contemporary, described the Lectures in his Life of Priestley, p. 54, saying "In this work he displayed much erudition, and as an admirer of the metaphysical philosophy of Hartley, he applied that philosopher's theory of association to objects of taste, in a clear and satisfactory manner."

Hartley makes frequent references to subjects related to speaking, and even to oratory itself. He discusses in some detail the origin and development of language by children, reasoning, memory, the passions, invention, topics, figurative language, hearing and speech defects; and, of course, each of these is considered in its relationship to the doctrine of the association of ideas.

Taking his cue from Hartley, Priestley undertook to develop a system of oratory which would not only present certain rhetorical precepts, but which would also explain, or as he says, "illustrate," the psychological foundations of those precepts by reference to the principles of associationism. In this task, he found encouragement and assistance from Lord Kames, who, in his Elements of Criticism, had presented an investigation of rhetoric and poetic based on a view of human nature which included the principles of association. Upon this theory of the mind, which he preferred to term "perceptions and ideas in a train,"[8] Kames developed doctrines on such matters as the passions and emotions, arrangement, beauty of language, the sublime, comparison, personification, hyperbole, metaphor, allegory, voice, and gesture. Alexander Gerard's Essay on Taste, which, as we have seen, probably had some influence

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[8]Lord Kames, Elements, Chapter I, "Perceptions and Ideas in a Train."

on Priestley's rhetorical writings, was also largely based on association psychology, and thus furnished an additional inspiration for his treatise. Priestley, therefore, found Kames and Gerard, not merely predecessors in literary critism, but also precursors in the use of associationism as the foundation for a critical theory.

With these three works as his principal guides, Priestley set out to illustrate associationism through an analysis of this doctrine as the psychological basis of rhetoric. By reviewing his system, it is possible to observe how he makes his favorite theory of mind the foundation stone for each of his four "parts" of rhetoric.

II. Recollection and Association. David Hartley, in his Observations on Man, suggests that "invention," which he defines as "the art of producing new beauties in works of imagination and new truths in matters of science,"[9] seems "reconcileable [sic] with, and deducible from, the power of association."[10] In accord with this statement, Priestley develops a doctrine of rhetorical invention based upon the association of ideas. "Recollection," as he calls this function or movement, is, as we have previously indicated, principally an artificial aid to the memory--its purpose

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[9]Joseph Priestley (ed.), Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind (London, 1775), p. 268.

[10]Ibid., p. 269.

being not to direct the discovery of new facts and arguments, but merely to assist the orator in recalling what he had previously stored in his mind. More specifically, Priestley's doctrine is built around three concepts: (1) the theory of proving propositions, (2) the topics as a mnemonic device, and (3) amplification. Each of these he explains by the association of ideas.

A. Propositions. Priestley defines a proposition as "a declaration of the coincidence of the subject and attribute." "Thus," he continues, "if I say, 'man is mortal' I mean that my idea of man coincides with my idea of a mortal being."[11] The work of association in proving a proposition is two-fold. First, the subject and predicate coincide when they are seen to have common associations, and if this coincidence is not immediately apparent, an intermediate term having associations with both may be employed to demonstrate their relationship, and thus to establish the validity of the proposition. Second, when the terms do appear to coincide, the "internal feeling" that has, through experience, been associated with "truth" will attach itself to the proposition at hand.

This psychological explanation of the process by which we assent to propositions is clearly stated in

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[11]Priestley, Lectures, p. 9.

Priestley's introductory essay to Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind:

> When we say that Alexander conquered Darius, we mean that the person whom we distinguish by the name of Alexander, is the same with him that conquered Darius; and when we say that God is good, we mean that the person whom we distinguish by the name of God, appears, by his works and conduct, to be possessed of the same disposition that we call good, or benevolent, in men. And having attained to the knowledge of general truths, the idea, or feeling, which accompanies the perception of truth, is transferred, by association, to all the particulars which are comprised under it, and to other propositions that are analogous to it; having found by experience, that when we have formed such conclusions we have not been deceived.[12]

In other words, since certain ideas associated with the term "God," coincide with those associated with the term "good," the "internal feeling" connected with "truth" attaches itself to the proposition "God is good." This same process lies at the basis of all assent.

B. Topics. Priestley explains memory as an operation of the mind made possible by the connections among ideas. As the mind gathers ideas, by means of the external senses, "these ideas [are] variously associated together; so that when one of them is present it will introduce such others as it has the nearest connection with."[13] Indeed, he asserts that it is virtually "impossible" to "recollect"

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[12]Priestley, Hartley's Theory, p. xxvii; see also pp. 23, 158-165, 180; and Works of Priestley, III, 18-19.

[13]Priestley, Hartley's Theory, p. xxv.

materials for a discourse without using one idea as a springboard leading to others. Thus, for example, upon the presentation of a proposition, one might ask what effects its adoption would bring, thereby leading to an inquiry into various specific consequences; another might ask what has gone before, thus moving into a study of causes. Each of these "trains of thought" originates from the general idea of effects or causes.

It is this basic law of mental activity which provides the justification for rhetorical topics, since these are merely general ideas which serve as springboards to more particular ones. Priestley's list of general topics includes: definition, adjuncts, antecedents, consequents, means, analogy, contraries, example, and authority.[14] Each of these, he says, will serve as a "thought provoker," thus leading the mind to various particular ideas related to the proposition or subject of the discourse, In short, as ideas are gathered, they are mentally cataloged in the memory through the laws of association, and are organized into classes such as those enumerated. The topics, which are merely the generic names for these various types of thought relationships, are the keys which unlock files of associated ideas.[15]

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[14]Priestley, Lectures, p. 10.

[15]It is worthy of mention that Hartley preceded Priestley in seeing the connection between the topics and

C. Amplification. Amplification, according to Priestley, is that process by which an orator may enlarge his discourse through the use of additional arguments, observations, and details related to his subject. This third element in the doctrine of invention, Priestley also establishes upon the principles of association.

In argumentative discourses, additional arguments may be supplied by further use of the topics, which, as we have already seen, are made possible by the association of ideas. In narrative discourses, on the other hand, amplification is accomplished either by including more details or by intermixing the narrative with related observations--both of which processes may be accomplished by pursuing the various lines of thought associated with basic features of the narrative.[16] As an example, says Priestley, consider the

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association. He wrote: "Our memories are also much assisted by our visible ideas in respect of past facts, and the preservation of the order of time depends in a particular manner upon our visible trains suggesting each other in due succession. Hence eye witnesses generally relate in order of time, without any express design of doing so. This recollection of visible ideas, in the order in which they were impressed, gives rise to the loci memoriales, in which matters principally worthy of rememberance are to be reposited, and to the artificial memory, that is borrowed from the eye; just as the facility of remembering words formed into verses does to the artificial memory borrowed from the ear." Priestley, Hartley's Theory, p. 75; see also, pp. 85, 185, 269.

[16]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 26-29.

case of a eulogist who wishes to find matter for amplifying his discourse. The idea of the subject's parents could easily establish a train of thought leading to various events associated with his childhood, thus providing details for elaboration. This same line of thinking could even suggest observations concerning the influences of the home on one's later life.[17]

Under this head of amplification, Priestley also believes it is profitable for one to compose freely as ideas come to the mind, saving until later the task of correcting and revising what has thus been set down. He says further:

> Besides, if we would wish to communicate to our readers those strong sensations, that we feel in the ardour of composition, we must endeavour to express the whole of our sentiments and sensations, in the very order and connexion in which they actually presented themselves to us at that time. For, such is the similarity of all human minds, that when the same appearances are presented to another person, his mind will, in general, be equally struck and affected with them, and the composition will appear to him to be natural and animated. Whereas, if, in consequence of an ill-judged scrupulosity and delay, we once lose sight of any part of that train of ideas with which our own minds were so warmed and interested, it may be impossible to recover it: and perhaps no other train of ideas, though, separately taken, they may appear to be better adapted to the subject, may have that same power to excite those sensations with which we would wish the composition might be read.[18]

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[17]Adapted from an example used by Priestley in the Lectures, pp. 34-35.

[18]Ibid., pp. 31-32.

Priestley's doctrine of invention, then, is firmly rooted in the soil of association. His basic concept of this "part" of rhetoric was in all probability influenced by passages in Hartley's Observations on Man, and each of the three ingredients in his system of recollection is explained by the psychology of association.

III. Method and Association. In method, likewise, Priestley makes the principles of association the foundation of his doctrine.

A. Narrative Discourses. A discourse, says Priestley, should be arranged so that it will both gain an easy admission into the mind, and be easily remembered; and an orator can attain each of these goals through an understanding of the mind's operations. He further points out that, according to Hartley's theory, the laws of association create certain common transitions or "paths" in the mind, and when a discourse follows one of these existing paths, it will gain the easiest admission and make the most lasting impression.[19] For example, the chronological order is a well-beaten mental trail; so a narrative utilizing this order will be more easily received than one disregarding it. The same may be said for the spatial and topical orders.

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[19]Ibid., pp. 33-35.

Paradoxically, however, these same two goals will occasionally lead an orator to deviate from the natural order. Chronological progression, for example, may sometimes be interrupted in order to pursue a cause or an effect, which may, for the moment, have a stronger connection with the event at hand than does the next event in time. This digression, however, must not lead the mind so far away from the basic order of presentation that it cannot easily make its way back, for this would destroy the train of thoughts which the orator has sought to establish. "In all these and the like cases, a writer can never be blamed if he dispose the materials of his composition by an attention to the strongest and most usual association of ideas in the human mind."[20]

B. Argumentative Discourses. In his discussion of method as applied to argumentative discourses, Priestley, as we have already seen, utilizes primarily the logical concepts of analysis and synthesis. But even here he finds some connection with associationism, for the effectiveness of both of these methods he traces, in some degree, to the association of ideas. Analysis, he points out, uses the order of investigation, generally following succession in time. Likewise, the synthetic pattern of geometric

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[20]Ibid., p. 35.

demonstration gains easy entrance into the mind because each step prepares the way for the next. Definitions direct the way to axioms; axioms lead to the proposition; the proposition calls for the proof; the proved proposition suggests observations and conclusions. Besides being a natural progression, and one in which ideas move in a train, this path is already well established, and has, therefore, formed a familiar trail in the mind. The audience should be allowed to see the process clearly as it unfolds, so they can trace the connections among the steps.[21]

An indirect use of associationism in connection with method is the fact that Priestley points to Hartley's Observations on Man as an excellent example of the use of the synthetic method.[22]

IV. Style and Association. Priestley's loyalty to Hartlean tenents is nowhere seen more clearly, however, than in his doctrine of style, for it is especially in this part of the Lectures that he dwells on the principles of mental activity.[23]

In introducing this section of his course, Priestley indicates that while a general knowledge of the principles

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[21] Ibid., pp. 36-50.

[22] Ibid., pp. 61-62.

[23] See Ibid., Lectures XII-XXXV.

of human nature must be looked for in ethical treatises, "that knowledge of human nature, which is necessary to understand the rationale of the ornaments of style will not be excluded a place in these Lectures, but will be explained pretty much at large in the third part of the course."[24] When he comes to the discussion of style, the third part of the course, he says:

> In treating of this part of my subject, I shall endeavour to lay open the sources of all the pleasures we receive from this most refined art, explaining what are the properties, or principles, in our frame which lay the mind open to its influences, as well as describe the various forms of expression which are found, by experience, to affect our minds in so agreeable a manner, and give examples of such forms of expressions.[25]

A. Taste. As Harding correctly states, both Blair and Kames rely, to some extent, on the common sense philosophy in their discussions of taste, for they understand certain elements in a person's taste to be instinctive.[26] In this regard, as one might expect, Priestley is different. Just three years before he published his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, he had written the previously mentioned reply to Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, opposing those elements of their philosophy which he regarded as incompatible with

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[24]Ibid., p. 4.

[25]Ibid., p. 72.

[26]Harding, "English Theories of Public Address, 1750-1800," pp. 351-352.

associationism, and in particular attacking the doctrine of "innate" ideas.[27] Therefore, instead of basing his standard of taste on some sense inherent in the mind, he founds it directly upon the association of ideas, calling "very probable," Dr. Hartley's opinion that association "is the only mental principle employed in the formation, growth, and declension of all our intellectual pleasures and pains."[28]

Specifically, his view is that "since all emotions excited by works of genius consist of such ideas and sensations as are capable of being associated with the perception of such works, nothing can be requisite to the acquisition of taste, but exposing the mind to a situation in which those associated ideas will be frequently presented to it."[29] In another passage, where he again points to the association of ideas as the foundation of taste, Priestley writes:

> [T]he properties of uniformity, variety, and proportion, or a fitness to some useful end, having been perceived in most of the objects with which pleasurable ideas and sensations have been associated, a complex pleasurable sensation will universally be annexed to the marks of uniformity, variety, and proportion, wherever they are perceived.[30]

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[27] Works of Priestley, III, 33.

[28] Priestley, Lectures, p. 130.

[29] Ibid., p. 75.

[30] Ibid., p. 133.

In short, according to Priestley, taste is dependent on associations which have arisen in the mind, and not on an instinctive "common sense."

B. Pleasing Style. Though as one reads Priestley's discussion of "pleasing style" it might appear on the surface that he accepts the "psychology of the faculties," a closer examination reveals the same bias for associationism and the same rejection of all other competing psychologies. It is true that Priestley uses such terms as "will," "judgment," "imagination," "passions," and "memory"; but while he recognizes the human mind as performing these functions of willing, understanding, imagining, feeling, and remembering, the point to be emphasized is that he does not regard these functions as innate faculties or reflex senses. This he is careful to make clear in the Lectures:

> Whatever it be, in the sentiment or ideas, that makes a discourse to be read with pleasure, must either be interesting, by exciting those gross and more sensible feelings we call the passions, or must awaken those more delicate sensations, which are generally called the pleasures of the imagination. Each of these kinds of feelings are, by some philosophers, referred to so many distinct reflex, or internal senses, as they call those faculties of the mind by which we perceive them; whereas, according to Dr. Hartley's theory, those sensations consist of nothing more than a congeries or combination of ideas and sensations, separately indistinguishable, but which were formerly associated either with the idea itself that excites them, or with some idea, or circumstance, attending the introduction of them. It is this latter hypothesis that I adopt, and, by the help of it, I hope to be able to throw some new light on this curious subject.[31]

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[31] Ibid., pp. 72-73.

Priestley explains this matter even more fully in the Introduction to his version of Hartley, where he asserts that each of these phenomena of the mind results from an association of ideas rather than from an inborn faculty. Memory, he says, is the recall of one idea by another associated with it; imagination is the combining of old ideas into a new complex; judgment is the perception of the coincidence of two ideas having common associations; passions are excited when a circumstance or idea occurs which has formerly been associated with certain feelings and emotions; and a volition is "a desire exclusive of emotion, which the idea of a favorite object not possessed may excite, and which is followed by those actions with which that state of mind has been associated."[32]

Thus, Priestley, while showing an acquaintance with the doctrines of the faculty psychology, and while, to some extent, employing terms usually connected with that theory, not only remains within the general confines of associationism, but takes special pains to stress this fact both in his Lectures and in his version of Hartley. As a result, the terms "passions," "imagination," and "judgment," have for him specialized associationistic meanings, and this fact must be

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[32]Priestley, Hartley's Theory, pp. xxv-xxxi.

kept in mind when considering Priestley's treatment of the elements of a "pleasing style."

1. Passions. Priestley conceives of the passions as "blind and mechanical principles" which also operate according to the laws of association. By experience, the states of mind which are called passions have come to be connected with certain circumstances, and when these conditions appear, the passions connected with them are automatically stirred. Moreover, he points out, the height to which an emotion may be raised is directly proportional to the vividness with which the mind conceives those circumstances which arouse it.[33]

This being true, the orator who would stir the passions of his audience must utilize those techniques of style which tend to produce vivid images--such things as the historic present, the injection of particular names and circumstances, and the use of "few" and "suitable" words. By these methods, past events, or even fictitious ones, may be presented in such a vivid fashion that they will appear almost as real as actual experiences. This doctrine provides the psychological basis for the previously mentioned theory of "ideal presence," found in both Priestley and Kames.

Second, and even more important, Priestley uses the doctrine of association to support the thesis that passions

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[33]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 79-80.

tend to produce belief. Throughout life, he says, strong emotions have been aroused by "external objects and circumstances really existing."

> Vivid ideas and strong emotions, therefore having been, through life, associated with reality, it is easy to imagine that, upon the perception of the proper feelings, the associated idea of reality will likewise recur, and adhere to it as usual; unless the emotion be combined with such other ideas and circumstances as have had as strong an association with fiction.[34]

In other words, we tend to assume that whatever is clear and vivid, or whatever stirs our passions is true and real; and, therefore, if an orator can sufficiently vivify or move, we tend to believe that his proposal is true.

Another appearance of associationism in connection with the passions is found in Priestley's statement that passions may be transferred from one object to another--a notion, incidentally, which is also to be found in Kames.[35] That such transfer occurs between related articles may, it is argued, readily be seen from the fact that persons tend to show affection for objects associated with a person they love, and aversion for objects associated with a person they hate.[36]

Finally, Priestley observes that because of the laws of association, certain passions may have a mutual effect on

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[34]Ibid., p.89.

[35]Kames, Elements, I, 66.

[36]See Priestley, Lectures, Lecture XIII, passim.

each other. If, for example, the mind is under the influence of love, it may easily be led to feel pity; but the mind filled with sorrow can scarcely endure mirth. This observation he bases on a belief that there are certain "kindred passions," which, being of a somewhat similar nature, have become associated with one another.[37]

In short, Priestley, influenced, as we have shown, by the doctrines of associationism, regards emotional appeal primarily as a matter of employing a style which will vividly call to consciousness those circumstances previously associated with strong feelings, thus recreating the feelings themselves, so that they may serve as springboards to the desired belief or action.

Priestley is, of course, by no means the first to point out the connection between language and the arousal of the passions, for a discussion of this relationship is common among rhetorical theorists, both ancient[38] and modern. Especially, among his contemporaries, George Campbell stresses the importance of "communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object" in order to arouse the passions.[39] The point

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[37]Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[38]See Cicero, De Orat., 3. 96. 104-105; and Quintilian, Inst. Orat., 8. 3. 61-72.

[39]Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric, pp. 12-13, 82-98.

which bears emphasis, however, is that almost without exception these other writers regard pathetic proof as an element of invention, while Priestley does not even mention it in that connection, reserving his entire discussion of the subject for the area of style.

We may recognize at least two possible reasons for this "relocation" of pathetic proof. First, Priestley's inventional system, as we have previously observed, is merely an artificial organon for proving propositions by arguments drawn from the topics. This emphasis on logical proof tends to exclude emotional, and even ethical appeal from the first "part" of rhetoric. Second, in organizing his treatment of style according to association psychology, Priestley finds a very convenient niche for both pathetic and ethical proof. Believing language to have the power of appealing to the passions, the understanding, and the imagination, Priestley places each of his stylistic techniques under whichever of these mental functions it stirs into activity: vivid language to arouse the passions, certain "forms of address" based on ethos to influence the judgment, and various "beauties of composition" to stir the imagination.

Probably, then, it is Priestley's narrowed concept of invention, along with his psychological orientation, that results in the placement of pathetic, and, for that matter,

ethical proof, entirely under the heading of style.

2. Judgment. Under this head Priestley discusses those "forms of address" which, in addition to the actual arguments and various pathetic appeals used to support a proposition, have a special influence on the judgment or understanding, thus helping to win assent to one's proposal. These are based on what he calls "the principle of sympathy," or the natural tendency of an unprejudiced audience to give assent to a proposition when "the person who contends for it is really in earnest, and believes it himself."[40]

"Sympathy," however, as Priestley is careful to point out, is not an innate principle, but, like all other mental phenomena, is rooted directly in the association of ideas. Since earnestness, for example, is universally characteristic of a person with firm conviction, these two qualities have, through association, become connected with each other. If, then, a speaker wishes an audience to believe that he is firmly convinced of the truth and justice of his proposition, he must appear earnest. Three other traits which Priestley lists as being associated with strong belief are: displaying a mastery of the subject, exhibiting a redundancy of proofs, and appearing candid.[41]

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[40]Priestley, Lectures, p. 109.

[41]Ibid., pp. 108-109.

Not only is each of these traits a sign of strong belief, but each has particular rhetorical methods which have through long use become associated with it. Thus the audience judges a speaker to be master of his subject when he is able to anticipate andanswer objections, and when he can "turn the tables" on his opponent. It judges him to be earnest when he appeals to the judgments of others, makes exclamations, and appears to give an unpremeditated address.

In these matters which tend to gain the assent of the judgment, then, association plays a double role. By it, candidness, earnestness, redundancy of proofs, and mastery of the subject become connected with the impression of strong belief; and by it, each of these "forms of address" becomes connected with the particular rhetorical methods which indicate it--earnestness with exclamations, etc.

3. Imagination. The pleasures of the imagination, according to Priestley, are stirred by two psychic processes: the "moderate exercise" of the mental faculties, and the transfer of ideas from one object to another. These two processes, both of which are founded on associationism, provide the divisions for Priestley's explanation of the figures which stir the imagination, even though the author himself recognizes that the divisions are not mutually exclusive.[42]

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[42] Ibid.

a) Exercise of the Faculties. Just as a moderate exertion of the muscles of the body is pleasant, so, suggests Priestley, a moderate exertion of the mind is pleasant. A speaker may provide this mental exercise for his audience by utilizing certain figures of speech--specifically, novelty, sublimity, and analogy.

Employing novelty will exercise the imagination, for the perception of a new train of ideas requires a greater exertion of the mind than the repetition of old ones. Moreover, "as the mind conforms itself to the ideas which engage its attention, and it hath no other method of judging of itself but from its situation, the perception of a new train of ideas is like entering upon a new world, and enjoying a new being, and a new mode of existence."[43] Likewise, Priestley attributes surprise, an effect somewhat related to the wonder produced by novelty, to the appearance of an old idea amidst new associations.

The imagination is, he believes, likewise exercised when it is required to comprehend something sublime. "The mind, as was observed before, conforming and adapting itself to the objects to which its attention is engaged, must, as it were, enlarge itself to conceive a great object. This requires a considerable effort of the imagination. . . ."[44]

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[43]Ibid., p. 147.

[44]Ibid., p. 151. A very similar analysis of the

Pleasure may be derived from the exercise afforded the faculties when attempting to comprehend analogies in objects, or as Priestley usually terms it, their uniformity and variety. He says, "[T]he moment we perceive that the parts of any object are analogous to one another, and find, or are informed, what that analogy is, the sight of a part, without any farther [sic] investigation, suggests the idea of the whole; and the judgment is most agreeably and successfully employed in completing the image."[45]

The delight arising from analogies is specifically attributed to the fact that there are certain common characteristics in almost every pleasing object in nature or art. These qualities, such as just proportion or harmonious coloration, are found in human and animal bodies, in vegetable nature, and in imitations of these in houses, gardens, furniture, and utensils. Since pleasure is associated with these qualities found so abundantly in pleasing objects, their presence in some new object will bring pleasure, through the association of ideas.

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nature of the sublime is presented by Lord Kames. He suggests that "a mental progress from the capital of the kingdom, to that of Europe--to the whole earth--to the planetary system--to the universe, is extremely pleasant: the heart swells, and the mind is dilated, at every step." Lord Kames, Elements, I, 220. "A great object," says Kames, "makes the spectator stretch upward, and stand a tiptoe." Ibid., p. 211.

[45]Priestley, Lectures, p. 164.

Specifically, comparisions, metaphors, allegories, and the various forms of contrast are the figures which derive their effect from the perception of uniformity and variety. These figures delight because a moderate mental effort is required to conceive of the similarities and differences between two objects placed along side each other. In comparisions, metaphors, and allegories, the auditor must discover the similarity in two objects which at first appear different; while in contrasts, which Priestley regards as primarily connected with various forms of humor, the mind is challenged to find differences in the midst of apparent similarity. In a pun, for example, words first appear to be similar, but a striking difference is soon apparent.

In addition to this exercise of the perceptive powers, analogies and contrasts, in particular, afford direct applications of the psychology of association. Priestley's description of laughter, taken first-hand from Hartley, states that laughter is at first "a nascent cry, raised by pain, or the apprehension of pain, suddenly checked, and repeated at very short intervals."[46] Eventually the motions and gestures of which laughter consists become associated with any strong opposition or contrast in things.

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[46] Ibid., p. 200; cf. Priestley, Hartley's Theory, pp. 271-275.

A further use of associationism in humourous contrast, as we shall see, is found in the transfer of ideas from one object to another. This is the second major division of Priestley's explanation of the effect of various figures on the imagination.

b. Transfer of Ideas. Priestley introduces this second method of stirring the imagination by saying:

> We have seen the extensive influence of association in forming all the pleasures of imagination that we have hitherto enumerated, and we have seen the probability of that opinion, which represents all our intellectual pleasures as derived originally from sensible impressions, variously mixed, combined, and transferred from one object to another, by that principle. Some of these were remote, and perhaps, to persons unused to such speculations, obscure effects of that great and universal agent in the affections of the human mind. We shall now take a view of some of the more manifest and immediate effects of it, in transferring, ideas belonging to some words upon others related to them.[47]

The foundation for this transfer of ideas is the doctrine that every word has, through experience, accumulated its own complex of associations. Thus, when a figurative expression is used in place of, or along with, the proper word, the associations of the first are transferred to the second. In the figure called personification, for example, the qualities associated with a human being are transferred to an animal or inanimate object, while in a hyperbole certain impressions are transferred from the exaggerated concept to

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[47]Priestley, Lectures, p. 231.

the idea at hand. This same transfer, says Priestley, also accounts for the effect of metonymy and of synecdoche, where a cause is put for the result, or the whole for the part.

By the same token, association is the psychological basis for the pleasure received from the sense of completion, the mind being "impatient of the interruption of a chain of ideas strongly connected, and . . . pleased to see every thing carried to its proper conclusion, according to the ideas previously formed of it."[48]

Related to this is the pleasure we receive from climax. The "gradual rise and improvement of things" is common in our world, and since this progression is usually associated with pleasurable occurrences, the pleasure may be transferred to thoughts in a discourse by utilizing a climax. This climax should build according to an order of time, place, cause and effect, worth, dignity, or importance, because these are common paths along which the mind readily follows a train of ideas. Any change or inversion of this order results in a feeling of disgust and incompleteness.[49]

Priestley further points out that a transfer of ideas takes place in certain figures mentioned earlier as being based on comparision and contrast.[50] In the metaphor of

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[48] Ibid., pp. 272-273.

[49] Ibid., pp. 275-277.

[50] Ibid., pp. 181-182, 211-212.

Virgil, for example, where "he calls the two Scipios the thunderbolts of war," the ideas associated with lightning are transferred to the two Scipios.[51] And in burlesque, a form of humorous contrast, "the ideas of meanness annexed to the lesser object are, by this comparison, transferred to the greater, and adhere to it by association."[52]

C. Resemblance of Sound and Sense. Not only does Priestley explain many elements of a pleasing style by the doctrine of association, but he also utilizes associational principles when discussing the resemblance between certain sounds and the ideas they signify. In this connection, he suggests that words or groups of words may be something more than arbitrary signs of ideas; they may also bear a tangible "resemblance" to the ideas they represent. In order to clarify this thesis, he gives two illustrations: that a person who does not know the meaning of the words spoken is

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[51] Ibid., p. 182.

[52] Ibid., p. 211. This concept of the transfer of ideas in figures of speech is, it should be noted, common in both Hartley and Kames. Hartley wrote: "Besides this, figurative expressions illuminate our discourse and writings by transferring the properties, associations, and emotions, belonging to one thing upon another, by augmenting, diminishing, &c." Priestley, Hartley's Theory, p. 263; see also, p. 131. Kames, likewise, mentions the transfer of ideas, by association, in figures of speech. In fact, Section V of Chapter XX, in reality a treatment of metonymy, is titled "A figure, which among related objects, extends the properties of one to another." Kames, Elements, II, 269. From this discussion Priestley takes several illustrations. See also Kames, Elements, I, 193; II, 269-270, 301-302.

often able to know something of the speaker's meaning by hearing the sound only; and that music, by the use of sound, is able to produce various states of mind.[53] These effects occur, we are told, because within a congeries of ideas there may be certain aural experiences which call to mind the whole group of ideas, including not only a general state of mind, but even particular ideas and feelings.

This relationship between sound and sense has many uses in composition. In some cases, words which actually sound like the idea they symbolize may be utilized, and, at other times, words may be combined in a phrase or sentence so as to convey ideas of speed, slowness, effort, or ease. Even pauses are valuable in making the sound resemble the sense.[54]

D. Attention. Although it is not given a separate section in the Lectures, at various places throughout his work Priestley, drawing again upon Hartlian associationism, presents a doctrine of attention which is worthy of notice, particularly in view of the fact that it so closely resembles certain modern theories of persuasion.

When introducing the subject of style, Priestley makes it clear that he regards this "part" of rhetoric not as mere

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[53]Priestley, Lectures, pp. 289-290.

[54]Ibid., pp. 289-297.

adornment, but primarily as a functional tool designed to "attract and engage the attention, by the grace and harmony of the style, the turn of thought, or the striking or pleasing manner in which sentiments are introduced and expressed."[55] To Priestley, however, attention is more than a temporary focus of the auditor's mind on the orator's subject. He believes that "since the mind perceives, and is conscious of nothing, but the ideas that are present to it, it must, as it were, conform itself to them"; and by this means, "a person, for the time, enters into, adopts, and is actuated by, the sentiments that are presented to his mind."[56] For this reason, a speaker must be very careful about introducing objections; lest by focusing attention on them, he unwittingly defeat himself.[57] On the other hand, in proportion as the attention of the audience remains on the speaker's message and they receive only favorable impressions concerning his proposition, all the ideas "associated" with the proposal will be congenial, and that being the case, their reaction will be as he desires.

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[55] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[56] Ibid., pp. 126-127.

[57] Priestley writes: "The chief art of an orator in answering objections consists in introducing them at a proper time, just when it may be supposed they may have occurred to his hearers; and before they could have had time to influence their minds. Ibid., p. 117.

In short, by maintaining the constant attention of the audience, thus regulating the ideas which enter their minds, an orator can control the cluster of ideas which form around his proposition; and by allowing only congenial ideas to enter this congeries he can gain the desired response.

Those familiar with twentieth-century rhetorical theory will perceive the similarity between Priestley's doctrine of attention and that advanced by James A. Winans. Winans, of course, developed what has come to be called the "attention determines response" theory--a theory which holds that if a speaker can control the attention of his audience, he can gain the desired response.[58] To point out this likeness is not to say that Winans drew upon Priestley, for there is no indication that such is the case. Indeed, the fact of the matter is that Winans, by his own admission, owes his doctrine to the teachings of William James, rather than to the works of the eighteenth-century associationists. At the same time, it is worthy of mention that both Priestley and Winans, each drawing from prominent psychologies of their day, advance a somewhat similar doctrine of attention. Priestley, however, wrote almost a century and a half before Winans, and should, therefore be given credit for being the first to suggest the important role of attention in

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[58]James A. Winans, Public Speaking (New York, 1915), Chapter VIII.

determining audience response.

V. Elocution and Association. Priestley is a strong advocate of a natural and unaffected style of delivery, and of a "natural" means for attaining it. Moreover, as in the other parts of his system, he finds the justification for this attitude in the doctrines of associationism.

David Hartley, it may be observed, had written, "As we express our inward sentiments by words, so we do also by gestures, and particularly by the muscles of the face. Here, again, association and imitation display themselves."[59]

Kames, likewise, frequently mentions the correspondence between inner feelings and outward expressions. "So intimately connected are the soul and body," he says, "that every agitation in the former produceth a visible effect upon the latter."[60] Moreover, he declares that "involuntary [bodily] signs, which are all of them natural, are either peculiar to one passion, or common to many. Every vivid passion hath an external expression peculiar to itself; not excepting pleasant passions, witness admiration and mirth."[61]

Following Hartley and Kames, Priestley writes: "[T]ones, gestures, and other circumstances have, by use,

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[59]Priestley, Hartley's Theory, p. 97.

[60]Kames, Elements, I, 426.

[61]Ibid., I, 433; see also I, 426-436, 450.

acquired as fixed associations with states of mind as articulate words."[62] Therefore, in order for a speaker to appear earnest, he must exhibit those qualities that are naturally associated with the delivery of an earnest person; for these traits are included in the mental configuration of earnestness. Of course, Priestley believes that the best way for one to exhibit these traits is actually to be sincere, for in this case the correspondent "motions" arise automatically. Moreover, he says that "no attention can supply the place of this [real feeling]. The external expressions of passion, with all their variations, corresponding to the different degrees of emotions, are too complex for any person in the circumstances of a public speaker to be able to attend to them."[63] If, however, the true feelings be present, they will provide the necessary bodily actions and vocal modulations for proper expression.

It is, in part, this same line of reasoning that leads Priestley to recommend extemporaneous delivery. He believes that this mode is, in the minds of most auditors, connected with such characteristics as "force," "earnestness," "naturalness," and "animation." Since each of these is a desirable attribute, and since each is associated with

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[62]Priestley, Lectures, p. 218.

[63]Ibid., p. 115.

extemporaneous delivery, Priestley suggests that "The perfection of speaking is, certainly, to speak extempore."[64]

Building, then, on concepts found in both Kames and Hartley, Priestley's doctrines of delivery, like the other parts of his system, are founded to a very considerable degree, upon the association of ideas; for upon this psychological theory, he bases his conception of the proper use of both body and voice in expressing meanings and emotions, as well as the correspondence of these in extemporaneous delivery.

VI. Summary. That Priestley remains true to his design of illustrating associationism by the means of rhetoric, no one who reads his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism can doubt. Associationism, like the motif in a symphony, is the ever-recurring theme, the "constant reference," by which Priestley explains and validates rhetorical precepts. Indeed, there is hardly a major doctrine in the entire work that cannot, in some degree, be traced back to its foundation in this psychology.

Moreover, Priestley is loyal to associationism in the sense that he draws upon it to the practical exclusion of competing contemporary psychologies. He rejects Reid's

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[64]Ibid., pp. 111-115.

common sense philosophy because its assumptions concerning the existence of certain "innate ideas" come into conflict with the associational view that all mental phenomena derive ultimately from sense experience. For the same reason, he refuses to accept that aspect of the psychology of the faculties which assumes that the so-called "powers" of the mind are inherent, and while he employs, perhaps inevitably, some of the faculty terminology, he does so, as we have shown, in a restricted and adapted sense.

Indeed, Priestley's consistent and thorough-going application of the principles of associationism to the problems of communication stands as his most significant contribution to rhetorical theory. In a century when rhetoricians were turning to a "psychological" view of their subject, as Harding points out, only Priestley and Ogilvie make a "conscientious effort to apply a psychological doctrine intact and unconfused--the faculty psychology to composition in one case and associationism to criticism in the other."[65]

Furthermore, Samuel H. Monk, writing on the sublime in the eighteenth century, evaluates Priestley's Lectures by saying: "By his thorough use of association to explain beauty and sublimity (in which he was followed later by

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[65]Harding, "English Rhetorical Theory, 1750-1800," pp. 355-356.

Alison), Priestley foreshadowed the complete abandonment of the rules, and the romatic emphasis on the subject rather than the object."[66] Monk also points to the fact that Priestley's work is "the first system of aesthetics that is acknowledged to be founded on the Observations [on Man]."[67]

Inasmuch, then, as Priestley's use of association psychology is substantiated by his own admission and by an examination of his Lectures, as well as by his reliance on Hartley and Kames, he may be said to conform to this trend in later eighteenth-century English rhetoric--the application of current psychological doctrines to rhetorical theory. No rhetorician of the period makes a more conscious effort to found rhetoric upon a psychological basis, and Priestley stands above all others in the direct and extensive application of the doctrine of association to rhetorical theory.

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[66]Monk, The Sublime, p. 238.

[67]Ibid., p. 118.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Although Joseph Priestley is best remembered today for his activities as a scientist and theologian, he also made significant contributions in the fields of philosophy, education, history, grammar, rhetoric, and criticism. It is with the last three of these--his work in the area of the language arts--that this study has principally been concerned. What is his place in the histories of grammar, rhetoric, and criticism? How shall we interpret and evaluate his contributions in these fields? These are the specific questions toward which attention has been directed.

So far as grammar is concerned, Priestley occupies a position of considerable importance. His Rudiments of English Grammar (1761; eds., 1768, 1769, 1772, 1784), although it is an elementary textbook designed for school use, seeks to bring about certain simplifications in the science of English grammar, especially by making it more independent of Latin and French forms. Of considerable importance also is the fact that it makes "usage" rather than

"authoritative pronouncements" the ultimate standard for determining "correctness." In A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar (1762) Priestley takes "sounds and characters"--his terms for phonetic and orthographic symbols--as the two basic linguistic elements, and attempts to demonstrate (1) the powers of expression of which these are capable, (2) the connection between these symbols and the ideas which they may be used to represent, and (3) the various modes of expression which may be employed in different languages in order to convey the same mental conceptions. By this means he believes it is possible to discover and to remedy the deficiencies which may exist in any particular language. In this work, as in the Rudiments, he is strong in his insistence upon "usage" as the standard of "correctness," and continues his efforts to free English from the trammels of foreign influence. In addition, it should be observed that here, as in the Rudiments, Priestley treats the adjective as a separate part of speech, while classifying the participle as a form of the verb. Thus he becomes the first writer to present the eight-part classification of the parts of speech that is still generally accepted and taught today. For this reason, as well as for his attitude toward "usage" and his desire for the independence of English grammar, he may properly be regarded as a direct precursor of many modern grammarians.

In the area of rhetoric, the key to Priestley's position is to be found in one of his own statements in the Preface to the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (1777): "The plan [of these lectures] is rather more comprehensive than any thing that I have seen upon the subject; the arrangement of the materials, as a system, is new, and the theory, in several respects, more so."[1] Indeed, as viewed in the light of nearly two hundred years of historical perspective, it is apparent that it is these very features--the comprehensiveness of plan and novelty of arrangement, as well as certain characteristic doctrines--that chiefly make Priestley's work of importance in the rhetoric of eighteenth-century England and that have sustained interest in it until the present time.

More specifically, as we have shown, because of these features it has a significant connection with each of the four dominant trends in later eighteenth-century English rhetoric--the classical, the belletristic, the elocutionary, and the psychological-epistemological. Thus a study of Priestley's system not only sheds light on a single rhetorician, but, more significantly, upon the whole picture of late eighteenth-century English rhetorical thought.

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[1]Priestley, Lectures, p. i.

From the classical rhetoric, primarily as presented in Ward and Lawson, Priestley takes his basic structure, general approach, and many theoretical details, such as topics, amplification, the divisions of a speech, and certain doctrines of style. Like the ancients, his basic objective appears to be the presentation of a system to guide the orator in the preparation and delivery of a persuasive discourse; and from their canons of invention, disposition, style, and delivery, he develops the major divisions of his system--recollection, method, style, and elocution.

With the basic structure of his system thus grounded in classicism, Priestley injects certain non-classical elements into his work. Believing all types of discourse to be founded upon the same basic linguistic principles, and assuming that the rules and precepts which serve as guides for composition may also serve as standards for criticism, Priestley broadens the scope of his rhetoric so as to include written as well as spoken discourse, and to embrace the work of the critic as well as that of the composer. Such a view, of course, places a considerable emphasis upon style. It is especially in this connection that he utilizes Lord Kames' Elements of Criticism, the source from which he borrows more frequently than from any other. By thus encompassing in a single work the composition and criticism of both spoken and written discourse, Priestley gives his entire system a

kinship with the belletristic tradition.

Still working within the classical framework, Priestley also includes to some extent, the doctrines of the elocutionists. While it is true that he does not give matters of delivery separate and systematic treatment, he makes it clear that he views "elocution" as an important canon of rhetoric. Moreover, as we know, the improvement of voice and bodily action, particularly along the lines suggested by such elocutionists as Sheridan, Mason, and Enfield, were of considerable importance in his own teaching program at Warrington.

Finally, as a foundation for his entire system, Priestley utilizes the association psychology. Together with such rhetoricians as Campbell, Blair, and Whately, he believes that rhetorical doctrines are valid only when they are based upon a proper view of the nature of the human mind. Therefore, like his contemporaries, he attempts to explain specific rules and techniques upon this basis. Using Hartley's Observations on Man as a beginning, and building upon the foundations which Kames and Gerard had alreadylaid, Priestley develops one of the most extensive applications of association psychology to rhetorical theory that has ever been presented. It is primarily in this explanation of rhetorical doctrine by the principles of association that Priestley makes those original contributions to which he

alludes in the previously quoted statement from the Preface of his Lectures.

With apparent awareness, therefore, of the directions in which contemporary rhetorical theory was developing, Priestley may be said to have devised one of the most comprehensive rhetorical systems of his century, utilizing each of the dominant trends present in contemporary rhetorical thought--the classical, the belletristic, the elocutionary, and the psychological. The basic materials with which to construct his system he draws from classical doctrine; borrowings from belles lettres and elocutionism he attaches primarily at their points of closest connection with his basically classical structure--belles lettres with style, and elocutionism with delivery; and underlying the entire system is his use of the principles of association by which he explains and justifies his doctrines. In short, Priestley molds each of the dominant trends of his period into a single comprehensive plan, includes within it certain novel theories of his own, and develops a structure suitable for co-ordinating and presenting this collection of ideas.

In rhetoric, therefore, as in so many other areas of eighteenth-century English life, Priestley may be regarded as completely typical of his age. Just as the advances of the century in science, politics, philosophy, theology, and education are reflected in his writings and deeds, so does

he mirror the prevailing trends in the rhetoric of his day. It is this very quality which leads Leslie Stephen to call him "a quick reflector of the current opinions of his time and class,"[2] and which causes Samuel Badcock to regard him as an "index-scholar."[3] At the same time, Priestley deserves considerable credit for his ability to touch upon essentials in all subjects; and, while he admittedly draws heavily upon the works of others, in rhetoric, as in other areas, he also invariably leaves his own peculiar mark upon whatever passes through his intellect.

Credit should also be given to the Dissenting academies for their influence upon Priestley's rhetorical system, for the underlying philosophy of these schools, as well as some of their practices, undoubtedly played a significant role in the development of his doctrines.

As has already been suggested, it was probably during Priestley's own school days at Daventry that he first undertook a systematic study of rhetorical theory. Also it was very probably at this time that he first acquired an appreciation of his native tongue; for the Dissenting academies were largely influential in beginning the movement

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[2]Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (3rd ed.; New York, 1927), I, 431.

[3]Samuel Badcock to John Nichols, quoted in James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson (London, 1884), IV, 408n.

toward a greater emphasis upon the English language, with a corresponding decrease in the stress placed upon Latin and Greek. This early training is reflected, as we have seen, in Priestley's own rhetorical system.

The study of belles lettres also was much cultivated among the Dissenters. McLachlan has suggested that this interest may have developed from a combination of the study of the English language and the writing of sermons--both of which were prominent in Dissenting schools.[4] Warrington Academy itself provides an instance of this stress on belles lettres, for from the very beginning of its existence, it had its "Tutor of Languages and Belles Lettres." Indeed, the fact that Priestley occupied this position undoubtedly had considerable influence on the direction in which his lectures developed. The practice of student speaking exercises, which Priestley introduced at Warrington and which, as we have seen, help to connect him with the elocutionary movement, were also a part of the curriculum at many of the Dissenting academies, including Daventry which he himself had attended.[5]

Moreover, the Dissenting academies were noted for their inclusion of current systems of philosophy and

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[4]McLachlan, English Education Under the Test Acts, pp. 27-28.

[5]Ibid., pp. 56, 84, 89, 95-96, 136-138, 147-148, 157, 161, 206, 239, 273.

metaphysics in their courses of study. While the Universities were censuring current philosophers and prohibiting students from reading their works, the Dissenters, free from the shackles of tradition, were encouraging the study of their doctrines.[6] Of particular interest in this connection is the fact that it was at Daventry that Priestley first came into contact with the Hartlian associationism which had such a profound influence upon his rhetoric. The attitude of these academies toward such philosophers as Locke, Hartley, and Descartes, therefore, had a significant influence on Priestley's thinking, and thus appear to have been at least partially responsible for the fact that he prepared a "psychological rhetoric" based upon associationistic doctrines.

But while these progressive tendencies were present in the Dissenting academies, it should also be noted that they still taught and viewed as essential the works of many of the classical writers; and of especial interest here, the works expressing the classical view of rhetoric. At Sheriffhales Academy, for example, Quintilian and Vossius were read;[7] at Bethnal Green Academy, where John Ward was enrolled, students read Vossius, Aristotle, and Cicero's

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[6]See Ibid., p. 38.

[7]Ibid., p. 46.

De Oratore.[8] Even at Warrington, Dr. Aikin, the classical tutor, required his students to read from Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics, and Quintilian's Institutes.[9]

A glance at the holdings of the Warrington Academy library reveals that it is even possible that the presence of certain works in this library had an important influence upon the development of Priestley's system of rhetoric. According to Irene Parker, the Warrington library included Ward's System of Oratory, Kames' Elements of Criticism, Sheridan's Lectures on Elocution, and Gerard's Essay on Taste, the very works which, along with Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory, were the major sources from which Priestley drew his ideas. The library also contained the works of Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Akenside, and Harris, from whose writings Priestley frequently quotes.[10]

These observations make it appear that in addition to reflecting the dominant trends in eighteenth-century English rhetorical thought, Priestley's system also reflects the basic philosophy and practices of the eighteenth-century English Dissenting academies. Indeed, it may be that the

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[8]Ibid., pp. 88-90.

[9]Turner, "Historical Account of Warrington Academy," p. 165.

[10]Parker, Dissenting Academies in England, pp. 158-159.

connection between Priestley and the four rhetorical trends mentioned above is due, in large measure, to his association with the academies. Thus, we might justifiably conjecture that Priestley came to Warrington knowing little about rhetorical theory, except for what he had learned in his own school days at Daventry. When he was called upon to construct a system of rhetoric for his classes in language, oratory, and criticism, he drew primarily upon the works in the Warrington library and upon the general practices of this and similar institutions--the courses in belles lettres, the speaking or elocution exercises, and the teachings in philosophy and the classics. By developing a system which encompassed these elements, he, at the same time and perhaps almost inevitably, developed a system that reflected the major trends developing in contemporary English rhetorical thought.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

FIGURES ILLUSTRATING PRIESTLEY'S RHETORICAL SYSTEM


RECOLLECTION
ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE
NARRATIVE DISCOURSE
LAY DOWN PROPOSITIONS
NARRATE FACTS
UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS
PARTICULAR PROPOSITIONS
MENTION ONLY A FEW PARTICULARS TO INFORM OF THE REALITY OF THE EVENT
CONFIRM-ILLUSTRATE
UNIVERSAL TOPICS
PARTICULAR TOPICS
DEFINITION
ADJUNCTS
ANTECEDENTS
CONSEQUENTS
MEANS
ANALOGY
CONTRARIES
EXAMPLE
AUTHORITY
PERSON
TIME
PLACE
MOTIVE
MANNER
INSTRUMENT
EVIDENCE
LAW
FORMS OF ADDRESS
[CONCISE DISCOURSE]
[ENLARGED DISCOURSE]
AMPLIFY FOR UNLEARNED AUDIENCE
LONGER TRANSITION
COPIOUS ILLUSTRATION
DIVERSIFIED EXPRESSION
REPETITION
AMPLIFY TO INTEREST AND AFFECT
FROM TOPICS
BY EXPLANATION
SUPPLY SUPPRESSED INTERMEDIATE ARGUMENTS
GIVE MORE COPIOUS INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS
DIVISION OF TOPIC
STRENGTH OF ARGUMENT
SUPPLY MORE DETAILS OF NARRATIVE
INTERMIX NARRATION WITH OBSERVATIONS
drafting by B.M.Fore

Figure 1


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ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE
NARRATIVE DISCOURSE
SYNTHESIS
ANALYSIS
REAL EXISTENCE
DEVIATIONS
ORDER OF DEMONSTRATION
ORDER OF INVESTIGATION
CHRONOLOGICAL
TOPICAL
SPATIAL
CAUSE AND EFFECT
SIMILARITY AND CONTRARIETY
INTRODUCTION
MAXIMS
DEFINITIONS
ACTUAL PROCESS OF DISCOVERY
PROPOSITIONS
LEMMAS
THESIS
DIVISION
NARRATION
SPECIAL TYPES
PROOF
DIRECT ARGUMENTS
INDIRECT ARGUMENTS
ESSAYS
SERMONS
MISC. REMARKS
LATITUDE IN ORDER
CAREFUL TRANSITIONS
TOPICAL
TEXTUAL
CONCLUSION
INFERENCES
APPLICATION
drafting by B.M.Fore

Figure 2


STYLE
PLAIN OR FIGURATIVE
ORNAMENT OF SENTIMENT
ORNAMENT OF DICTION
PERSPICUITY
PLEASING
PLACEMENT OF WORDS & CLAUSES
USE OF ARTICLES COPULATIVES AND SYNONYMS
CARE IN CONSTRUCTION OF SENTENCES & PARAGRAPHS
HARMONY OF VERSE
RESEMBLANCE OF SOUND AND SENSE
HARMONY OF PROSE
METRE
PAUSE
EASE AND DIFFICULTY
LONGER AND SHORTER
ORDER OF SYLLABLES
PAUSES
PAUSES
TONE OF VOICE
CLIMAX
ALLITERATION
PASSIONS
JUDGMENT
GENERATE BELIEF
MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER OBJECTS
HAVE MUTUAL INFLUENCE
AROUSE BY VIVIDNESS
USE HISTORIC PRESENT
USE PARTICULAR NAMES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
USE FEW AND SUITABLE WORDS
INFLUENCE BY FORMS OF ADDRESS TO INTRODUCE AND EXPRESS ARGUMENTS SO AS TO GAIN ASSENT
EARNESTNESS
REDUNDANCY OF PROOFS
APPEAL TO JUDGMENT OR OPPONENT
EXCLAMATION
EXTEMPORE UNPREMEDITATED
SLIGHT MENTION OF ARGUMENTS
SLIGHT MENTION OF SELF (MODESTY)
MASTER OF SUBJECT
CANDID
ANTICIPATE AND ANSWER OBJECTIONS
TURN TABLES
SHOW DOUBT
RETRACT
ALLOW WEIGHT TO OPPONENT
SEEM TO SEEK TRUTH
IMAGINATION
MIND CONFORMS TO IDEAS PRESENTED
THROUGH EYE AND EAR
INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES ARE COMPLEX
PLEASURES OF IMAGINATION STIRRED BY BEAUTIES OF COMPOSITION THROUGH
MODERATE EXERTION OF FACULTIES
TRANSFER OF IDEAS TO IMPROVE SENSE
CONCISE OR DIFFUSE
NOVELTY
ANALOGY
SUBLIME
METONYMY
HYPERBOLE
PERSONIFICATION
IMITATION
SYNECDOCHE
SERIOUS
RHETORICAL
UNIFORMITY & VARIETY
COMPARISON
CONTRAST
COMPLETENESS
CLIMAX
SIMILE
METAPHOR
SERIOUS
HUMOROUS
ALLEGORY
WORDS USED IN UNUSUAL SENSE
ANTITHESIS
RISIBLE
RIDICULOUS
RIDDLES
PUNS
WIT
HUMOR
MOCK-HEROIC
BURLESQUE
PARODY
IRONY
drafting by B.M.Fore

Figure 3


ELOCUTION
UNDERSTAND MEANING
FEEL SENTIMENT
VOICE
EARNEST
NATURAL
GRACEFUL
BODY
PRONUNCIATION
EXTEMPORANEOUS DELIVERY
GESTURE
SOUND
SILENCE
POSTURES
HANDS
COUNTENANCE
STRESS
RHYTHM
ARTICULATION
ATTITUDES
MOTIONS
LOOKS
PAUSE
TONE
HARMONY
drafting by B.M.Ford

Figure 4

APPENDIX II

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY AND LORD BACON

I. Introduction. A principal aim of this study has been to view the rhetoric of Joseph Priestley within the framework of late eighteenth-century English rhetorical thought; but another aspect of Priestley's work in language, oratory, and criticism concerns a possible connection between him and a seventeenth-century figure--Sir Francis Bacon.

A considerable portion of Lord Bacon's writings deal, directly or indirectly, with the subject of communication; and in his Advancement of Learning (1607) and its Latin version De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), he presents what may be regarded as a systematic treatment of this subject. In his study of Bacon on Communication, Karl Wallace noted certain similarities between the doctrines propounded by Bacon in the seventeenth century and those presented by Priestley in the eighteenth; but he was not able to determine whether the resemblance was coincidental or the result of some direct connection between the two writers.[1]

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[1]See Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, pp. 223-224.

The purpose of this Appendix, therefore, is two-fold: first, to single out those elements in Priestley's system of rhetoric that bear a significant similarity to doctrines contained in the writings of Lord Bacon; and second, to set forth the evidence that has been discovered relating to Priestley's direct use of Bacon's works.

II. Significant Similarities Between Priestley and Bacon on Rhetoric. Upon a comparison of the rhetorical systems of Priestley and Bacon, several basic points of resemblance appear.

A. The Function of Rhetoric. Fundamentally, Bacon's rhetorical analysis is based upon a brand of "faculty psychology" involving four mental functions: passion, reason, imagination, and will. The passions, Bacon says, look only to the present, and, therefore, generally recommend to the will a course of action that takes insufficient notice of the future; reason, on the other hand, though considering the future, is often unable to make its decisions attractive to the will. If, however, the imagination vivifies the future events contemplated by reason, and causes them to appear present, it can make the action recommended by reason more appealing to the will. Therefore, Bacon states, the function of rhetoric is to co-ordinate the work of reason and imagination, or, to use his terms, "the duty and office of Rhetoric is

to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will.[2]

Priestley, likewise, considers oratory to perform a basically logical function, with the imagination playing a subservient but nonetheless important role. He says, "The orator may, indeed, intend to please or affect his hearers; but, if he understands himself, he only means to influence their judgments, or resolutions, by the medium of the imagination or the passions."[3] Priestley's statement, like Bacon's, involves the use of certain terms connected with the faculty psychology, and suggests that the imagination may help gain the assent of the judgment or will. Moreover, Priestley's doctrine of "ideal presence," discussed at length in Chapter VI of this study, states that the orator will be effective in proportion as he makes future events appear present.

B. Invention. As Wallace suggests, those who are acquainted with the theory of rhetorical invention advanced by Bacon will immediately notice certain similarities between it and Priestley's ideas on this subject. The two writers seem to agree that such invention is not investigation, but

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[2]Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, XVIII. 2.

[3]Priestley, Lectures, p. 68.

only "recollection," to use Priestley's word, or "resummoning," to use Bacon's.[4] Both believe that the orator must previously be furnished with the materials for his discourse, and that the purpose of rhetoric is simply to provide the tools by which he can call or summon these materials into action. Bacon, for example, says that the use of rhetorical invention is "no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration."[5] Priestley, similarly, says oratory can do no more than assist the orator "in the habit of recollection, or . . . direct him which way to turn his thoughts, in order to find the arguments and illustrations with which his mind is already furnished."[6]

Not only do Bacon and Priestley agree on the purpose of rhetorical invention, but they also show considerable similarity in the methods which they advance for accomplishing "recollection." Bacon suggests two inventional devices: commonplaces, a store of prepared materials which may be adapted for use in various situations;[7] and topics, that

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[4]Bacon, Advancement of Learning, XIII. 6.

[5]Ibid.,

[6]Priestley, Lectures, p. 5.

[7]Bacon, Advancement of Learning, XIII. 7-8.

which "doth assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof."[8] Although Priestley makes "commonplaces" and "topics" synonymous, instead of viewing them as two separate methods, his definition of topics and his conception of their use, are precisely the same as Bacon's.

In sum, therefore, Priestley and Bacon both regarded rhetorical invention as a matter of "recall" rather than "discovery," and they both suggest the topics as indispensible tools for promoting this "resummoning" of the information stored in the mind. This similarity assumes even greater significance when it is recalled that throughout the long history of rhetorical theory, which extends over a period of some twenty-five centuries, these two writers are the only major rhetoricians who view rhetorical invention exclusively as a system of recalling from the memory previously stored materials.

C. Method. The term "method" is used by both Bacon and Priestley to denote the process of arranging a discourse in the most effective manner. But there are similarities in this regard which go far beyond the common use of a word.

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[8] Ibid., XIII. 9.

Bacon's discussion of method, focusing largely upon the matter of adapting the discourse to the audience, indicates various types of arrangement. Of particular importance in this comparison, however, is his suggestion of the "magistral" method for teaching a popular audience, as contrasted with the method of "initiative," for presenting scientific material to a learned audience; for Priestley, it will be recalled, speaks of exactly corresponding divisions--the synthetic method to prove and the analytic method to teach. Moreover, under the head of amplification, Priestley discusses at length the adaptation of a discourse to a popular or learned audience, the very types suggested by Bacon.

It is also of interest to note that Bacon's analysis of adaptation leads him to suggest two basic types of discourse: "exposition," from which the audience learns, and persuasion, as a result of which they judge or act.[9] Priestley makes almost precisely the same division by suggesting that discourses may be divided into "narrative" (informative) and "argumentative" (persuasive).

D. Elocution. Mention should also be made of the use which each of these theorists makes of the term "elocution." As already suggested, Priestley is the first major rhetorician, writing a treatise covering all of the

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[9]See Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, pp. 23-24.

functions of the orator, who uses the term "elocution," in common with the "elocutionists," that is, to mean "delivery." Since Bacon employed this term some 130 years before Priestley, it must be explained what he meant by it. To Bacon, elocution was synonymous with the total process of transmitting ideas, or what might be called, "communication." Under this heading he included the following items: those symbols, which by custom have become attached to ideas which they represent, such as words and gestures; a discussion of various types of arrangement; and rhetoric or the illustration of discourse. It is obvious from this, that to Bacon, elocution was much broader than the use of voice and body in delivering a speech; and thus, that Bacon's use of the term does not parallel that of the "elocutionists."

The fact remains, however, that both Priestley and Bacon do use the term "elocution" to refer to a significant portion of their respective systems.

E. Summary. In three of the four "parts" of Priestley's system, therefore, certain resemblances to Bacon's theories appear. The most significant similarities occur in connection with the canon of invention, which both writers regard as a matter of "recollection" and for which both recommend a system of topics. The terms "method" and "elocution" also appear in the works of both, although the latter is used with a different signification. Moreover,

they both appear to have a similar belief concerning the function of oratory, to consider audiences as either "learned" or "popular," and to suggest that discourses be suited to these types.

III. Priestley's Connection with Bacon. Much of this study has been concerned with establishing the sources from which Priestley drew the ideas which were molded into his own system of rhetoric. On some occasions, Priestley plainly acknowledges his dependence upon or use of certain theorists; and, in other cases, his sources may be established by internal evidence such as the obvious borrowing of illustrations and observations. In regard to Bacon, however, no such evidence is available; for Priestley neither makes any acknowledgment to Bacon, nor does he obviously borrow from his work.

There are, however, certain indications, in addition to the similarities in doctrine previously mentioned, that Priestley was familiar with Bacon's rhetorical writings, and thus, that his thinking may have been influenced by them.

No well-informed man of the eighteenth century was ignorant of the writings of Sir Francis Bacon, and Priestley's mention of him in places other than his grammars and rhetoric makes it certain that he was acquainted with his works. References to Bacon occur in many of Priestley's books, such as the Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of

Air,[10] the conclusion to Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind,[11] the Essay on Civil Government,[12] the Proper Objects of Education,[13] Miscellaneous Observations on Education,[14] Familiar Introduction to the Study of Electricity,[15] and the Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit.[16] Most of these references concern Bacon as a scientist, but one of the citations, that appearing in the Disquisitions, refers to a statement in Bacon's De Augmentis Scientiarum, the Latin version of the Advancement of Learning, only ten pages from where Bacon begins his discussion of the intellectual arts.[17] This, of course, suggests that Priestley may well have read what Bacon says on the subject of oratory.

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[10]Joseph Priestley, Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air, (London, 1775), I, xv, xvii.

[11]Priestley, Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, p. 370.

[12]Priestley, Memoirs, II, 347.

[13]Joseph Priestley, The Proper Objects of Education in the Present State of the World (2nd ed.; London, 1791), p. 9.

[14]Priestley, Miscellaneous Observations on Education, p. 243.

[15]Joseph Priestley, The History and Present State of Electricity with Original Experiments (4th ed.; London, 1775), pp. 5, 460.

[16]Works of Priestley, III, 167.

[17]Francis Bacon, De Augmentis Scientiarum, IV. 3.

It is also worthy of note that two of the rhetorical works which Priestley specifically mentions make references to Bacon's rhetorical theory: Bayly's Introduction to Languages,[18] and Lawson's Lectures Concerning Oratory.[19]

Even in the absence of any positive evidence supporting Priestley's use of Bacon, considerations such as these make it plausible to conjecture that Bacon may have had some influence on Priestley. As a hypothesis, it may be suggested that at some time in his life Priestley read those passages in the De Augmentis Scientiarum dealing with the intellectual arts and rhetoric, and that these ideas, being compatible with his own views, may have been absorbed into Priestley's own thinking, so that when he produced his system of rhetoric, the Baconian influence was manifested. Therefore, while the details of the connection between Priestley and Bacon must, for the present, remain a matter of conjecture, the similarities of certain of their doctrines is, indeed, striking, and the evidence seems to indicate that at least Priestley was, to some extent, familiar with Bacon's rhetorical works.

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[18]Bayly, Introduction to Language, Preface (n. p.).

[19]Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory, pp. 12, 126-127, 386.

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P 7259